Schenkeveld, Dirk M. 2001. "Philosophical Prose." In Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400, edited by Porter, Stanley E., 195–264. Leiden: Brill.

Cicero, pp. 216-223.

"Cicero introduced philosophy in Latin literature, an achievement of prime importance for Western philosophy. Here is not the place to sketch his reasons for doing so and to give an account of his philosophical ideas; after giving general information stress must here be put on the linguistic and rhetorical aspects of his philosophical dialogues, for both are closely related.

The reason why Cicero prefers the dialogue form to that of a treatise is to be found not only in the Greek tradition (see above on the Greek dialogue) but also in the scope the dialogue gives to Cicero to show his abilities as a writer. Moreover, dialogues with their informality of conversation (sermo) are more in tune with the urbanity of the participants who all belong to the same social class." (p. 217 notes omitted)

(...)

"Cicero lists his books on philosophical subjects in De divinatione, prologue to the second book. Commonly scholars distinguish two periods of philosophical activity, the first occurring around 55 BC, when he writes De republica, in which his famous Somnium Scipionis stands, De legibus and De oratore, combining a philosophical approach with a discussion of rhetoric. The second period (46-3 BC) is the more important one, in which he publishes Academici libri, De finibus bonorum et malorum, Tusculanae disputationes, De natura deorum, De divinatione, De fato, Cato maior de senectute, Laelius de amicitia and De officiis, all of which are still extant, whereas of other books not mentioned here we have fragments only. Only De officiis does not have a dialogue form; all other writings have." (p 218, a note omitted)
Schmidt, Peter L. 1979. "Cicero's Place in Roman Philosophy: a Study of his Prefaces." The Classical Journal no. 74:115–127.

"To treat the topic of Roman philosophy in Cicero's time in the restricted compass of a paper seems to imply preposterous audacity and to guarantee failure, were it not that the connections between philosophy and society in the late Roman republic - approximately from 60 to 40 B.C. - converge on Cicero. The philosophical stimuli received, the interests pursued by him and the impulses emanating from him justify a treatment which looks at a whole generation of Roman philosophy from Cicero's point of view.

An adequate historical understanding of Cicero's philosophy in his time and society has to take into account a number of different aspects of the problem: 1) the autobiographical conditions; 2) Who else participated in the endeavour to romanize Greek philosophy? 3) In what way is his philosophical approach different from that of his contemporaries? 4) How does he meet prejudices and reasoned criticism? 5) How does he tackle the literary task of communicating his philosophical teaching and tenets?" (p. 115)
———. 2001. "The original version of the De Re Publica and the De Legibus." In Cicero’s Republic, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F. and North, J. A., 7–16. London: Institute of Classical Studies.
Schofield, Malcolm. 1986. "Cicero for and against Divination." The Journal of Roman Studies no. 76:47–65.

"This paper is a study of the way Cicero wrote philosophy. Or rather a way: as onewould expect of an author of his ambition and versatility, Cicero produced different sorts of philosophical writing in different works. What I am considering here, accordingly, is the way Cicero wrote philosophy in one particular treatise, de Divinatione. Section I examines the place of Div. in his philosophical oeuvre, and asks why he should have decided to devote a treatise to the topic. It suggests inter alia that he was attracted by the special opportunities for philosophical rhetoric which it afforded him. Section II explores the two distinctive styles of rhetoric in Div., and proposes that they are best seen as a particular kind of marriage of the Greek and the Roman. Section III discusses the claim that Div. is to be read as a tract against superstition, and opposes to it a conception of the work - at once more straightforward and more nuanced - as an exercise in the opposition of arguments. It focuses particularly on the avowedly Socratic dimension of Div. Section iv supports the same view of the dialogue by emphasizing the philosophical weight of the arguments for as well as against divination." (p. 47)
———. 1995. "Cicero's Definition of Res Publica." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 63–83. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"This chapter aims to rehabilitate the Republic in the reader's esteem. I shall not try to salvage the marriage of history and philosophy which has so moved the ire of the critics. Instead I shall focus on something no less fundamental, namely the definition of res publica as res populi which launches the argument of the whole work. My principal proposal relating to the definition has two dimensions. First, I shall maintain that the definition has a quite specific function in the dialogue, namely to operate as a criterion of legitimacy. Its introduction is designed to furnish the grounds of a distinction between constitutions/politeiai/set-ups/ 'regimes' (in Straussian parlance) that are legitimate and those that are not. Second, I shall claim that this interest in discriminating between set-ups on grounds of legitimacy is a distinctively Roman and Ciceronian input into the theory of Rep., not one inherited from whatever Greek models Cicero was using." (pp. 63-64)
———. 2002. "Cicero, Zeno of Citium, and the Vocabulary of Philosophy." In Le Style de la pensée. Recueil de textes en hommage à Jacques Brunschwig, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique and Pellegrin, Pierre, 412–428. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
———. 2002. "Academic Therapy: Philo of Larissa and Cicero’s Project in the Tusculans." In Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World, edited by Clark, Gillian and Rajak, Tessa, 91–109. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter begins with a translation and re-examination of the Stobaeus text [*]. It considers whether there is anything distinctively Academic in Philo's presentation of the analogy as mediated by Stobaeus. It argues that, if there is, what it consists of is not a Sceptical stance of any kind, but a return to a Socratic outlook on the scope and function of philosophy itself. The chapter looks afresh at the catalogue of De Divinatione 2 and proposes that Cicero's account there of his writings on philosophy betrays a view of its function that bears a significant resemblance to Philo's ‘Socratism’. For their part the Tusculans, who seem to figure as the chef d'oeuvre of the entire catalogue, present themselves in a similarly Socratic light. Some reflections on their specifically Ciceronian features, and particularly on what one might call their Academicism are presented."

[*] (Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2. 39. 20–41.25): "Philo of Larissa, an Academic philosopher, a pupil of Clitomachus, was one of those who introduced a significant advance in the other areas [sc. other than definitions, just dealt with]. This Philo has done a skilful job in other respects, and particularly as regards his division of philosophical discourse, which I am going to make available."
———. 2008. "Ciceronian dialogue." In The End of Dialogue in Antiquity, edited by Goldhill, Simon, 63–84. Cambridge.

"Cicero is often perceived as a much inferior composer of dialogues when judged against the Platonic gold standard. No mesmerising Socrates fascinates the reader. There are no dramatic coups de théâtre. We miss the erotic complexities of the gymnasium and the symposium, and even more the nagging of Socratic dialectic. Above all, Plato writes philosophy of a power and originality beyond Cicero’s capacity. In this paper I attempt to do something to redress the balance. I am going to argue that Cicero does things with the dialogue that Plato doesn’t – and that Hume (another standard of comparison) doesn’t either.

