"Rhetoric and Practical Knowledge in Aristotle." 2013. Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought no. 30:185–321.

Guest editor: Eugene Garver-

Eugene Garver: Introduction 185; Eugene Garver: Deliberative Rhetoric and Ethical Deliberation 189; Bryan Garsten: Rhetoric and Human Separateness 210; Daniela Cammack: Aristotle’s Denial of Deliberation About Ends 228; Wendy Olmsted: Ethical Deliberation in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics 251; Ryan K. Balot: Epideictic Rhetoric and the Foundations of Politics 274; David Depew: Why Aristotle says that Artful Rhetoric can happen in only a few Venues — and why we should too 305-321.
Aberdein, Andrew. 2021. "Was Aristotle a virtue argumentation theorist?" In Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity, edited by Bjelde, Joseph Andrew, Merry, David and Roser, Christopher, 215–229. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

"Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) emphasize the roles arguers play in the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, that is, virtues and vices. The inspiration for VTA lies in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics, the latter being a modern revival of Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is also, of course, the father of Western logic and argumentation.

This paper asks to what degree Aristotle may thereby be claimed as a forefather by VTA." (p. 215)
Abizadeh, Arash. 2002. "The Passions of the Wise: Phronêsis, Rhetoric, and Aristotle’s Passionate Practical Deliberation." The Review of Metaphysics no. 56:267–296.

"My intention in this paper is to demonstrate that Aristotle shows how an account of practical reason and deliberation that constructively incorporates the emotions can illuminate key issues about deliberation at the political level. First, I argue that, according to Aristotle, character (ethos) and emotion (pathos) are constitutive features of the process of phronetic practical deliberation: in order to render a determinate action-specific judgment, practical deliberation cannot be simply reduced to logical demonstration (apodeixis). This can be seen, I argue, by uncovering an important structural parallel between the virtue of phronesis and the art of rhetoric. Second, this structural parallel helps to tease out the insights of Aristotle's account of practical deliberation for contemporary democratic theory-in particular, the ethical consequences that follow from the fact that passionate political deliberation and judgment are unavoidable in democracy and are always susceptible to straying from issuing forth properly ethical outcomes." (p. 267)
Adamik, Tamás. 1984. "Aristotle's Theory of the Period." Philologus no. 128:184–201.

"Aristotle expounds his period theory in Chapter 9 of Book 3 of the Rhetoric." (p. 185)

(...)

"To sum up, it appears to me that Aristotle's theory of the period forms a coherent whole, and is in harmony with his conception of style. Discussing rhythm(19), the period and the Gorgianic figures one after the other, he emphasizes that these are in unity, and he uses them to describe two models of text-construction — periods based on parallel and contrast —, which are equally suitable both for eliminating the tediousness of continuous style, and for increasing clarity.

The basic forms of the period are the compound unit of text consisting of two kola and the simple unit of text consisting of one kolon. In regard to size he has only one reservation: the period should not be so long as to become a speech and so to lose its periodic character, and it should not be so short as to become unsuitable for the construction of the divided structure based on parallel or contrast." (p. 193)

(19) A wise summary is given on prose rhythm by H. Drexler, Einführung in die römische Metrik (Darmstadt 1967), 142ff.; and Gnomon 32 (I960), 237—247.

[kolon = "In the theory of rhetoric, which goes back to Thrasymachus (85 A 1 Diels-Kranz), a syntactical unit, such as a main or subordinate clause or a group of words in a sentence, which is usually regarded as part of a period. Aristotle (Rh. 3,9,1409b 17) is clearly of the opinion that two kola form a natural period (although he also recognized the períodos monókōlos)" (Martin L. West, Brill's New Pauly Online]
Adams, Marcus P. 2015. "Demarcating Aristotelian Rhetoric: Rhetoric, the Subalternate Sciences, and Boundary Crossing." Apeiron no. 48:99–122.

Abstract: "The ways in which the Aristotelian sciences are related to each other has been discussed in the literature, with some focus on the subalternate sciences. While it is acknowledged that Aristotle, and Plato as well, was concerned as well with how the arts were related to one another, less attention has been paid to Aristotle’s views on relationships among the arts. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s account of the subalternate sciences helps shed light on how Aristotle saw the art of rhetoric relating to dialectic and politics. Initial motivation for comparing rhetoric with the subalternate sciences is Aristotle’s use of the language of boundary transgression, germane to the Posterior Analytics, when discussing rhetoric’s boundaries, as well as the language of “over” and “under” found in APo. First, I discuss three passages in Rhetoric Book I and argue that Garver’s (1988) account cannot be correct. Second, I look to the subalternate sciences, especially focusing on optics and the distinction between “unqualified” optics and mathematical optics. Third, I discuss rhetoric’s dependence on both dialectic and politics."

References

Garver, Eugene. 1988. “Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Unintentionally Hitting the Principles of the Sciences.” Rhetorica 6.4: 381–393.
Allard-Nelson, Susan K. 2001. "Virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical Capacity." Philosophy & Rhetoric no. 34:245–259.

"It has been argued that Aristotle's description of excellence {aretë) as a capacity (dynamis) in Rhetoric 1.9 is inconsistent with his treatment of excellence in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, where he specifically argues that arete is not a dynamis, but a hexis (i.e., a state or condition).(1)." (p. 245)

(...)

"Based on an understanding of this apparent inconsistency in terminology as intentional on Aristotle's part, I intend to argue here that Aristotle's identification of arete with dynamis in Rhetoric can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been an identification of arete with hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretê as a dynamis in the Rhetoric and as a hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics(3), Aristotle can be defended against the charge of inconsistency.

To this end, then, I begin by examining the implications of defining rhetoric as an art (technê) that has persuasion (pistis) as its end (telos) and function (ergon)." (p. 246)

(1) For a discussion of the problem, see Grimaldi (1980), 194-95; in a wider context, Garver (1989), 7-28; in a related context, Mirhady (1995), 405-9.

(3) Hereinafter, the Nicomachean Ethics will be abbreviated EN.

References

Garver, Eugene. 1989. "Aristotle's Metaphysics of Morals." Journal of the History of Philosophy. 27.1: 7-28.

Grimaldi, William M. A. 1980. Aristotle, "Rhetoric" I: A Commentary. New York: Fordham University Press.

Mirhady, David C. 1995. "A Note on Aristotle "Rhetoric" 1.3 1358b5-6." Philosophy and Rhetoric, 28.4: 405-9.
Allen, James. 2007. "Aristotle on the Disciplines of Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Analytic." Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric no. 25:87–108.

Abstract: "According to an argument made by other authors, analytic —the formal logical theory of the categorical syllogism expounded in the Prior Analytics—is a relatively late development in Aristotle’s thinking about argument. As a general theory of validity, it served as the master discipline of argument in Aristotle’s mature thought about the subject. The object of this paper is to explore his early conception of the relations between the argumentative disciplines.

Its principal thesis, based chiefly on evidence about the relation between dialectic and rhetoric, is that before the advent of analytic dialectic played a double role. It was both the art or discipline of one practice of argumentation and the master discipline of argument to which other disciplines turned for their understanding of the fundamentals of argument."
Anderson, Floyd Douglas. 1968. "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean and its Relationship to Rhetoric." The Southern Speech Journal no. 34:100–107.

"Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, a fundamental tenet of his system of ethics, also permeates his treatment of rhetorical theory. The doctrine underlies several of the principles discussed in Rhetoric. Although the relationship of this doctrine to Aristotle's conception of rhetoric has previously been noted,(1) it has never been fully described, nor has its application to specific principles of rhetorical theory been enumerated. My purpose in this essay is to do both. I shall first describe the doctrine and shall then outline its relationship to Aristotle's conception of rhetoric as an "art" and to his treatments of invention, stylistic clarity and appropriateness, metaphor, and arrangement." (p. 100)
Arnhart, Larry. 1981. Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary of the 'Rhetoric'. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

"How Aristotle uses his theory of the enthymeme to differentiate rhetoric from both science and sophistry becomes clearer in the light of four tripartite distinctions. 1) Persuasion, which is the aim of the enthymeme, differs both from instruction and from compulsion. 2) Opinion, which provides premises for the enthymeme, does not conform to absolute truth; but neither is it absolute falsehood. 3) The probability characteristic of most enthymematic inferences falls somewhere between necessity and mere randomness, or chance. 4) And finally, the enthymeme itself differs from a strict demonstration but without being a sophistical fallacy.

Each of these points requires further comments. In what follows, the intention is to state in general the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric that will be substantiated in detail through the subsequent commentary on the text of the Rhetoric." (pp. 4-5)

(...)