There are two particular dimensions in which Ciceronian dialogue achieves something all its own. First, in its final Academic form (as represented by the major works of 45 and 44 BCE) Ciceronian dialogue is more genuinely open-ended than Platonic. In dialogues such as Academica, De Finibus, De Natura Deorum and De Diuinatione Cicero gives properly argued alternatives a real run for their money, and adopts a variety of literary strategies for indicating that further reflection on their merits and choice between them is left to the reader. If the point of dialogue is to explore and to invite to exploration through debate, the form of the Academic dialogue looks better constructed to achieve this than the Platonic." (p. 63, a note omitted)

(...)

"Cicero’s second claim on our consideration rests on his highly original exploitation of authorial presence. Here he shows to advantage by comparison with Hume as well as Plato. Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion do preserve a Ciceronian open-endedness. But like Plato, Hume is careful to avoid participating in the conversation himself, or even appearing as narrator. Cicero’s dialogues, particularly the Academic dialogues, take more of a risk in this regard. Cicero puts himself into his dialogues, and thereby gives dialogue an existential dimension of engagement and self-exposure that anonymity and the urbanities of Platonic or Humean anonymity can’t reach." (p. 64)
———. 2013. "Writing philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero, edited by Steel, Catherine, 73–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Scholars of Plato and Aristotle would give their proverbial back teeth to have in the record anything remotely resembling the remarkable passage that opens Book 2 of Cicero’s De divinatione. Here Cicero presents a retrospective catalogue of his philosophical oeuvre as it stands at the time of writing: soon after the assassination of Julius Caesar in March 44 BC. The catalogue is to a degree selective, but it has the added bonus of explicit or implicit indications of order of composition for a fair proportion of the items mentioned." (p. 73)

(..)

"This chapter of the Companion will effectively consist in commentary on the On Divination catalogue. That way we shall get a sense of why and when Cicero wrote most of the philosophy he wrote, and indeed how he conceived of the very idea of philosophy." (pp. 73-74)
———. 2017. "Cicero's Plato." In From Stoicism to Platonism: The Development of Philosophy, 100 BCE-100 CE, edited by Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, 47–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Cicero was not a Platonist. He was not a Stoic, either. He hardly ever described himself as a philosopher at all. But Plato, the writer and thinker himself, was a presence of the greatest importance in Cicero’s own writing and thinking; and Stoic ethics mattered a good deal to him too. This chapter will attempt to explore just what Plato meant to Cicero, and say a little about the attraction that Stoicism also – but not in the least in conflict with his veneration of Plato – held for him. I shall pursue my theme first in some of Cicero’s letters of the period 54–49 BCE, then in the dialogues of 55–51, and finally in the theoretical writings of 46–44."
———. 2017. "Cicero on Imperialism and the Soul." In Selfhood and the Soul: Essays on Ancient Thought and Literature in Honour of Christopher Gill, edited by Seaford, Richard, Wilkins, John and Eright, Matthew, 107–124. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Is justice an objective value or purely a matter of convention? And whatever the answer to that question, can the res publica—public affairs, the business of the state, the commonwealth itself—be conducted without it? Or does the truth lie in the opposite direction: must wisdom be prepared to resort to injustice for successful government? These were the principal questions they tackled. And imperialism turns out to have been a key preoccupation of the discussion. The case for valuing prudence more highly than justice (whether a conventional or an absolute value) was put by Lucius Furius Philus, who is represented as anxious to make it clear that he advances it argumenti causa, not out of conviction. Gaius Laelius, closest to Scipio of all his friends, then made a reply. For Laelius justice is part of the fabric of the world itself; and he would argue that good government cannot be conducted without justice.

Philus may well have devoted the last few sections of his speech to what he may have regarded as the clincher for his own argument: to acquire and hold on to an empire, there is no alternative to committing injustice—and that is precisely what the Romans have done. Laelius did not shirk the challenge of rebutting this charge. His case for justice—which is unfortunately much less well preserved than Philus’ speech—evidently ended with a tour de force making the argument that empire is one of the forms of naturally just rule, which is how the Romans have historically conducted government. That argument exploited an analogy with the rule of the soul over the body and the reason over the passions. And it is that analogy and its use for political purposes that I want to examine in my contribution to this volume." (pp. 107-108)
———. 2021. Cicero: Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This book explores the Cicero who wrote of his ‘incredible and unparalleled love for the res publica (de Or. 3.13). His work in political philosophy stands as the first surviving attempt to articulate a holistic rationale for republicanism and a sustained account of its different elements."

(...)

"In this study Cicero’s pioneering contribution to that kind of republican thought is tracked through studies of some of his major themes, which include some that still have resonances today as in earlier periods of the history of the West. The book focuses mainly on the three major writings that he devoted to political philosophy: On the commonwealth, On laws, and On duties—the third of these formally speaking a general treatise on practical ethics, but in reality addressed to the young man expected and expecting to enter public life, and much of it concentrating on conduct in the public sphere." (Preface, p. VII)
———. 2022. "Cicero and Plato." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 88–102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Cicero was not a “Platonist.”(1) He hardly ever described himself as a philosopher at all.(2) But Plato, the writer and thinker himself, was a presence of the greatest importance in Cicero’s own writing and thinking.

“No other individual philosopher,” as A. A. Long has written, “is cited by Cicero as fully and frequently.”(3) This chapter will not attempt to describe or assess Cicero’s treatment of “Platonism” as a system. He inherited fromhis philosophical teachers – Philo and Antiochus – differing views of the overall stance from which Plato philosophized(4) even in Antiochus’ version of Academic history it was only subsequently that a “system” was articulated (descriptio disciplinae: Acad. 1.17) invoking his authority. Instead it will explore just what Plato himself meant to Cicero:(5) first in some of his letters of the period 54–49 BCE, then in the dialogues of 55–51, and finally in the theoretical writings of 46–44." (p. 88)

Much of the material presented in this chapter was first published in Schofield 2017b. [“Cicero’s Plato,” in From Stoicism to Platonism, ed. T. Engberg-Pedersen. Cambridge] 47-66.

(1) A contrary view has lately been revived by Altman 2016a. [The Revival of Platonism in Cicero’s Late Philosophy: Platonis aemulus and the Invention of Cicero. Lanham, MD.]

(2) See Hine [“Philosophy and philosophi: From Cicero to Apuleius,” in G. Williams and K. Volk Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy. Oxford] 2015 14-19. Plutarch, however, says that he would often tell his friends that they should call him a philosopher, not an orator, oratory merely being his instrument (Plu. Cic. 32.5).

(3) Long1995a: [“Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle,” in J. G. F. Powell ((ed.) Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford 1995a] 37-61.

(4) Described by Lévy and Guillaumin 2018 [“Présentation,” in Plato Latinus: aspects de la transmission de Platon en Latin dans l’Antiquité, ed. J.-B. Guillemain and C. Lévy. Turnhout. 7-29] 17 in a penetrating succinct overview, as “visions parfois contradictoires que Cicéron donne de Platon.”

5) The treatment of this topic by Boyancé [Études sur l’humanisme Cicéronien. Brussels] 1970, 222-247 (first published in 1953) remains a rewarding read.
———. 2023. "Debate or Guidance? Cicero on Philosophy." In The Oxford Handbook of Roman Philosophy, edited by Garani, Myrto, Konstan, David and Reydams.Schils, Gretchen, 119–140. New York: Oxford University Press.