"The fundamental principle of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric, I have argued, is that rhetoric is a genuine form of reasoning. He distinguishes rhetoric from science and philosophy by showing that rhetorical argument lacks the exactness and certitude of philosophic and scientific demonstration. But he also distinguishes rhetoric from sophistry by showing that rhetoric aims at truth.

The logical instrument of rhetorical reasoning is the enthymeme. I have maintained that Aristotle views the enthymeme as encompassing all the major elements of rhetorical persuasion (including the presentation of the speaker’s character and the control of the audience’s passions).

I have also contended that Aristotle regards the enthymeme as a genuine syllogism that is both materially and formally valid." (p. 183)
Arvanitis, Alexios, and Karampatzos, Antonis. 2011. "Negotiation and Aristotle's Rhetoric: Truth over interests?" Philosophical Psychology no. 24:845–860.

Abstract: "Negotiation research primarily focuses on negotiators’ interests in order to understand negotiation and offer advice about the prospective outcome. Win-win outcomes, i.e., outcomes that serve the interests of all negotiating parties, have been established and promoted as the ultimate goal for any negotiation situation. We offer a perspective that draws on Aristotle’s philosophical program and discuss how the outcome is not defined by the parties’ interests, but by the intersubjective validity of claims, which can essentially be treated as representative of the ‘‘truth"."
Atwill, Janet M. 1993. "Instituting the Art of Rhetoric: Theory, Practice, and Productive Knowledge in Interpretations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric." In Rethinking to History of Rhetoric: Multidisciplinary Essays on the Rhetorical Tradition, edited by Poulakos, Takis, 91–117. Boulder: Westview Press.

"It is my purpose here to focus on the operation of one particular disciplinary strategy, the theory/practice binary, in two interpretations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: the work of the nineteenth-century commentator Edward Meredith Cope, and his twentieth-century counterpart, William S.J. Grimaldi. Both scholars wrote introductions to and commentaries on the Rhetoric, and both use the theory/practice opposition to define rhetoric’s “object” of study and secure its disciplinary identity. Cope, on the one hand, argues that rhetoric is a “practical art,” whereas Grimaldi, on the other, contends that rhetoric is theoretical, or philosophical, knowledge.

Though each defines the theory/practice opposition differently, their use of the binary illustrates its role in the institutionalization of epistemological foundationalism." (p. 92)

(...)

"In the end, what is at stake for Cope and Grimaldi is securing a disciplinary space for rhetoric; but in order to institute rhetoric as a formal discipline, both must transform it. In particular, they must extricate rhetoric from the epistemological model of productive knowledge and refashion it according to the specifications of the foundationalist paradigm. As we have seen, this reconstruction may yield rhetoric as science, philosophy, or ethics. What it does not yield is the model of productive knowledge outlined in the Aristotle corpus. It is clear that the epistemological paradigm of productive knowledge was eclipsed by the foundationalist/philosophical model of knowledge. But the “reinvention” of the productive paradigm may serve two useful functions for those who would either observe or institute rhetoric in our own cultural and historical context.

First, productive knowledge may serve as a heuristic for exploring what was left on the cutting floor of epistemological foundationalism. It is this “use” of productive knowledge as a means of critique that I have appropriated in my discussion of Cope and Grimaldi.

(...)

"I would suggest lies a second function for the reinvention of the productive paradigm. Productive knowledge never attempts to overcome the contingencies of time and circumstance, nor does it attempt to effect the breach between objects and value upon which the foundationalist paradigm is precipitously constructed. Indeed, in abnegating the task of defining autonomous objects of knowledge—particularly any task that attempts to make a distinction between object and value—the productive paradigm, as an inventional model of knowledge, would focus attention on the practices by which we invent both exemplary texts and exemplary interpreters. More important, such a model would refuse to base its cultural authority on its ability either to define impenetrable processes of nature or to reflect immutable structures of reality and truth." (pp. 112-113)
———. 1998. Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

"My purpose in this book is to set the ancient logõn technē tradition against the normalizing tendencies of the Western humanist tradition of the liberal arts. As I interpret it, this ancient rhetorical tradition was far more concerned with challenging and recalculating standards of value than with protecting a specific set of values from the forces of time and circumstance. My sources for this portrait of technē include Western medical, technical, and rhetorical treatises and mythical accounts, particularly the Prometheus narratives depicted by Hesiod, Aeschylus, Protagoras, and Isocrates. These accounts are examined in most detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4." (p. 2)

(...)

"Although Aristotle outlined a very specific model of subjectivity in his concept of eudaimonia, he also maintained that this subject was the product of a distinct set of class relations. In no way did eudaimonia serve as a general model of either the knowing subject or the citizen of the polis. Aristotle directly asserts that this hexis will be attained only by the philosopher; in other words, only philosophers win the ambiguous title of "subject." That "subject" is defined primarily in terms of knowledge, and it is depicted as solitary and self-possessed.

Perhaps it is even "self" conceived as "possession."

In sum, while it may seem strange to praise rhetoric for failing either to consist of the highest knowledge or to be driven by the end of the "good life," Aristotle's greatest contribution to rhetoric may have been his willingness to allow it these two failures. In this chapter I explore Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge, his concept of eudaimonia, and his views of rhetoric and philosophy as they contrast with those of Isocrates." (pp. 163-164)
Atwill, Janet M., and Lauer, Janice. 1995. "Refiguring Rhetoric: Aristotle's Concept of Techne." In Discourse Studies in Honor of James L. Kinneavy, edited by Gabin, Rosalind J., 25–40. Potomac: Scripta Humanistica.

"The following discussion explores the means by which Anistotle's characterization of rhetoric as an art has been eclipsed by the theory/practice binary in three dominant rhetorical traditions: philosophical rhetoric, the practical handbook tradition, and the tradition of the statesman/orator. Though these traditions take many diverse forms, we shall focus briefly on one example of each that appropriates Aristotle in its interpretation of rhetoric. Finally, Pierre Bourdieu's critique of the theory/practice opposition will be used to outline a reevaluation of rhetoric as a productive art. The purpose of this examination is not to impose a rigorous taxonomy on the many varieties of rhetoric but to use heuristically a taxonomy already in play to mark out new possibilities for rhetoric's disciplinary identity." (p. 26)

(...)

"Techne does not represent unchanging laws or immutable truths, nor is it entirely tacit, the gift of genius or a mysterious set of inherited powers: it is explicit and teachable even as it calls into question what it makes explicit and what it teaches. Radically democratic, techne is the knowledge of those social practices that characterize the acts of insiders.

Fated neither only to reproduce relations of power, nor only to reveal points of indeterminacy in those relations, techne enables cultural critique and becomes the means by which new social possibilities are invented." (pp. 37-38)
Balaban, Oded. 1986. "Aristotle's Theory of πρᾶξις." Hermes no. 114:163–172.

"According to the philosophy of Aristotle, two distinct kinds of activity can be discerned: Praxis (πρᾶξις) and Poesis (ποίησις). The first one is an end, the second is subordinated to an end. The concept of πρᾶξις, has not been sufficiently studied, perhaps due to a change in prevailing values, or the need to oppose Aristotelian teleology by the mechanism of Modern Science, or possibly because of Aristotle's vacillation. This paper defines the concept of πρᾶξις by differentiating it from the concept of ποίησις. We interpret the concept of πρᾶξις as being the precursor of the concept of energy in Modern Physics, where energy (ἐνέργεια) means the conservation of power (potentiality - δύναμις) and not it's destruction." (p. 163)
Balla, Chloe. 2003. "Aristotle versus Plato on studying the emotions." In On Aristotle's Poetics and the Art of Rhetoric, edited by Koutras, Demetrios N., 16–25. Athens: Society for Aristotelian studies "The Lyceum".

"Scholars have often assumed that in his Rhetoric Aristotle by and large expands on the arguments of Plato's Phaedrus. One of the most striking similarities between the Phaedrus and the Rhetoric is the attention each work pays to the study of the emotions." (p. 16)

(...)

"Does our evidence allow us to infer some connection between Aristotle's treatment of particular emotions and discussions then current in the Academy? To what extent is Plato's Philebus an appropriate source for such evidence(4)? The question I propose to raise is whether Plato and Aristotle share a common understanding of the role to be assigned, if any, to the theoretical study of the emotions within an art of rhetoric.

My answer in each case will point to the further question, whether the emotions are in themselves susceptible of systematic study." (p. 17)

(4) See D. Frede, «Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's Rhetoric», in A. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1996, pp. 258-285.
———. 2004. "Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle on Rhetoric." Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science no. 1:45–71.