"I have now mentioned three of the four texts— De legibus, Tusculan Disputations, and De officiis— that will be my case studies in this chapter (the fourth will be De republica). I shall tackle first a remarkable passage from Book 1 of De legibus, where in fundamentals of public policy silencing of debate is advocated. Next I turn more briefly to Book 3 of De republica, in which by contrast Cicero stages a confrontation between two views on justice, here as in Book 1 of De legibus taken to be the value that political philosophy needs to make central. The final text to examine in any detail will be the most complex of them all, calling accordingly for the fullest treatment: the remarkable attempt he makes in the Tusculan Disputations to harmonize conflicting philosophical positions in the service of ethical guidance for the individual. Then we shall consider briefly Cicero’s approach to individual guidance in a different literary genre, as exemplified by De officiis, in which debate is alluded to but not conducted. Some brief concluding remarks will round off the chapter." (p. 121)
Schrenk, Lawrence. 1994. "Cicero on Rhetoric and Philosophy: Tusculan Disputations I." Ancient Philosophy no. 14:355–360.
Schultz, Celia E. 2014. A commentary on Cicero, De Divinatione I. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Latin text and commentary in English.
Schutrumpf, Eckhart. 1990. "Cicero De Oratore I and the Greek Philosophical Tradition." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 133:310–321.

"It was F. Solmsen(3) who traced Cicero's views on emotions as brought forward in De oratore back to Aristotle's rhetorical theory. Although Solmsen only discussed the tradition for De or. II 185-214, scholars after him derive Cicero's views on emotions in De oratore generally, even outside of II 185-214, from Aristo tle. Here I am only concerned with the role given to emotions in Cicero's rhetorical theory of De oratore Book I." (p. 311, anote omitted)

(3) 3) Aristotle and Cicero on the orator's playing upon the feelings, Classical Philology 33, 1938, 390-404 (= Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim 1968, II 216-230).
Setaioli, Aldo. 2013. "Cicero and Seneca on the Fate of the Soul: Private Feelings and Philosophical Doctrines." In The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean, edited by Rüpke, Jörg, 455–488. New York: Oxford University Press.

"The notion of individuality is frequently associated with an interest in a prolongation or final attainment of individuality beyond the traits of biological life. For two important thinkers, Cicero in the mid-first century BC, and Seneca in the mid-first century AD, reflexions about the fate of the soul will be investigated." (p. 455)

(...)

"In conclusion, Cicero’s attitude concerning the fate of the soul after death never goes beyond a sentimental leaning: he longs for immortality, but harbours no unquestioning faith in it. When he is touched in his own paternal feelings he makes an earnest effort to convince himself and the others that his daughter survives after death. If we compare the Consolatio with the consolatory letters he wrote to some bereaved correspondents of his,(90) we realize that he tries to convince himself that her fate is different from that of all the others. It is a rhetorical rather than philosophical attempt, which in no way affects the deep sincerity of the author." (p. 469)

(90) Cic. Tusc. 3.76 (= consol. F 16 Vitelli): erat enim in tumore animus et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio.
Shackleton Bailey, D. R. . 1971. Cicero. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

"As rhetorician, stylist, moralist, and freedom-fighter Cicero’s appeal has dwindled, even to classical specialists. His personality remains of unique interest, because it is accessible. No other Greek or Roman has projected himself into posterity like Cicero in his extant correspondence.

Socrates and Horace have left sharper images; but how much of our Socrates is Plato’s artifact, and how much of our Horace is Horace’s?. No similar suspicion can arise with Cicero, because the letters that reveal him were never meant to become public property - his state of mind if anyone had told him that this would one day happen hardly bears imagination. Nothing comparable has survived out of the classical world: not the ‘literary’ letters of Plato, Seneca, and Pliny; not Fronto’s correspondence with imperial pupils or patrons, the prosings of a hypochondriac pedagogue in a dull epoch; not the flotsam of papyrus finds. In Cicero’s letters we see a Roman Consular, on any reasonable estimate one of the most remarkable men of his eventful time, without his toga." (Introduction, p. XI)

(...)

"Secondary authorities are comparatively meagre and unreliable. The most important are Plutarch’s largely anecdotal ‘Life’ in the second century A.D. and Cassius Dio’s Roman History (with a strong anti-Ciceronian bias) in the third. Plutarch twice refers to Tiro’s work, but as a rule it is impossible to trace particular statements in either to their sources. Even in Cicero’s case, the materials do not allow of a full and balanced biography, but there is enough to show the manner of man he was. The design of this book is to let him do that, as far as possible, for himself." (Introduction, p. XII)
Shackleton Bailey, D. R. 1992. Onomasticon to Cicero's Speeches. Stuttgart: Teubner.

"Personal names are listed according to the conventions used in Pauly-Wissowa (RE), except that Greek names appear in the form used by Cicero.

The speeches are cited with slight variations in the order, which is chronological, and with the abbreviations used in Merguet's index.

References are to the standard numbered sections (the smaller ones) used in editions. Where the person is alluded to but not named, the reference is in round brackets.

Round brackets in the name itself indicate parts of it not found in the text of the speeches. Where Cicero in the speeches names a person more than once and in more than one fashion, his usage is given in special notes. But where he uses a gentilicium or cognomen sometimes with praenomen and sometimes without, I have usually not given specific references (see part i, "Tria Nomina")." (From the Preface)
———. 1995. Onomasticon to Cicero's Letters. Stuttgart: Teubner.

"The following is repeated essentially from the preface to Onomasticon to Cicero's Speeches.

References are to the standard numbered sections used in editions.

Where the person is alluded to but not named, the reference is in round brackets.

Round brackets in the name itself indicate parts of it not found in the text. Where a person is named more than once and in more than one fashion, the styles are given in special notes.

Letters (RE etc.) following an entry refer to published lists: see 'Abbreviations'. In the case of magistrates reference to Broughton's Magistrates of the Roman Republic is assumed as automatic.

The tribe being part of a Roman's official name, they are given where possible from L. R. Taylor's Voting districts of the Roman Republic and supplementary sources, though usually there can be no more than a probability. Certainties or near-certainties are in italics.

Apart from brief identifications, such as the date of a magistracy (but not all magistracies), biographical detail, superfluous now that we have RE etc., is not included. Modern discoveries and discussions, however, on onomastic and occasionally other interesting items are noted, together with comment or other contributive matter original to this work." (Preface)
———. 1996. Onomasticon to Cicero's Treatises. Stuttgart: Teubner.

"As in the two earlier volumes, anonymous references are placed in round brackets. Round brackets in a name itself indicate parts of it not found in the text. Two or more occurrences under the same reference number are indicated thus: 502, 513 and so on. Variations of style in recurrent names are given in separate notes. An asterisk indicates that the reference is part of a quotation. Entries with two components, e.g. Demetrius Phalereus, are listed as they occur in the first reference and changes of order in subsequent references indicated thus: Ο Ι.3^r. In the first index geographical appendages like Paelignus or Pisaurensis, which might or might not have been regarded as cognomina (as some certainly were, e.g. Calenus), are italicized, a and / or b before an entry means that it is also in OCS and / or OCLrespectively." (From the Preface)
Sharples, Robert W. 1986. "Cicero's Republic and Greek Political Theory." Polis no. 5:30–50.

"Cicero's Republic, even though surviving only in a fragmentary state, is perhaps the most rewarding of his works to the student of Greek and Roman literature, thought, and history. Times have changed since the days when people regarded the works of 45 and 44 B. C., the Tusculans, De Natura Deorum and so on, as little more than compilations from Greek sources to which Cicero had contributed little or nothing of his own, and as quarries for the sort of Quellenforschung which operated on the principle that all original ideas must by definition have been produced by authors whose own works do not survive. All the same, those later philosophical works written in haste; and they do draw heavily on Greek sources now lost. In the case of the Republic, however, there is the obvious interest of comparison with Plato's Republic, a comparison which Cicero obviously invites by taking Plato's work as his model;(2) there are indications, even in the present fragmentary state of the work, of careful literary, composition;(3) and the central issue - the best form of constitution, and the way in which political harmony might be achieved - is closely related to Cicero's own career and political standpoint.(4)"

(2) For points of similarity cf. e.g. C.W. Keyes, Cicero; De re publica, De legibus (Loeb, 1928) 6-1 (all references to Cicero's Republic are to this editon), and R.G.G. Coleman, 'The Dream of Cicero', Proc. Cambridge Phllol. Soc. n.s. 10 (1964), 2 n.2.

(3) See below, section Ill.

(4) One might speculate as to how far Scipio the Younger, the chief speaker in books 1 and 2, Is speaking for Clcero himself, or whether Cicero is deliberately attributing to Scipio positions which the historIcal Sclpio would have held though CIcero himself does not; the latter alternative seems to me unlikely.
———. 1995. "Causes and Necessary Conditions in the Topica and De Fato." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G. F., 247–272. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Cicero’s treatise De Fato (On Fate) was written in some haste(1) in late May or early June of 44 Bc.(2). His Topica (Topics) were written on board ship while he was sailing between Velia and Rhegium, with the intention, which he finally abandoned, of leaving Italy for Greece, in July of the same year.(3) It is hardly surprising, given the closeness of date and the circumstances of composition, that Cicero utilizes some apparently similar material; in both works the prologue of Ennius’ Medea, based on that of Euripides, is used to illustrate the distinction between a necessary condition for an event’s coming about and what actually brings it about, and in both works the discussion of necessary conditions is connected with the Stoic doctrine of fate. But whereas in the Topica we are told that necessary conditions are causes, in the De Fato Cicero attacks the Stoic doctrine of fate by arguing that they are not. There is thus an apparent contradiction. On the other hand, the two works have different concerns; the Topica is concerned to distinguish between different types of cause with a view to their treatment in rhetorical argument, while De Fato exploits, in the interests of its own antideterminist argument, a limitation of what is to count as a ‘cause’.

The analysis which follows makes no claim to settle all the questions with which it deals; it is offered rather as a contribution which may help to stimulate further discussion. That is an

approach which Cicero himself, as a follower of the Academy, (4) would have approved."

(1) This at least is the natural interpretation of Cicero's reference in § 1 to a chance occurrence preventing him from setting out the work in the form of speeches for each side. Cf. A. Yon, Ciceron: Traite du destin (Paris, 1933), p. viii.

(2) Cf. Yon, pp. ii-v.

(3) Cf. P. M. Huby, 'Cicero's Topics and its Peripatetic Sources', in W.W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz (eds.), Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 4; New Brunswick, 1989), 61-76, at 61 and n. 1; J.-J. Duhot, La Conception stoicienne de Ia causalité (Paris, 1989), 202.

(4) Cf. J. Glucker, 'Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations', in J.M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The Question of Eclecticism (Berkeley, Calif., 1987), 34-69.
Skvirsky, Alexndre. 2019. "Doubt and dogmatism in Cicero's Academica." Archai: The Origins of Western Thought no. 27:1–21.

Abstract: "The objective is to show the peculiar way in which Cicero’s philosophical thinking is original and distances itself from the main representatives of the New Academy: the Roman thinker does not practice epoche, nor does he assign any special role to it in his thought. Instead, Cicero introduces the concept of doubt to characterize his own way of thinking."
Smethurst, S. E. . 1952. "Cicero and Dicaearchus." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 83:224–232.

"Among the writers of the Hellenistic period whose works have been lost the Peripatetic, Dicaearchus of Messene, has a prominent place. Recently it has once more been maintained that Cicero's theory of the mixed constitution and much of the first book of his Republic is derived from Dicaearchus.' But little survives of his work except a few tantalizing fragments. Of these twenty-four are found in the works of Cicero who, nevertheless, makes no men- tion of Dicaearchus in the Republic and refers to him but once in the Laws.2 On the other hand, we note that in the Republic Panaetius is cited twice, Polybius three times and Plato nine times, in addition to the fourteen occasions on which he is quoted in the Laws.3 Since it may be argued that such statistical details are not of great significance, it is the purpose of this paper to ex- amine the importance of Dicaearchus in relation to Cicero's thought, with especial reference to his political theory." (p. 224)

(1) By T. A. Sinclair, History of Greek Political Thought (London 1952) 251, 284.

(2) Cicero refers to him ten times in letters (fr. 4, 18a, 20, 25, 27, 28, 67-70); six times in the Tusculans (fr. 8c-e, 9, 43) of which five refer to Dicaearchus' denial of the immortality of the soul; four times in De divinatione (fr. 14-17); once in the Academica Priora (fr. 8f), De officiis (fr. 24) and Laws (fr. 67). Of them all only seven refer, even vaguely, to Dicaearchus' political theory or to titles of political works (fr. 25, 27, 28, 67-70). In this paper all references to the fragments are cited from the edition of F. Wehrli, Dikaiarchos (Basel 1944), the first volume in the series 'Die Schule des Aristoteles.'

(3) Panaetius: Rep. 1.10.15, 1.21.34. Polybius: Rep. 1.21.34, 2.14.27, 4.3.3. Plato: Rep. 1.10.16, 1.14.22, 1.17.29, 1.42.65, 2.1.3, 2.11.22, 2.29.51, 4.4.4, 4.5.5; Leg. 1.5.15, 1.21.55, 2.3.6, 2.6.14, 2.7.16, 2.15.38. 2.16.41, 2.18.45, 2.27.67, 2.27.69, 3.1.1, 3.2.5, 3.6.14, 3.14.32.
Smith, Gregory Bruce. 2018. Political Philosophy and the Republican Future: Reconsidering Cicero. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

"In what follows I do not attempt to recover an understanding of Cicero merely to reenthrone him as the one author who got it right for all times. We turn to Cicero to see a mode of thinking that can be redeployed in any given present. Yet that thinking will still have to be ours and turned loose on our unique present.