Abstract: "Scholars often regard the 4th century controversy on education as a rivalry between philosophy, which is represented by Plato and Aristotle, and rhetoric, which is represented most prominently by Isocrates. The problem with this view is that it presupposes a distinction between philosophy and rhetoric which seems to be the product rather than the cause of the controversy. In this paper I discuss certain aspects of Isocrates’ thought which allow us to place him in the beginning of a tradition which only later would be recognized as empiricist. Both Plato and Aristotle oppose Isocrates, but their arguments develop in different directions. I argue that Aristotle, who is influenced by Isocrates, provides him with the normative context rhetoric needs in order to qualify as an art. This, however, does not imply that Aristotle subscribes to empiricism. Following Plato, he postulates a realm of real essences grasped by reason which, in Aristotle’s case, ultimately accounts for his view that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic. By contrast, Plato bans rhetoric completely from the state, handing over the task of persuasion to the philosopher or the ideal legislator."
———. 2007. "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetorical Empiricism." Rhetorica no. 25:73–85.

Abstract: "Current interpretations of early Greek rhetoric often rely on a distinction between the empirical stage of rhetoric (associated with the sophists) and the theory of rhetoric which was invented by the philosophers Plato and Aristotle. But insofar as the distinction between experience and theory is itself a product of philosophical criticism and reflects the philosophical priorities of the authors who introduced it, its application in the interpretation of pre-Platonic rhetoric is anachronistic. By examining the contexts in which Plato's and Aristotle's arguments are cast, I propose to show the ways in which their accounts distort our picture of their predecessors."
———. 2013. "Plato's criticism of empiricism in the Gorgias and in the Phaedrus." In Plato, Poet and Philosopher: In Memory of Ioannis N. Theodoracopoulos: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Philosophy, Magoula, Sparta, 26-29 May 2011, edited by Sinou, Christina, Moutsopoulos, E. and Protopapas-Marneli, M., 137–152. Athens: Academy of Athens. Research Center on Greek Philosophy.

Abstract: "Plato’s account of empirical knowledge is often presented in the context of his discussion of rhetoric. Rhetoric is seen as an artificer of persuasion, as a technique that provides us with the tools by which we can convey any message, regardless of its content. The Gorgias presents the orator as a demagogue, a person who uses flattery, in order to secure his audience’s support, and describes this procedure as empirical: lacking knowledge of the subject-matter, the orator confines himself to a superficial calculation of the desires of his addressees. Based on a rather negative account of Athenian democracy, Plato is unwilling to envisage an orator who, like Pericles in Thucydides, would exploit his rhetorical skills in the interest of the good. But what would have happened if Socrates or his interlocutor Polus had used instead of rhetoric the case of medicine? To suggest that the empiric doctor takes into account what looks pleasing to his patients is of course absurd; and this may be the reason why when, in the course of his more positive treatment of empiricism, in the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the example of a physician who can be a successful healer on the basis of mere experience. Drawing on the use of the medical analogy in the Phaedrus and the Laws, this paper examines the reasons that Plato is prepared to provide in order to resist Aristotle’s more favourable account of empeiria as a source of knowledge."
Ballacci, Giuseppe. 2017. Political Theory Between Philosophy and Rhetoric: Politics as Transcendence and Contingency. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 2: Between Philosophy and Rhetoric: Plato and Aristotle, 13-50.

"My analysis of Plato and Aristotle’s conceptions of rhetoric will be presented in Chap. 2, while that of Cicero and Quintilian will be found in Chap. 3. Chapter 2 starts with a brief historical reconstruction of the quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric in ancient Greece. After that I take in consideration, first, Plato’s famous critique of rhetoric and, then, move on to Aristotle to discuss his theory of rhetoric as the first systematization of the art of speaking. Plato’s critique of rhetoric testifies to the relevance of the pole of transcendence in politics. It is an attack made in the name of an ethical and political necessity to transcend conventions by pursuing absolute knowledge. Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric, on the other hand, offers the first systematic defence of the art by way of a revaluation of contingency as the specific realm of human affairs. In his view rhetoric represents one of the most important forms of the kind of reason proper to this realm: practical reason. Chapter 2 might be considered an introductory chapter. Its main function in the general argument of the book is to demonstrate how the dimensions of transcendence and contingency correspond to philosophy and rhetoric." (p. 4)
Barnes, Jonathan. 1995. "Rhetoric and Poetics." In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, 259–285. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Modem philosophy does not greatly occupy itself with rhetoric. Ancient philosophy did: philosophy was sometimes hostile and sometimes friendly, but it never ignored rhetoric. Indeed, one of the questions

which preoccupied philosophers was precisely the question of what attitude philosophy should take to rhetoric.

The question standardly took this form: Is rhetoric an art, a techne? The task of oratory, it was universally supposed, is to persuade; and good orators have the capacity to persuade by their speeches. The object of rhetoric was to study and to teach this capacity, and rhetoric is an art only insofar as it can achieve its object by intellectually respectable means. In particular, an art is a body of knowledge, practical in aim but systematic in organization, in which particular theorems and precepts are shown to follow from a relatively small set of fundamental truths. (An art is to practice what a science is to theory; and the conception of an art which I have just sketched bears an evident relation to the concept of a demonstrative science.') If rhetoric is an art, then it is in principle the sort of thing which a philosopher might study." (p. 159)
Barr, Timothy. 2021. "A Rule That Bends: Aristotle on Pathos and Equity." Philosophy & Rhetoric no. 54:149–170.

Abstract: "Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that leading judges into passions is like warping a rule or kanon before using it. Rather than seeing this as an exclusion of emotion from rhetoric, I argue that the ability for the pathe to bend judgment has its appropriate use in achieving equity. The pathe are themselves a kanon, resembling the soft, leaden rule used by Lesbian masons, referred to in his discussion of equity in the Nicomachean Ethics. In problematic cases, the rigidity of law requires the correction of a judge’s pathetic capacity. I then read Lysias’s Against Simon, a speech given under strict relevancy requirements, to show how the pathe are used in the narration of the accused party in seeking an equitable judgment. I conclude with how such a view may inform contemporary rhetorical inquiry on the emotions."
Becker, Marcel. 2013. "Aristotelian Ethics and Aristotelian Rhetoric." In Aristotle and The Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, edited by Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth and Coelho, Nuno M.M.S., 109–122. Dordrecht: Springer.

"We will ask two questions:

– Does Art of Rhetoric bear in it an orientation towards the good life, as described in the Ethics?

– Is there something rhetorical in the way Aristotle presents his arguments in the Ethics?

This paper is driven by the conviction that an answer to these questions requires that we do justice to the Aristotelian framework of practical philosophy, to which also Politics belongs. A problem is that in the rehabilitation of Aristotelian practical philosophy the unity of his framework is disguised by the fact that the Nicomachean Ethics has by far received the most interest, and is often treated as a separate work.

This, however, cannot be justified. In the opening chapters of the Ethics Aristotle announces that he is starting a new discipline, political science ( EN 1094a30 hê politikè) , that has as its object eudaimonia. His first step is an investigation into the ‘ethical’ part of political science: a treatise on virtue. It is important for the statesman to have knowledge about the human soul and virtue ( EN 1102a7 and 1102a19 ).

At the end of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle announces the second part of his program, the ‘political’ part in the narrow sense of the word. The transition from Ethics to Politics is completed when Aristotle describes, in the opening chapters of the Politics, that a human being is a political animal by nature. Aristotle also explicitly states that Art of Rhetoric is embedded in his project of practical philosophy: Rhetoric is the ‘paraphues’ (‘loot’/ ‘offshoot/appendage’) of political science ( Rhet. 1356a20–21). However, there is no transitional chapter from Ethics or Politics to Art of Rhetoric. The place of the book in the system is not clear." (p. 110)
Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron. 2003. "Aristotle on emotions towards the fortune of others." In Envy, Spite and Jealousy: Competitive emotions and thumos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, edited by Konstan, David and Rutter, N. Keith, 99–121. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

"I have suggested elsewhere dividing emotions into three groups, which refer to: (1) the fortunes of agents, (2) the actions of agents, and (3) the agent as a whole. Each group can be further divided into emotions directed at other agents and at oneself. These groups express three basic patterns involved in evaluating agents: (1) the desirability of the agent’s situation; (2) the praiseworthiness of the agent’s specific actions; (3) the appealingness of the agent.(1)

In this chapter, I discuss those emotions in the first group that pertain to the fortune of others. The major emotions in this subgroup are envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, pleasure-in-others’-misfortune, happy-for and admiration." (p. 99)

(1) See Ben-Ze’ev 2000: ch. 4; see also Ortony, Clore and Collings 1988.

References

Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2000), The Subtlety of Emotions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ortony, A., Clore, G. L. and Collings, A. (1988), The Cognitive Structure of Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Benoit, William L. 1980. "Aristotle's Example: The Rhetorical Induction." Quarterly Journal of Speech no. 66:182–192.

Abstract: "The example is an important part of Aristotle's inventional theory, for everyone who persuades through proof uses “either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way” (Rhetoric, 1356b5–7). This essay rejects claims that the example reasons from part to part, without a mediating generalization, and then explicates Aristotle's view of the example."
———. 1982. "The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's Rhetoric." Rhetoric Society Quarterly no. 12:2–9.

"Aristotle's Rhetoric has played a long and distinguished role in the history of rhetoric as one of the earliest systematic investigations into the nature of the art of persuasion. While in some eras it may have suffered undeserved neglect,(1) the importance of this treatise cannot be disputed. The task of further illuminating a document which has received the scrutiny accorded the Rhetoric over the centuries(2) is not one to be undertaken lightly. After establishing criteria for assessing the importance of an idea, a passage will be selected as the most significant one of this work on the basis of those criteria." (p. 2)

(...)

"Summary

Aristotle's testimony, as well as that of rhetorical scholars, establishes that his discussion of enthymeme and example as the logical forms of persuasion was original. He considered it to be an important idea, the most effective means of persuasion. Internal evidence reveals that it was an integral part of the Rhetoric (Books I and II). External evidence demonstrates that it was an influential concept. Ample rationale exists, on the basis of these four convergent criteria, for the claim that the passage at 1356bl-7 is the most significant in Aristotle's Rhetoric." (p. 9)

(1) See, e.g., James J. Murphy, "Aristotle's Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 52 (April 1966): 109-15.

(2) See, e.g., Keith V. Erickson, Aristotle's Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1975).
———. 1983. "Systems of Explanation: Aristotle and Burke on 'Cause'." Rhetoric Society Quarterly no. 13:41–57.

"This essay will explicate and contrast the systems of explanation developed by two of the most influential rhetorical theorists -- Aristotle's four causes, and Kenneth Burke's pentad. Both of these methodological tools have been subject to rhetorical scholarship recently, although only a few writers have attempted to compare these two important concepts despite Burke's own suggestion of an interrelationship between them. (3) In order to illuminate these systems of explanation, the importance of the concept of cause to communication will be briefly sketched, then Aristotle's system of the four causes will be explicated, third Burke's pentad will be discussed, and then Burke's discussions of these two systems of explanation will be considered. Finally, Burke's conclusions concerning the relationship of these two systems will be challenged in a fresh and more thorough comparison of Aristotle's four causes and Burke's pentad." (p. 41, two notes omitted)

(3) Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), esp. pp. 227-229, 276.
———. 1987. "On Aristotle's Example." Philosophy & Rhetoric no. 20:261–267.

"Aristotle déclares in two separate passages that the example is reasoning from "part to part" {Prior Analytics, 69al4-15; Rhetoric, 1357b28-29), but while he contrasts it with reasoning from part to whole, whole to

part, and whole to whole, nowhere does he explicitly rule out the possibility that his phrase "part to part" could be shorthand for "part to whole to part." Hence, it is conceivable that the whole (or universal or generalization) is typically implicit, consistent with his treatment of enthymeme.(3) Herein lies the fundamental controversy: Is Aristotle's conception of example {παράδειγμα, paradeigma) mediated by a generalization?" (p. 261)

(3) See, for example, Lloyd F. Bitzer's discussion in "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," Quarterly Journal of Speech 45 (1959): 408.
———. 1990. "Isocrates and Aristotle on rhetoric." Rhetoric Society Quarterly no. 20:251–259.

"While the relationship of Plato and Aristotle has been investigated (Hunt, 1920), as has that of Isocrates and Plato (Coulter, 1967; Howland, 1937; Perkins, 1984; De Vries, 1953, 1971), there is no adequate systematic attempt to compare and contrast the views of Isocrates and Aristotle on rhetoric.

Although it is important to note important concepts developed by one but not the other, this sort of undertaking entails risks.

(...)

Hence, the absence of a topic from the surviving corpus of either of these rhetoricians is insufficient evidence for concluding that they failed to discuss it. It is therefore far safer to focus on topics and concepts addressed in the surviving works of each. While this approach of necessity offers only a partial picture of their differences, the picture that is generated should be a generally accurate one.

Of course, other potential sources of inaccuracy remain. For example, there is the possibility their discussion of a topic in a surviving work is not their last word: they may have changed their mind or refined a topic in a later work which does not survive. Similarly, the fact that we have a textbook for Aristotle but only speeches (or pamphlets) for Isocrates makes certain distortions inevitable. Nevertheless, limiting this exploration to concepts treated in the surviving works of each rhetorician is a conservative, though reasonable, approach, as long as we remain cognizant of its limitations.

Specifically, this essay will address their views on the nature of rhetoric, on the relationship of rhetoric and knowledge, criticisms of previous rhetoricians, and sources of proof. However, a brief description of these two important figures in classical rhetoric provides a context for situating the analysis which follows." (p. 252)

References

Coulter, J. A. (1967). Phaedrus 279A: The praise of Isocrates. Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, 8, 225-36.

De Vries, G. J. (1953). Isocrates reaction to the Phaedrus. Mnemosyne, 6, 39-45.

DeVries, G. J. (1971). Isocrates in the Phaedrus: A reply. Mnemosyne, 24, 387-90.

Howland, R. L. (1937). The attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus. Classical Quarterly, 57, 5-59.

Hunt, E. V. (1920). Plato and Aristotle on rhetoric and rhetoricians. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 6, 35-56.

Perkins, T. M. (1984). Isocrates and Plato: Relativism vs. idealism. Southern Speech Communication Journal, 50, 49-66.
Berlin, James A. 1992. "Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Context: Interpreting Historically." In A Rhetoric of Doing: Essays on Written Discourse in Honor of James L. Kinneavy, edited by White, Stephen P., Nakadate, Neil and Cherry, Roger D., 55–64. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.

"My argument is that looking at the Rhetoric in relation to the material and social conditions of its own day will lead to new interpretations that enhance—not diminish—its value to us. In addition, historical treatments of this important text will warn us against hastily appropriating its name in the service of projects that it only partially endorses or perhaps cannot be made to endorse at all. James Kinneavy has led the way in undertaking this sort of operation, pointing to Aristotle’s system as a whole in order to remind us that certain readings of the Rhetoric are simply improbable, if not necessarily impossible. (This approach is most notable in Kinneavy’s brilliant critique of Grimaldi.) The Rhetoric will continue to inspire workers in rhetorical studies, offering suggestions for possibilities not yet explored. These suggestions are to be welcomed. Realizing the historical conditions of the text’s production, however, will caution against offering them in the name of the one, true Aristotle.

While rhetoricians of many contrary stripes will continue to profit from Aristotle as the inspiration of their projects—the present writer included—all should be chary of claiming exclusive right to its endorsement. After all, the conditions of Greece in the fourth century B.C. are not the conditions of the United States in the twentieth, and as my analysis has attempted to indicate, there is no reason to wish that it were otherwise: the Golden Age of Greece is not altogether untarnished." (p. 64)
Black, Deborah L. 1990. Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy. Leiden: Brill.

Chapter IV. The Epistemological Domain of Rhetoric, 103; Chapter V, 138-179.

"In the present chapter, we will begin our consideration of the place of rhetoric within the context theory, focusing on the underlying epistemological aims that come to be associated with rhetorical argument in the Arabic tradition.

Despite the vestiges of the Alexandrian modal and truth-value schemes that remain scattered throughout Arabic philosophical writings, the predominant means of characterizing the logical arts is to isolate their peculiar epistemological goals. And this, for the Arabic philosophers, is primarily a matter of discerning the characteristic type of assent that various logical methods evoke. In making epistemological distinctions, however, the role played by the object of knowledge in specifying the act of cognition cannot be ignored, and thus the Arabic tradition also devotes considerable attention to determining the nature of the objects with which rhetoric is best suited to deal. The interplay of these two ways of determining the epistemological domain of rhetoric makes for considerable complexity in the Arabic accounts of rhetoric, and raises some fundamental questions regarding the relative importance of subjective and objective considerations in the working out of the context theory as a whole." (p. 103)

(...)