We have one significant impediment to approaching Cicero. The Cicero who is offered up for present audiences is but a vague, and boring, facsimile of the original. To be of anything but antiquarian interest to us we have to gain access to this noble author who has fallen into eclipse. It can be hoped that this effort will reinspirit a sense of our responsibility to the future like the one shown by Cicero. We will need more than a little genuine remembrance of our past to do that. Tocqueville has unfortunately been proven correct when he predicted that the people of the modern world, especially as presented in that vanguard of modernity among Americans, would become among the most ahistorical peoples of all times. We are close to accomplishing the “innocence and forgetting” posited by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as the gateway to the future." (Introduction, p. 7)
Smith, Kevin. 2018. "The Idle Argument in Cicero’s De Fato." Polymath: An Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences Journal:16–22.

Absdtract: "Throughout the course of this paper I examine Cicero’s analysis of the Idle Argument for fatalism and the two possible refutations of the argument that he mentions in his work entitled De Fato. Between the two refutations, one of which was originally given by the Stoic Chrysippus and the other by the Academic Skeptic Carneades, Cicero clearly expresses preference for the one given by Carneades. Cicero claims to prefer Carneades’s refutation for two reasons: because it is simpler than Chrysippus’s refutation and because it allows for praise and blame to be justly applied while Chrysippus’s refutation does not. I argue that this was a mistake, due to the fact that both refutations are equally complicated and they both allow for praise and blame to be justly applied. Upon showing that both of Cicero’s reasons for preferring Carneades’s refutation were false, I conclude that Cicero had no good reason for preferring one refutation over the other and that he therefore made a mistake when he claimed that Carneades’s refutation was better than the one given by Chrysippus."
Smith, Philippa R. 1995. "‘A self-indulgent misuse of leisure and writing’? How not to write philosophy: Did Cicero get it right?" In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G. F., 301–323. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Recently there has been, I think, a heightened awareness of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of arguing in spoken or written language without some sort of 'style', all the more so when one is fired with enthusiasm, passion, or missionary zeal: in other words, the impossibility, pace Plato, of separating rhetoric and philosophy.

Cicero had many reasons for wanting to reconcile them, not least perhaps to reconcile his tremendous oratorical gift and thirst for public glory with his private love of philosophy, but it is reasonable to suppose that, with his acute sensitivity to language and its power, he recognized this particular dilemma too. One solution, with a claim to be more honest and realistic, is indeed to use language rhetorically, but to do so openly and unashamedly, and to provide equally open and unashamed rhetoric on the opposite side.

Thus, even Torquatus, the Epicurean, is given the opportunity to stir the soul with his picture of the virtues and of his Wise Man, ever happy, free from vice, his desires within bounds, with no fear of the future, of death or of divinity, to set against that inspiring Stoic hero, who alone is truly powerful, rich, beautiful, free, unconquerable, and happy.(43) And so in this way, perhaps, with open and not covert rhetoric, with many-sided not one-sided persuasion, one may after all achieve that laudable aim of the Academics 'to leave the audience's judgement pure and free'." (p. 323)

(43) Fin. I. 62; 3. 75.
Smith, Richard Edwin. 1966. Cicero the Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"It is hoped that this study of Cicero’s career as a statesman may be of interest and, possibly, instruction both to scholars and students, and to that wider reading public which is familiar with Cicero and Rome, but has not—at any rate for some years— made it a subject of particular study.

hi handling a subject such as this one is at once confronted with a difficulty; for so much work has been done by scholars both on Cicero and the last century of the Republic that a decision must be made at the outset, how far, if at all, should the narrative be equipped with footnotes. My decision was to omit them, since they would have burdened the pages immensely without contributing greatly to the narrative. References to the ancient sources for all the historical events are to be found both in Magistrates of the Roman Republic [1951] by T. R. Broughton and in The Roman Republic [1923] byT. Rice Holmes, and there seemed no need to repeat them all here; and since I was nowhere taking issue with any particular scholar’s interpretation of events, it seemed unnecessary to refer to all the works of scholarship which took the same view as myself or to draw attention to those whose interpretation differed; for my object is not to put forward a new and controversial viewpoint, but to write a narrative and interpretative account of Cicero’s political career, which, while it may in places differ in emphasis and interpretation—as, indeed, it does—is not attempting to controvert any particular generally accepted thesis or interpretation." (Preface, p. V)
Solmsen, Friedrich. 1938. "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings." Classical Philology no. 33:390–404.

"In view of the close association, amounting almost to identity, which persists even to the present day between rhetoric and the playng upon the feelings, we should expect peoples like the Greeks and Romans, who made rhetoric into a system, to include ψυχαγωγία a among the principal objects of this art and to direct a large proportion of their precepts toward this end. It is no surprise, therefore, to find Cicero stating that movere audientium animos is one of the three main tasks of the ideal orator and to learn that the paramount importance of ή διά τοῦ πάθους πιστίς was recognized as early as Aristotle's time; for ἀπόδειξις, ἦθος and πάθος together form the bulk of his rhetorical system.

It appears, however, from a closer study of the history of ancient rhetoric that this attitude toward ψυχαγωγία, i.e., its recognition as one of the three main objects of the τέχνη, was an exception and that, though its importance was seldom completely ignored, the ancients had several ways of incorporating it into their system. The object of this paper is to describe the two main methods which ancient writers on rhetoric adopted with regard to the treatment of the affectus, to investigate, as far as possible, the origin and history of each of them, and to use the results toward defining more clearly than has hitherto been done the place of Cicero in the history of ancient rhetoric and especially his attitude toward Aristotle and what may be called the "Aristotelian tradition"." (p. 390, two notes omitted)
Steel, Catherine. 2005. Reading Cicero: Genre and Performance in Late Republican Rome. London: Duckworth.
———, ed. 2013. The Cambridge Companion to Cicero. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Map list IX; Notes on contributors XI; List of abbreviations XVI; Catherine Steel: Introduction 1;

Part I: The greco-roman intellectual

1 Anthony Corbeill: Cicero and the intellectual milieu of the late Republic 9; 2 John Dugan: Cicero’s rhetorical theory 25; 3 J. G. P. F. Powell: Cicero’s style 41; 4 Malcolm Schofield: Writing philosophy 73; 5 Emma Gee: Cicero’s poetry 88; 6 Jill Harries: The law in Cicero’s writings 107; 7 Emma Dench: Cicero and Roman identity 122;

Part II: The Roman politician

8 Ann Vasaly: The political impact of Cicero’s speeches 141; 9 Catherine Steel: Cicero, oratory and public life 160; 10 Andrew Bell: Cicero, tradition and performance 171; 11 James E. G. Zetzel: Political philosophy 181; 12 Ruth Morello: Writer and addressee in Cicero’s letters 196; 13 Jon Hall: Saviour of the Republic and Father of the Fatherland: Cicero and political crisis 215;