"Our examination of the epistemological domain of rhetoric in the previous chapter emphasized the close ties between rhetoric and dialectic, and often left undetermined the characteristics that bestowed upon rhetoric the status of a distinct syllogistic art. In this chapter we will attempt to determine more precisely those unique features of rhetorical argumentation which, in the eyes of the Islamic philosophers, necessitated the logical independence of rhetoric from dialectic. We will follow the lead of the Islamic philosophers in approaching this topic, considering first the material properties of rhetoric, i.e. the nature and source of rhetorical premises, the kind of assent they evoke in the knower, and their characterization in modal terms. Then we will consider the logical features of rhetoric from a more formal perspective, through an analysis of the structures of the enthymeme and the example, the properly rhetorical forms of syllogistic and induction." (p. 138)
Blank, David L. . 2007. " Aristotle’s «Academic Course on Rhetoric» and the end of Philodemus, On Rhetoric VIII 5-47." Cronache Ercolanesi no. 37:5–47.

"Studies of Aristotle's early life and work have ascribed some importance to sparse ancient accounts that the philosopher at a certain point in his career began to lecture on rhetoric. While the existence in our corpus Aristotelicum of the three books On Rhetoric perhaps indicates that Aristotle did indeed lecture on that subject, it is far from clear whether the ancient accounts of his rhetoric lectures have any relation to an

historical reality, or what that reality might have been. A passage of Philodemus has been taken together with these accounts in support of the thesis that Aristotle's career began with a 'course of lectures' held in the Academy in the early 350's B.C. A new look at the Philodemus text and its interpretation will, I think, cast doubt on any contribution this passage has appeared to make to the story of a lecture course on rhetoric in the Academy. As the other sources we have also do not give clear support to this story, it should be viewed with scepticism by scholars of Aristotle's early work. Insofar as these passages are taken to refer to lectures, they are not clearly to be located in the Academy. How- ever, they may be based on a literary episode, one deriving from a written work of Aristotle's, such as the Protrepticus, in which case they may still be referred to his first stay in Athens." (pp. 5-6, a note omitted)
Blettner, Elizabeth. 1983. "One Made Many and Many Made One: The Role of Asyndeton in Aristotle's Rhetoric." Philosophy & Rhetoric no. 16:49–54.

"The art of delivery appears. then. to attain its end solely through its persuasive imitation of the passions.

Aristotle poses a striking alteration of this art. in order to moved the hearer in an altered way. Such a transformation is suggested by the philosopher's discussion of the figure asyndeton.

Although asyndeta seem inappropriate in written speech, in public debate rhetoricians rightly employ them, for they require delivery.

Their various elements may aptly serve as vehicles for dramatic variation. Thus the asyndeton, "l came, I met. I entreated," must be delivered: "one should not speak with the same tone and character. as if saying only one thing" (Rhetoric 1413b 29-31)." ) (p. 51)
Bloomquist, Gregory. 2020. "Aristotle as critic of Plato Rhetoric? Some conclusions, questions and implications." Science et Esprit no. 72:49–71.

Summary: "Plato is often understood to be merely an outspoken critic of rhetoric and Aristotle a systematizer of rhetoric. The reality is more complex. Plato’s criticism is not of rhetoric per se but of a particular (Sophistic) kind of rhetoric; his work actually evidences a keen desire to enshrine a true rhetoric, one that will enable instruction in truth to happen. Nor is Aristotle a critic of Plato; rather, Aristotle provides a systematic approach to political discourse and human language as it is in practice. Aristotle thus establishes both the foundations for analysis of democratic political discourse and the analytical groundwork for the much later analysis of “ordinary language.””
Bolonyai, Gábor. 2005. "Aristotle on Sentence Types and Forms of Speech." Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 45:143–152.

Summary:" According to Hermeneutics ch. 4, the analysis of non-assertive sentences such as wishes, commands, etc. belongs to rhetoric or poetics. They are, however, examined neither in the Rhetoric, nor in the Poetics, where in ch. 20 their treatment is explicitly excluded from the art of poetry and referred to that of delivery or performance. In this paper an explanation is given for this discrepancy, based on an interpretation of Aristotle’s rejection of Protagoras’ criticism of Homer."
Bosley, Richard. 1995. "Aristotle's Use of the Theory of the Mean: How Adaptable and Flexible is the Theory?" Apeiron no. 28:35–66.

"Classical Greek contains a number of different words for the Mean: kairos, meson, metron/metrion, and ison, for example. These words are found in a number of different authors, at different times, and in different genres; the different uses of the terms embody different presuppositions about ethical judgment. We may accordingly treat uses of these terms as embodying theories of the Mean. Further, upon the basis of comparative studies of the doctrine of the Mean in ancient Chinese and in ancient Greek thought I assume that different doctrines of the Mean are possible.

Aristotle develops and uses one possible version; Aristotle's is important because in central ways it abandons the excessive rigidity to be found in some of its predecessors. Of course, the notion of 'theory of the Mean' should not be overdone. In writers earlier than Aristotle a 'theory' is largely implicit.

Aristotle uses a theory of the Mean in giving structure and content not only to ethical but also to physical and psychological inquiries. Since Aristotle has flexible ways of dealing with distinct kinds of subject-matter, and since his theory of the Mean is integrated into ways of dealing with subjects as distinct as physics is from either psychology or ethics, it is reasonable to expect Aristotle both to adapt the theory to the subject matter at hand and to do so with some flexibility. The principal question of this paper is whether this is so." (pp. 35-36, anote omitted)
Braet, Antoine C. 1992. "Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Re-Examination." Argumentation no. 6:307–320.

Abstract: "In Aristotle's Rhetoric, logos must be conceived as enthymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn't relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker or (reasons for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation - with a good procedure and rational judges - logos dominates and in the real situation of Aristotle's time - with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges - ethos and pathos prevail."
———. 1999. "Aristotle's Almost Unnoticed Contribution to the Doctrine of Stasis." Mnemosyne no. 52:408–433.

"It is universally accepted that Aristotle's Rhetoric contains numerous examples of what have later come to be known as 'staseis', the basic issues of a case. These places have been more or less adequately surveyed in the literature, and interpreted in terms of the later Hermagorean staseis." (p. 408)

(...)

"The result of this investigation into the influence which Aristotle's views on the staseis had on Hermagoras and Cicero is as follows.

Aristotle's most characteristic contribution to the doctrine of stasis, the discussion in Rhetoric 1.1.3, has not only been underestimated in modern research, it is entirely lacking in Hermagoras and Cicero.

These two authors built largely on the attempts to formulate a doctrine of stasis in the handbook tradition, as first seen in Ad Alexandrum and Book 3 of the Rhetoric. We can identify only one possible major specific Aristotelian idea on the staseis-the notion that these occur in all three types of speech-and then only in Cicero and only indirectly. (In other cases as well, not only the casual treatment of the staseis in the Rhetoric, but also the fact that the knowledge of this work was indirect is a possible explanation for the small influence of Aristotle's views on the staseis.(53)" (p. 433)

(53) Quintilian's mention of quantity as a stasis in the Rhetoric, for instance, is probably also based on indirect knowledge (cf.J. Adamietz, M.F Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae liber Ill, mit einem Kommentar herausgegeben (Miinchen 1966), 10 and 134).
———. 2005. "The Common Topic in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Precursor of the Argumentation Scheme." Argumentation no. 19:65–83.

Abstract: "In the present article I attribute to the common topic in the Rhetoric a twofold suggestive function and a guarantee function. These three functions are possible because this type of topic, while often quite abstract, nevertheless contains thoughtsteering, substantial terms, and formulates a generally empirical or normative endoxon.

Assuming that according to Aristotle an enthymeme has at least two premises, it would appear that a common topic is the abstract principle behind the often implicit major premise. This means that the topic may be regarded as the – generalizing – if-then statement in a modern argumentation scheme. Therefore it should be possible to see the enthymemes of Rhetoric 2.23 as a combination of a logical argument form (which can usually be reconstructed as modus ponens) and an argumentation scheme – even though we may not attribute this idea to Aristotle himself."
Brake, Robert J. 1971. "Aristotle on pleasure." The Southern Speech Journal no. 36:324–332.

Abstract: "Aristotle's concept of pleasure permeates the Rhetoric. This article examines the concept as treated in Nichomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric, and suggests its relationship to the types and ends of oratory and the emotions. Especially important is the relationship between pleasure and forensic oratory."
Brandes, Paul Dickerson. 1961. "Evidence in Aristotle's Rhetoric." Speech Monographs no. 26:21–28.

Abstract: "Early in Book I Aristotle divides all proofs into two types, ατεχνōι πίσεις and εντεχνōι πίσεις. This paper defends the position that ατεχνōι πίσεις may best be translated as “evidence,” and points to possible explanations of why this translation has not been made. Two passages from Chapter 15 of Book I, which reflect upon the relationship between the two types of proofs, are discussed. It is concluded that the position of ατεχνōι πίσεις in Aristotle's Rhetoric is not intended to de‐emphasize the position of evidence or to confine its use to forensic speaking."
———. 1968. "The Composition and Preservation of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Speech Monographs no. 35:482–491.

"There can be little doubt that twentieth-century scholarship concerning oral communication refers more to the Rhetoric of Aristotle than to any other single :source. Concepts and theoretical formulations derived from this work have formed the basis for an incalculable amount of experimental and critical research in speech. The study of the Rhetoric has, sporadically, stimulated literary critics of both prose and poetry to probe the treatise to develop theories of rhetorical significance.

Despite this widespread dependence on the Rhetoric, it is often forgotten that the book we read today is at best an imperfect statement or Aristotle's conceptions of rhetoric. II is to re-emphasize this important consideration that the present essay is written.

What follows is a collation of especially significant research and speculation concerning when Aristotle's Rhetoric was written. how it was written, :and how it has been preserved. The collation draws upon modem scholarship extending across nearly a century and a hall and is offered in the interests of encouraging a realistic contemporary treatment of the Rhetoric as a source of :hypotheses and critical postulates useful for the study or rhetorical discourse." (p. 482)
———. 1985. "Printings of Aristotle’s Rhetoric During the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries." Communication Monographs no. 52:368–376.

Reprinted in R. L. Enos, L- P. Agnew (eds.), Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric, pp. 245-257.

"This study applies the results of an updated and extended investigation of the printings of Aristotle’s Rhetoric between 1477 and 1599 to demonstrate the availability of the Rhetoric during the Renaissance. Four conclusions are drawn: (1) the Rhetoric was widely available, for at least 95 printings occurred during the period examined; (2) the repeated printings of Latin translations by five different humanists indicates a growing demand for the Rhetoric; (3) Victorius’s [Piero Vettori, 1499-1585] efforts to reconstruct an authentic Greek text had a favorable influence on improving subsequent editions; and (4) the fact that most of the printings appeared in five continental cities indicates that the dissemination of the Rhetoric depended upon its purchase by private scholars and collectors." (p 245 of the reprint)
———. 1987. "The Relationship between Argument and Evidence in Aristotle's Rhetoric." In Argumentation: Perspectives and Approaches: Proceedings of the Conference on Argumentation 1986, edited by van Eemeren, Frans Η., Grootendorst, Rob, Blair, J. Anthony and Willard, Charles A., 237–245. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.

"In organizing his thoughts on rhetoric, Aristotle set out to accomplish what many contemporary philosophers seek to do, to improve on the efforts of his predecessors. Aristotle found the prior treatments of rhetoric inadequate for two reasons: first, because they had emphasized forensic persuasion to the exclusion of other forms [1354b22] and second, because they had concentrated on appeals to the emotions rather than on presenting the logic upon which the decision makers could reach a rational conclusion. [1354a1].

Aristotle attempted to correct the first inadequacy by resorting to his customary method of categorization. y asking himself what could be the occasions in which persuasion might be used, Aristotle arrived at his three categories of demonstrative, forensic, and epideictic speaking. In order to enhance the import of his expanded treatment, Aristotle proposed that political persuasion was a more worthy subject than forensic persuasion. [1354b22-27]. Yet, in developing his treatment of rhetoric, Aristotle was often preoccupied with forensic oratory." (p. 237)

(..,)

"Pisteis is translatable into English as "proof" and its two subdivisions are properly translated as "evidence" and "argument." (p. 245)
———. 1989. A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric with a Bibliography of Early Printings. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Summary of Chapter One: The composition and preservation of Aristotle's Rhetoric: "Because the date of the Rhetoric cannot be established, because it is almost certain that Aristotle revised his treatise over a long period without always integrating his revisions with the previous text, and because it is certain that whatever was originally Aristotelian passed through numerous versions and even translations, considerable care must be taken before anyone can draw highly positive conclusions from the position of a chapter or a turn of a sentence in the Rhetoric. Randall said: “The Aristotelian documents are fragmentary, and frequently break off; they are repetitious, and often display little clear order in their parts. Still more, they exhibit manifest contradictions, of approach, of mood, of theory, even of fundamental position and ‘doctrine.” (1960, 23) Randall continued by saying that obviously the text now available is considerably different from the one left by Aristotle.

Grayeff concluded: “The Corpus Aristotelicum that we possess was edited about three centuries after Aristotle’s death, and, indeed, after the peripatetic school had suffered a long eclipse, during which time all peripatetic writings had been in the hands of people who, to say the least, did not bestow on them the care and attention which was given e.g. to Plato’s work.” (1956, 108) It is with these decided cautions in mind that the Rhetoric must be examined.

Solmsen [1975 (1929), 229] summarized for us the value of the Rhetoric. “In its entirety, said Solmsen, “the Aristotelian Rhetoric presents to us the results of a comprehensive and penetrating ordering of the Greek intellectual endowment.” Aristotle, said Solmsen, used his powers of organization to integrate the ideas of Plato, Isocrates, and the sophists. “This accomplishment, Solmsen noted, “is the true value of Aristotle’s treatise, an eminent intellectual and philosophical work.”

References

Grayeff, Félix. (1956). “The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle’s Text" Phronesis I, #2, 106-8.

Randall, J.H. (1960). Aristotle, New York.

Solmsen, Friedrich. (1975). Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Wiedmann, W. Berlin. Originally published in 1929 from the dissertation that appeared in 1928.
Breitenbach, Harold Prell. 1911. The De Compositione of Dionysius of Halicarnassus considered with reference to the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

"The De Compositione of Dionysius of Halicarnassus is a work that deserves more attention from students of language and literature than it has received.(1) Now that so excellent an edition and translation has been published, that of W. Rhys Roberts, there is every incentive for the study of the treatise.(2) A comparison of it with the Rhetoric of Aristotle promises to throw some new light upon the methods and results of both authors.

In this paper I purpose to indicate the attitude of each writer to his problem by disclosing and comparing the fundamental presuppositions that underlie the two treatises. I shall endeavor also, from the standpoint of aesthetics, to explain their divergent positions.

Finally I shall refer to certain similar standpoints in modern rhetorical theory." (p. 163)

(1) Cf. Clayton Hamilton Materials and Methods of Fiction, [Chautauqua-New York: The Chautauqua Press 1911] p. 206.

(2) It is, however, only fair to state that this essay (together with some other studies of similar nature) was prepared several months before Professor Roberts' edition was announced as forthcoming.

References

William Rhys Roberts, Dionysius of Halicarnassus On literary composition, being the Greek text of the De compositione verborum, London: Macmillan & Co. 1910.
Brinton, Alan. 1986. "Ēthotic Argument." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 3:245–258.

"It has become the custom in modern philosophy to regard appeals to or attacks upon character in argument as logically irrelevant. This attitude is reflected in the tendency to think of them in terms of the "informal fallacies" ad verecundiam and ad hominem. It was not always so. We find the Socrates of the Apology and other Platonic dialogues, for example, making a variety of references to the character of participants, as well as appeals to authority. And in Aristotle we find a detailed discussion of the role of ἦθος (character) in persuasive speaking. There are certain ambiguities, to be sure: How seriously are we to take Socrates' appeals to the poets, for example, given what he says about them elsewhere?

And to what extent does Aristotle condone "ethical proof' merely as a compromise to the defects of popular audiences? But still, the role of ἦθος in argument is a subject which merits more serious attention than modern philosophers have given it. There has been extended discussion of "ethical proof' by recent speech theorists; but it has for the most part centered around diluted conceptions of ἦθος and focused almost exclusively on empirical questions. It is the question of the nature of the appeal to ἦθος as a form of argument which is the subject of the present essay. Our discussion will begin with Aristotle's conception of "ethical proof' in the Art of Rhetoric, but will then turn to the Nicomachean Ethics for a fuller conception of ἦθος and for materials which will be sufficient for a more adequate account of its role in argument, with a view toward its justification. We will then turn to some actual uses of ἦθος in reasoning by Seneca and other Stoics. Finally, we will consider briefly the role of in wider contexts of argumentation." (p 245)
———. 1988. "Pathos and the "Appeal to Emotion": An Aristotelian Analysis." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:207–219.