Part III: Receptions of Cicero

14 Alain M. Gowing: Tully’s boat: responses to Cicero in the imperial period 233; 15 Sabine Maccormack†: Cicero in late antiquity 251; 16 David Marsh: Cicero in the Renaissance 306; 17 Matthew Fox:: Cicero during the Enlightenment 318; 18 Nicholas P. Cole: Nineteenth-century Ciceros 337; 19 Lynn S. Fotheringham: Twentieth/twenty-first-century Cicero(s) 350;

Cicero’s works 374; Bibliography 377; Index locorum 410; General index 416-422.
———. 2013. "Structure, Meaning and Authority in Cicero’s Dialogues." In Der Dialog in der Antike. Formen und Funktionen einer literarischen Gattung zwischen Philosophie, Wissensvermittlung und dramatischer Inszenierung, edited by Föllinger, Sabine and Müller, Gernot Michael, 221–234. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"My purpose in this chapter is to explore the formal features of Cicero’s dialogue and, on that basis, to offer some observations about his construction of the exchange of knowledge among members of the Roman elite within his treatises. This in turn may throw light on one dialogue in particular, Partitiones Oratoriae, which appears in a number of respects to be anomalous.

The identification of a treatise as a dialogue is straightforward: it contains a conversation between two or more people. But there are a number of aspects of dialogue which Cicero varies, and consideration of these variables throws light on the ways in which he addressed the issues of community and pedagogy.

First, Cicero’s dialogues usually have a frame in which Cicero speaks in his own voice and introduces the context of a dialogue and its participants. However, in two cases – De Legibus and Partitiones Oratoriae – there is no frame, and the dialogue is presented as a script, recording the contributions of each character. Secondly, there is great variation in the choice of characters.

(...)

In the dialogues which mix the dead with the still living, Cicero is always present himself s a character in the dialogue, and the Cicero character is usually the sole representative of the latter category. The exception is De Finibus, where, in the fifth book, Quintus Cicero and Atticus are also in conversation with the subsequently deceased Lucius Cicero and Pupius Piso. Cicero is also always a character in dialogues which only involve speakers who were alive at the time of composition. Finally, the time at which the dialogue is set is either identified or not identified, and if the former, may be contemporaneous with the time of writing, or set in the past." (p. 223, a note omitted)
———. 2018. "Re publica nihil desperatius: salvaging the state in Cicero’s pre-civil war philosophical works." In Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie? Kultur-, literatur- und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven, edited by Müller, Gernot Michael and Mariani Zini, Fosca, 269–282. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Cicero’s turn to philosophy in the 50s reflected a very different environment from that in which he was writing the series of works composed between 46 and 44. This earlier series begins at the time of – and perhaps is even initiated by – the public demonstration of Cicero’s weakness and dependence on Pompeius in late spring of 56, a weakness that remained until the outbreak of civil war.

These treatises attempt to enhance Cicero’s auctoritas through their novelty and seriousness as well as to make a claim about the significance of eloquent public speech which is far from borne out by his actual practice as an orator between 57 and 51. In addition, the most immediate challenge to the stability of the res publica was not Caesar, absent in Gaul, but Pompeius. He, as well as Cicero, should be read against the remedies which Cicero reflects on in these treatises, and his success in 52 provides a possible context for the greater confidence and optimism which is discernible in De legibus. As events turned out, a Pompeian rector rei publicae proved a dead end in Cicero’s political theory: when he resumed philosophical composition, it was in a political environment now transformed into autocracy." (pp. 281-282)
———. 2022. "Philosophy in Cicero’s Speech." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 59–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Cicero’s use of philosophy in his speeches thus matches the prescription which Crassus offers in De oratore.(35) Philosophy is one of a number of bodies of knowledge which the orator should possess as a source of effective arguments. It also, in Cicero’s case, underpins the beneficent relationship between the orator and the res publica: Cicero’s philosophical knowledge and understanding enabled him to identify the ways in which he could serve the res publica and support his oratorical skill in explaining to a range of audiences what was required from everyone in its protection." (p. 70)

(35) Cic. De or. 1,52-57.(...)
Stockton, David L. 1971. Cicero: A Political Biography. London: Oxford University Press.

"I have set out to write an account of the political life and activities of Cicero, not a full-scale study which would include a detailed examination and assessment of his literary achievement as well. An assessment of Cicero as a literary figure would not lend itself readily to a biographical treatment, and the public man can be studied separately from the literary giant, so long as -we do not ignore the obvious truth that his literary reputation in his own day contributed to his influence in the political field. For Cicero himself, at any rate, his literary activities were always secondary to his political interests and ambitions, and were pursued only in the subsiciva of an incredibly busy life or fallen back on in periods of enforced withdrawal from the political centre-stage.

The years of Cicero’s maturity are better known to us than any other period of ancient history, and not least because of the great good fortune that has preserved not far short of a thousand letters from and to Cicero for us to read. These letters give to a period otherwise well-supplied with source material a richness of texture unequalled either before or after; and if, together with the many speeches and treatises of Cicero's which have survived, they put us in danger of seeing events and issues too much through his eyes, that is a risk which we have to accept gladly and try to minimize. It has been said that we might understand the history of the late Republic better if none of Cicero’s writings had survived; but whether we should enjoy studying it half so much or gain as much profit from the study is quite another matter. Thanks to his writings, and above all to the letters, the chief dramatis personae come back to life again and take on flesh and bones and colour—and of none of them is this more true than of Cicero himself." (Preface, p. VII)
Striker, Gisela. 1997. "Academics fighting Academics." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 257–276. Leiden: Brill.

"In the famous summary of Photius (Bibl. cod. 212, 170a16), Aenesidemus is said to have described the Academics of his day as 'Stoics fighting Stoics'. The dispute between Cicero's teachers Philo and Antiochus was actually a case of one Academic arguing against another Academic, but if my interpretation of Philo's Roman views is somewhere near the truth, then there would not be much to choose between these two descriptions. Both parties to the dispute were dogmatists, differing only in their greater or lesser modesty; both held theories that can be seen as versions or variants of Stoic epistemology; and neither of them could any more be called a sceptic.*" (p. 276)
Stuart-Buttle, Tim. 2019. From Moral Theology to Moral Philosophy: Cicero and Visions of Humanity from Locke to Hume. New York: Oxford University Press.