"Despite the development in recent years of an extensive philosophical literature on the emotions, with great emphasis on their cognitive aspects, little attention has been given to the question of the legitimacy of the "appeal to emotion" as a form or aspect of argument.(1) What little logic textbooks have to say about the emotions is for the most part to be found in treatments of so-called "informal fallacies" such as the ad misericordiam, ad populum, and ad baculum.(2) I propose here to offer a sketch of an account of the role of the emotions in rational persuasion; my concern is with what seems to be their legitimate role in argument rather than with logical abuses. The recent philosophical literature has a great deal to offer to the details of a full account. My approach will be, however, to make only passing references to recent literature, and to ground my sketch mainly in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric.(3) The reason for this approach is two-fold: first, the most relevant and central insights for our topic are to be found already in Aristotle; and, second, Aristotle writes not only as a philosopher but also as a rhetorical theorist, which gives him a better appreciation than most contemporary philosophers have of the importance of the emotions in the actual conduct of argumentation.(4)" (p. 207)

(1) A good selection of articles is to be found in Rorty's Explaining Emotion (...)

(2) Perhaps the "standard" approach is best summed up by a quotation from Isaac Watts' Logick: " ... when an argument is borrowed from any Topics which are suited to engage the Inclinations and Passions of the Hearers on the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince the judgment, this is Argumentum ad Passiones, an Address to the Passions: or if it be made publicly, it is called an Appeal to the People"-quoted in C.L. Hamblin (1970).

(3) References will be to the Ross translation of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (1925), hereafter EN, and to the Roberts translation of the Rhetoric (1984).

(4). References to Aristotle are, however, common in the recent literature. The present discussion is indebted to the excellent interpretive work (and more) of Fortenbaugh, Kosman, and Leighton (1982).

References

Fortenbaugh, W.W., 1975, Aristotle on Emotion (London: Duckworth).

Hamblin, C.L.: 1970, Fallacies (London Methuen).

Kosman, L.A.: 1980, "Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics" in A.O. Rorty, ed., Essays in Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of CA Press), pp. 103-116.

Leighton, S.R.: 1985, "A New View of Emotion', American Philosophical Quarterly", vol. 22, pp. 133-141.

Leighton, S.R.: 1982, "Aristotle and the Emotions," Phronesis, vol. 27, pp. 144-174.

Rorty, A.O. (ed.): 1980, Explaining Emotions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press).
———. 1990. "The Outmoded Psychology of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Western Journal of Speech Communication no. 54:204–218.

Abstract: "Argues that Aristotle's Rhetoric is not grounded in outmoded psychological conceptions that make it outdated. Reasons for relegating older rhetorics to the status of historical relics are discussed, and the notion that rhetorical theories die with their psychological conceptions is rejected. The components of the psychology of Rhetoric are presented, and their relevance to modern students is argued."
Brockriede, Wayne E. 1966. "Toward a contemporary Aristotelian theory of rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech no. 52:33–40.

"The study of rhetoric as a theory to explain how contemporary man interacts symbolically and purposively with other men, however, is a monistic matter.

There is one art of rhetoric, one systematic body of principles of symbolic and purposive human interaction, and its students must conceive and formulate a theory sufficiently comprehensive to accommodate all known moral objectives, cultural environments, and philosophical starting points. Although I am not altogether unconcerned with rhetoric from the points of view of the speaker, teacher, and philosopher -all of which invite pluralistic approaches- the emphasis in this paper is upon a monistic theory of rhetoric.(5)

My purpose is to argue that although the Aristotelian theory itself should be modified or discarded, the Aristotelian approach to the theory may be applied profitably in the modification or replacement.

More specifically, I shall try to defend four statements. First, the essence of the Aristotelian study of rhetoric is not the system of finding the available means of persuasion; rather, it is the empirical description of rhetorical .situations and the philosophical construction of an appropriate system of principles. Second, a modern application of such an approach should not copy the descriptions and precepts Aristotle found useful for the Greek society of the fourth century B.C.; rather, it should describe empirically twentieth-century situations. Third, a theory derived from the new description should be dynamic and comprehensive. Fourth, achieving a modern theory of rhetoric would yield advantages for the experimental researcher, the rhetorical critic, and the teacher." (p. 34)

(5) In this paper the term "rhetoric," unless qualified, is used in its theoretical function.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1996. "Aristotle's Rhetoric as a 'Counterpart' to Dialectic." In Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, edited by Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, 34–55. Berkeley: University of California Press.

This essay is an abridged and revised .English version of "Rhétorique et dialectique, Rhétorique et Topiques," my contribution to Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, ed. D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (Princeton, 1994) [pp. 57-96].

"The most famous sentence in Aristotle’s Rhetoric is quite probably the first one, namely “Rhetoric is a counterpart (antistrophos) to dialectic.” After delivering this sentence (likely to have shattered the walls of Plato’s Academy),(1) Aristotle offers the rationale for his statement: both arts (technai) have many features in common, and most of these features belong to no other art. However, the two treatises he wrote in order to teach rhetoric and dialectic, respectively the Rhetoric and the Topics, do not look like each other much. Admittedly, we read a number of explicit references to the Topics in the Rhetoric; this last treatise makes abundant use of the very notion of topos; indeed, it is only in the Rhetoric (2.26.1403316—17) that we find something that looks like a definition of topos, whereas such a definition is strangely missing in the Topics themselves, in spite of their title and of their usual generosity otherwise in the matter of definitions. Nevertheless, if we take a panoramic look at the two treatises, we can only be struck by their many contrasts from a number of such points of view as style, presentation, teaching method, expected readership, pedagogical results, and so on. Quite obviously, Aristotle did not think that there was only one way of teaching a techne, even when it was a matter of teaching two technai as closely connected as are the two main arts of discourse: rhetoric and dialectic.

My problem here may be stated quite simply. It will be to try to offer some suggestions about the history, the meaning, and the grounds of the following contrast: on the one hand, if we consider rhetoric and dialectic qua arts, Aristotle claims that they strongly resemble each other; on the other hand, if we consider rhetoric and dialectic qua works both written by Aristotle, they no less strongly differ from one another." (p. 34)

(1) Chapter 1.1 has often been considered, either in part or in its entirety, as having been written earlier than the rest of the Rhetoric, which might itself have been written fairly early in Aristotle’s career (see Kantelhardt 1911 and Solmsen 1929). However, I shall not dwell here on evolutionist hypotheses. The backward reference of 1.2.1356331, to “what was said at the outset,” shows (if genuine, of course) that Aristotle himself is responsible for the integration of chapter 1.1 into the whole of the treatise. If delivered by Aristotle during his stay in Plato’s Academy, this first sentence could not fail to remind the audience of the famous passage in Plato’s Gorgias (465c), where rhetoric was pictured as an antistrophon to cookery. Aristotle added a new provocation, by means of a strongly deflationist description of dialectic, as compared with the sublimity of the tasks assigned to it by Plato.

References

Kantelhardt, A. De Aristotelis Rhetoricis. Dissertation. Gottingen, 1911. In Rhetorika. Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistichen Rhetorik, ed. R. Stark. Hildes- heim, 1968.

Solmsen, F. Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik. Berlin, 1929.
Burke, Michael. 2008. "Advertising Aristotle: A Preliminary Investigation into the Contemporary Relevance of Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric." Foundations of Science no. 13:295–305.

Abstract: "In this article, a preliminary investigation will be conducted in order to try to discover whether or not Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric can have any relevance as a handbook for the rhetoricians of the twenty-first century and in particular for advertising designers. First, the background against which this question is posed will be set out. Second, the chosen methodology will be explained. Thereafter, some qualitative data will be presented and discussed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn suggesting that The Art of Rhetoric may be just as relevant and influential today for advertising professionals as it was for the lawyers and politicians of classical times."
Burks, Don M. 1966. "Psychological Egoism and the Rhetorical Tradition." Speech Monographs no. 33:400–418.

"This paper will focus on three periods in the development of rhetorical theory: ancient theory, chiefly that of Aristotle; the refutation of egoism in eighteenth-century England, including George Campbell's incorporation of an unegoistic psychology into rhetorical theory; modern rhetorical theory, with emphasis on James A. Winans' theory of persuasion.

The objectives are to show: (1) that the influence of the egoistic doctrine may be found in the work of classical rhetoricians; (2) that there is presented in George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric an unegoistic theory of persuasion which illustrates the breadth of rhetorical theory based upon an unegoistic psychology; (3) that the topic of psychological egoism continues to receive consideration from modern philosophers, and, although somewhat indirectly, from modern rhetorical theorists as they concern themselves with questions of motive appeal and self-interest." (p. 401)

(...)