"One, primary objective of this book is to offer an intellectual context which sheds light on why Hume held Cicero’s authority to be inviolable when attempting to settle a question which, it is argued, occupied the central place in philosophical debate in Britain from the mid-seventeenth to the late-eighteenth century.(6) This concerned the relationship between moral philosophy and moral theology: a subject to which Hume gave more attention, and on which he wrote more extensively, than any other. To what extent, if at all, do the principles that determine the quality of human behaviour need to be understood in the light of God’s will and intentions for His creatures? This question was, in Britain, placed within the context of the historiography of moral philosophy. How far had the heathen philosophers, who had known nothing of Christ, been able satisfactorily to explain morality without recourse to the existence of a divine creator and moral legislator, who would reward or punish individuals for their conduct on the Day of Judgement? Had the moral teachings of Christianity enlarged upon, contradicted, or merely reaffirmed what the ancient philosophers had been able to discover by means of reason alone? What had been the implications of the institutionalization of Christianity, from the late Roman Empire onwards, as a national religion throughout Europe for the moral and political regulation of communities, and for an accurate philosophical understanding of the true principles of ethics and justice? Hume maintained that Cicero had something uniquely valuable to say on all these questions. As this study explains, he was not alone in doing so. By taking this interest in Cicero as a lens through which to understand the development of moral philosophy in this period, this study also seeks to contribute to other areas of current scholarly interest, and to allow us to reconstruct contemporary understandings of the interrelationships between them. This includes the history of scholarship; the contested relationship between sacred and civil history; the emergent interest in the history of manners and mores; the interpretation of the significance of ‘modern’ commercial society; and the development of theories of toleration, and their connection to fears concerning priestly imposture (‘priestcraft’)." (p. 2)

(6) A debate, moreover, which attracted a great deal of public interest: see the brief remarks in Mautner’s introduction to Hutcheson, Two Texts, 28–30.
Stull, William. 2011. "Deus ille noster: Platonic Precedent and the Construction of the Interlocutors in Cicero's De oratore." Transactions of the American Philological Association no. 141:247–263.

Summary: "In a letter to Atticus defending the treatment of Scaevola in De oratore, Cicero appeals both to the example of Plato, “that god of ours,” and to the memory of what the real Scaevola was actually like. Turning from the letter to De oratore itself, I show how this juxtaposition of Platonic divinity and Roman memory reflects a pattern present in the prefaces to each of the three books. I argue that Cicero presents his characters, in pointed response to Plato in general and the Phaedrus in particular, in such a way as to privilege history and oratory over philosophy."
———. 2012. "Reading the Phaedo in Tusculan Disputations 1." Classical Philology no. 107:38–52.

Description: "The discusssion of the immortality of the soul in the first book of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations begins with a conspicuous display of deference to Platonic precedent. The book recommended is of course the Phaedo, and for a moment, amid thoughts of Socrates in his prison cell, it seems that further consideration of immortality at Tusculum might well be superfluous. Then, in a striking reversal, the situation changes. The otherwise ill-educated interlocutor, conventionally identified as A, reveals that he has in fact read the Phaedo before, more than once and his experiences with it have ultimately been less than satisfactory. Here, to fully explicate A's experience, Stull reviews the sequence of events that brings Ciero's characters, at a surprisingly late stage in their discussion of death, to contemplate the possibility of postmortem survival."
Taifacos, Ioannis G. 1980. "Cicero and the Sicilian Historiography: Timaeus." Ciceroniana on line no. 4.

"Philistus and Timaeus, the two writers who belong to the circle of the Sicilian historiography, are the only ones who have attained an outstanding position in the surviving · works of Cicero. The purpose of this paper is the -examination of Cicero's point of view with regards the historical work of Timaeus and of the historical and geographical information one can draw from the works of the latter. In the future a similar presentation will be made concerning Philistus' place in the works of Cicero (1)." (p. 177)

(1) (1) Cicero cites Philistus in div. 1, 20, 39 ( = FGrHist 556 T 24, F 57), 1, 33, 73 ( = F 58), Brut. 17, 66 ( = T 21), de orat. 2, 13, 57 ( = T 17b), and ad Q. fr. 2, 11, 4 (= T 17a).
Tarán, Leonardo. 1987. "Cicero's Attitude towards Stoicism and Skepticism in the De natura deorum." In Florilegium Colombianum. Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, edited by Selig, Karl-Ludwig and Somerville, Robert, 1–22. New York: Italica Press.

Reprinted in: L. Tarán, Collected Papers (1962-1999), Leiden: Brill 2001, pp. 455-478.
Taylor, Barnaby. 2016. "Definition and ordinary language in Cicero De finibus 2." Classical Philology no. 111:54–73.

"Cicero’s interests in the second book of De finibus are not limited to Epicurean ethics. Out of the first-order ethical discussions of the book there emerges a parallel debate about philosophical procedure. At 2.3–19, Cicero treats, in quick succession, two distinct methodological issues: the rejection of definition (2.3–5), and the use of ethical terms drawn from ordinary language (2.6 –19, revisited at 2.48–50). For Epicureans, these two issues were not unrelated. In the first two parts of this article I provide a new account of Epicurus’ rejection of definition in the light of his attitudes toward ordinary language. This includes an interpretation of the role of preconceptions in Epicurean inquiry, together with a novel understanding of how the relationship of preconceptions to words allows them to be distinguished from other conceptions in a useful way. I will show how the existence, in Epicurean linguistic theory, of transparent connections between terms and underlying preconceptions, and between preconceptions and external reality, warranted

a rejection of definition (both real and nominal) as procedurally unnecessary.

In the third, fourth, and fifth parts, I consider how these Epicurean theories are (and are not) dealt with in De finibus 2. There I will show that, instead of attacking Epicurean doctrine for its epistemological and language-theoretical commitments, Cicero adopts a dialectical approach, seeking to demonstrate that Epicureans regularly fail, in practice, to live up to their own professed procedural standards." (p. 54)
Tempest, Kathryn. 2011. Cicero: Politics and Persuasion in Ancient Rome. London: Continuum.

"Accordingly, it is not my intention to persuade the reader to like Cicero as a person, or to admire his political thoughts and actions, but rather to understand him, to appreciate his works and hopefully even to challenge the traditional obstacles, described above, facing anyone who studies Cicero in depth. Above all, I hope to demonstrate that Cicero – the man, politician and author – remains a valuable and exciting topic of study.

With this objective in mind, I have largely avoided engaging in the extensive debate that surrounds much of what I say; for those wanting to know more, notes and a bibliography are provided which will point the way to further study.

Instead, the narrative which follows is given, as far as possible, as a unifi ed presentation of my own views, which are driven by the conviction that Cicero was – as the Emperor Augustus described him – a master of words and a patriot. But it will also argue that a careful reading of Cicero’s works can reveal something substantial about what motivated Cicero to behave the way he did, and how and why he achieved a predominant role in a political system that was, as we shall see, fiercely competitive." (Prologue, p. 6)
———. 2020. "Cicero's artes liberales and the Liberal arts." Ciceroniana on line no. 4:479–500.

Abstract>: "This article examines Cicero’s concept of the artes liberales within his larger vision for education. Starting with the codification of a curriculum in the work of Martianus Capella, it explores the reception of Cicero’s works in the early development of the canon before turning back to the contexts of Cicero’s original thinking on the subjects. In particular, it illustrates how Cicero sought to broaden the curriculum and make the artes relevant for life in first-century BC Rome, combining traditional Greek learning with innovative topics on modern history and political science. In so doing I suggest some of the ways in which Cicero’s arguments on the value of a broad education still echo in our ideas of the Liberal Arts today before ending with some reflections on the political context in which they were produced."
ten Berge, Bram. 2014. "Dreams in Cicero’s De Divinatione: Philosophical Tradition and Education." Archiv für Religionsgeschichte no. 15:53–66.