"The Rhetoric and the Ethics have been considered together in this discussion but without intent to equate two works in which the differences are many. We know that one looks to what is, the other to what ought to be. We are here concerned with a question of belief about human motivation, and nowhere is the connection between rhetoric and ethics more pronounced than at those points where motivation must be accounted for. What our survey has shown is that whether one turns to the Rhetoric or the Ethics, there are exceptional statements on the part of Aristotle, but his view of human nature as revealed in these works remains egoistic when considered on balance." (p. 407)
Burns, Tony. 2003. "The tragedy of slavery: Aristotle's Rhetoric and the history of the concept of natural law." History of Political Thought no. 24:16–36.

Abstract: "This article focuses on the history of the concept of natural law and the role which Aristotle, and especially his Rhetoric, has to play within it. It is sometimes suggested that the origins of the concept of law are to be located in the writings of Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century BCE. The article argues that there is evidence both in Aristotle’s Politics and in his Rhetoric to support the view that this is not the case. In these texts Aristotle suggests that the origins of the concept of natural law lie in the writings of the Sophists in the fifth century, some of whom used natural law arguments to question the legitimacy of slavery."
Calboli Montefusco, Lucia. 1994. "Aristotle and Cicero on the officia oratoris." In Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Mirhady, David C., 66–94. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

"It is well known that Cicero derived from Aristotle and from the later Peripatetic school many precepts.(19 This is certainly true of rhetoric; and in this paper I would like to focus on a problem which, when examined carefully, turns out to be much more complex than it would first appear, namely the doctrine of the officia oratoris.

That is to say, we must try not only to understand what Cicero meant when he called on the orator to docere, conciliare/delectare, and movere; but also to see whether the alternative formulations, conciliare and delectare, are based on different elements in Aristotelian rhetorical theory. I shall argue that we face two distinct kinds of "officia," expressed by the two triads, which for the moment I indicate "tout court" by the expressions docere conciliare movere and docere delectare movere. I think that the difference between them can be explained by considering two points in Aristotle's doctrine, enlarged by not insignificant Hellenistic elements." (p. 66)
———. 2002. "Between Logic and Rhetoric: Aristotle’s Concept of the ένδεχόμενον πιθανόν." Euphrosine no. 30:193–199.

"Aristotle discusses the persuasive in rhetoric several times, but only once refers to its modality. He does this when, as is well known, he defines rhetoric as the faculty to discover το ένδεχόμενον πιθανόν about each case: Rhet. 1355 b 25 f. Έστω δή ρητορική δύναμις περί έκαστον τοΰ θεωρήσαι(1) το ένδεχόυενον πιθανόν." (p. 193) [Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion. (tr. George A. Kennedy)]

(...)

"Aristotle’s pupils must have been familiar with the meaning of ένδεχόμενον, for he does not bother to explain it in the Rhetoric. However we are not. So we need to look at his works on logic, where the modality of the ένδεχόμενον is carefully dealt with. In the Prior Analytics (29 b 29 ff.) Aristotle makes particular distinction between three different kinds of syllogism, according to the modality of their premises: "Since ύπάρχειν ('to apply’) is not the same as ε ξ άνάγκης ύπάρχειν (‘necessarily to apply’) or ένδέχεσθαι ύπάρχειν (‘possibly to apply’) (because there are many predicates which apply, but not necessarily; and other neither apply necessarily nor indeed apply at all, but it is possible that they should apply), it is clear that the syllogism also is different in each of these cases”. After dealing with syllogisms founded on the άναγκαίον (that which necessarily applies) and on the ύπάρχον (that which applies), he goes on to discuss those founded on the ένδεχόμενον, which he first defines thus: "I call a thing possible if, when not being necessary it is assumed to be true, no impossibility will thereby be involved”. To grasp the meaning of this definition and consequently the modality of the ένδεχόμενον we need to take a look at the modalities of that which is not άναγκαιον and that which is not αδύνατον, for they seem to be in a reciprocal relationship." (pp. 194-195, two notes omitted)

(1) Cf. Rhet. 1355 b 31 ff. and Top. 149 b 25 ff. where Aristotle considers the 'perfect orator' (αγαθός ρήτωρ) as ‘δυνάμενος τό έν έκαστο) πιθανόν θεωρειν και μηδέν παραλείπειν’. This speculative activity gives rhetoric the dignity of τέχνη: Cf W. M. A. Grimaldi, Aristotle, Rhetoric I. A Commentary, New York 1980, p. 32; J. Sprute, “Philosophie und Rhetorik” p. 41, in C. J. Classen - H.-J. Müllenbrock (Hrsg.), Die Macht des Wortes. Aspekte gegenwärtiger Rhetorikforschung, Marburg 1992, 29-45; L. Calboli Montefusco, “Può esistere un'ars dicendi? Il compromesso ciceroniano nella soluzione di una 'verbi controversia'”, in P. Defosse (ed), Hommages C. Deroux, Bruxelles (forthcoming [2003]).
Calvo Martínez, José Luis. 2021. "The "Little Ethics" and the Nicomachean Ethics: Rhetoric and Ethics in Aristotle." In La Filosofía griega y su legado. Homenaje a Tomás Calvo Martínez, edited by.Orden, Rafael V, 299–314. Madrid: Guillero Escolar.

"The title of this work does not refer to any lost work of the Stagirite, but to a compendium of ethical content that is well known but perhaps, in my opinion, has not been given due attention. On the other hand, the title is a verbal play on a well-known treatise pompously called, it is not clear why, the "great Ethics", Magna Moralia, admittedly late and belonging not to Aristotle himself but to members of his school from the Hellenistic period.

The content to which I am referring is to be found in the first book of the Rhetoric, chapters IV to XIV. And, I repeat, I think it deserves to be treated with greater attention and systematicity than usual, since it presents a view of ethics that is, to a large extent, different from Aristotle's "mature" conception. And, on the other hand, it helps to confirm, better than in any other aspect of the treatise, that the Rhetoric belongs to an early age and that it might not even be far from the "Course in Rhetoric" which we know from Quintilian(2) that Aristotle taught at the Academy during his stay there and in connection with the polemic with the Isocratic school." (p. 299, a note omitted)

(2) Cf. Quintilian, Institutiones oratoriae 3.1.14.
Carey, Christopher. 1996. "Rhetorical Means of Persuasion." In Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, edited by Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, 399–415. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reprinted in Ian Worthington (ed.). Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action, New York: Routledge 1994, pp. 26-45.

"In the Rhetoric (1356a) Aristotle distinguishes three means of persuasion (pisteis) which can be produced by the rhetorician’s art. The term used, pistis, although frequently translated “proof,” is broader in its semantic range than the English word would suggest. Its use encompasses the related qualities of trust, trustworthiness, credence and credibility, and extends to objects and means used to secure trust or belief. This breadth of usage explains the disparate contents of Aristotle’s list, and his inclusion of items that have no bearing on factual proof; he lists argument (as Aristotle puts it, “to demonstrate something or appear to demonstrate”), the character of the speaker, and the disposition created in the hearer. Aristotle considers the first of these to be the proper task of rhetoric, the other two being additional effects necessitated by the nature of the audience. Certainly this item is different in kind from the others in that demonstration by argument addresses itself more or less directly to the issue to be decided, while the other two pisteis listed have only an indirect bearing at most on the issue. These indirect “proofs” do however play a major role in Attic oratory, and accordingly Aristotle feels compelled to accept and advise on their use. In this chapter I shall examine the range of effects sought by their deployment in the Attic orators, and the means used." (p. 399)
Cassin, Barbara. 2014. "Saying what one sees, letting see what one says: Aristotle's Rhetoric and the rhetoric of the Sophists." In The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle, edited by Baracchi, Claudia, 21–40. New York: Bloomsbury.

Translated from the French by Claudia Baracchi and Marcus Michelsen.

"The Aristotelian definition of rhetoric is “the faculty of contemplating in any given case the available means of persuasion” (δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν, Rhetoric I.2, 1355b25f.). There are three objects proper to rhetoric: the parts of speech and their order, proofs and their sources, and style in the strict sense. Regarding the parts of speech, after ridiculing the proliferating of divisions, Aristotle keeps two and only two:

You must say the thing at stake, and you must demonstrate it. You cannot either say it without demonstrating it, or demonstrate it without first having stated it; since any demonstration must be the demonstration of something, and one makes a preliminary statement in view of the demonstration that follows it. (III.13, 1414a31–35)

Aristotle proposes to call the first part—which corresponds to the dialectical “problem” (πρόβλημα, “that which is thrown ahead,” 36)—πρόθεσις or “proposition.”

He proposes to call the second part—what we would call apodeixis in the strict sense— πίστις, a term with two indissoluble meanings: subjectively, it means faith, belief, and adherence; and objectively, proof and confirmation.

Thus, analysis attains the principal object of rhetoric: the classification of proofs, πίστεις.." (p. 30)