Abstract: "This paper proposes an explanation for the surprisingly extensive treatment of dreams in Cicero’s De divinatione. It suggests that Cicero saw an opportunity to become the first Roman author to write extensively on dreams. The paper rejects the notion that Cicero voices his personal opinion about (dream) divination, and suggests, rather, that he wished to provide for his readers a comprehensive debate of Stoic and Academic views on dreams. Finally, Cicero points to the value of this discussion when he implies that dreams have become a source of anxiety and that his account may relieve the reader of such apprehension."
Thorsrud, Harald. 2002. "Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: the Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 40:1–18.

"It is possible that Cicero, under the spell of his teacher Philo, misinterpreted his Academic predecessors,(16) but it is also worth exploring the hypothesis that he did not get them wrong in order to see what kind of a picture emerges. This is especially worth doing since Cicero is our earliest and best informed source for the views of Arcesilaus and Carneades. He is also our most sympathetic source.

Since he was entirely uninfluenced by Pyrrhonism, we find none of the polemical attacks on the Academy that are evident in Sextus Empiricus.

A careful consideration of Cicero’s remarks about Carneades and Arcesilaus will reveal, I believe, coherent and interesting portraits that are consistent with Philo’s Academic fallibilism but not with the dialectical interpretation." (p. 5)

(16) For this interpretation, see especially M. Burnyeat, “Antipater and Self-Refutation: Elusive Arguments in Cicero’s Academica,” in AA. [= B. Inwood and J. Mansfeld, eds., Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero’s Academic Books, (Leiden: Brill, 1997)]
Trollope, Anthony. 1881. The Life of Cicero. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Trouard, Mary Alexaidia. 1942. Cicero’s Attitude Towards the Greeks. Chicago: The University of Chicago.

"Although Cicero admitted with some reservation the supremacy of the Greeks in matters pertaining to culture and learning, still on one ground he withheld the concession entirely, namely, in regard to language. In undertaking to attain the goal which he set before himself of presenting an encyclopedia of philosophy to the Romans, Cicero found further reasons to vaunt the superiority of the Romans over the Greeks in matters of vocabulary. It was his belief that Latin was not only richer in its vocabulary than the Greek(1) but that it was unquestionably superior, a contention which he had maintained in face of opposition(2) and which he lost no opportunity to argue." (p. 52)

(...)

"Nevertheless, the proposal to philosophy for Roman readers involved furnish an encyclopaedia of several almost Insurmountable obstacles. First there was the questionable propriety of a Roman--and he one of consular rank—engaging in a literary career; secondly, there were difficulties arising from the attitude which the Romans took towards philosophy; thirdly, an equally serious problem resulted from the disdain with which the Romans regarded native literary ability; and finally, there was the tremendous task of creating a philosophical vocabulary for the Latin language." (p. 86)

(...)

"Previous to Cicero’s venture no notable attempts, with the exception of Lucretius, had been made to present philosophy in the Latin tongue. Of Lucretius, Cicero had little to say.

However, the poet’s contribution to a philosophical terminology was negligible insofar as Cicero was concerned, for the scope of Lucretius’ poem, confined as it was to the mechanical and physical aspects of Epicureanism, was extremely narrow in comparison with Cicero’s alm to discuss the entire system of philosophy. Furthermore, the restriction placed on Lucretius by the Latin hexameter could be Ignored to advantage by the prose writer.(4) On the other hand, little or no assistance could be got from the works of the other Roman Epicureans whose efforts to put Greek philosophy into Latin consisted of translations of worse originals.(5) As true disciples of Epicurus, whose language was notoriously unintelligible,(6) these Romans were no models of lucidity(7) and consequently had to be disregarded.(8) Under such circumstances, it devolved upon Cicero to create a philosophical terminology for Latin·" (pp. 88-89)

(1) De fin. 1.10,

(2) De fin. III. 5,

(4) C. Reiley, Studies In the Philosophical Terminology of Lucretius and Cicero (New York; Columbia University Press, 1909), pp. 25-27.

(5) Ad fam, xv. 19. 2: "ipse enlm Epicurus, a quo omnes Catil et Amafinii, mali verborum interprètes, etc."

(6) De fin. II. 15.

(7) Acad. 1. 5; T. D. IV. 6, 7; II. 7; III. 33; Cf. S. Reid, Reliquiae Academicorum (London: 1885), Introd. p. 21.

(8) Acad. 1. 5.
Tsouni, Gergia. 2023. "Cicero’s Academic Scepticism in De officiis." In Cicero: De officiis, edited by Brüllmann, Philipp and Müller, Jörn, 33–50. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Cicero’s explicit dependence on Panaetius’ treatise Peri tou kathēkontos (at least in the first two books of De officiis) has been another reason for the lack of attention to Academic scepticism in the discussion of Cicero’s last philosophical work. This has placed the focus of scholarship predominantly on “source criticism” and Cicero’s relation to his Stoic source(4) and has left Cicero’s own aims, and in particular those related to his allegiance to the Academy, underdiscussed. This despite the fact that, while explicitly stating at 1.6 that on the question of duties “we will follow the Stoics above all” (sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos), Cicero is also keen to stress that he is not a mere translator of Stoic views but that he will use his own (critical) judgement in the discussion of the treatise of Panaetius.(5) This statement seems to be intimately linked to Cicero’s Academic identity, both in the peculiar sense in which Cicero is meant to “follow” the Stoics on the question of duties and with regard to his critical distance towards that theory. Accordingly, in this chapter I will discuss how Cicero’s Academic identity shapes the discussion of appropriate actions in De officiis, focusing primarily on how Cicero applies the Academic principle of persuasiveness (probabile) in this work and on the use of Academic dialectical methodology for the discussion of the Stoic theory on appropriate actions, especially in the third book of De officiis." (p. 34)

(4) This approach is exemplified, for instance, in Dyck’s [A commentary on Cicero, De Officiis] 1996 commentary of the work.

(5) Cf. Fin. 1.6. At Off. 3.20 Cicero also refers to the “freedom” (licentia) enjoyed by Academic sceptics, who defend philosophical positions after exercising their free judgement.
van der Blom, Henriette. 2010. Cicero’s Role Models: the Political Strategy of a Newcomer. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This study examines Marcus Tullius Cicero’s rhetorical and political strategy in late Roman republican politics with regard to his self-advertisement as follower of chosen models of behaviour from the past—his role models or personal exempla. As an ambitious newcomer, a homo novus, in a political culture which favoured men descended from famous consuls and generals, Cicero had to devise alternative strategies to reach political office and influence.

It will be argued that Cicero, through his main means to political power, his oratory, adopted the traditional claim to political offices through ancestry and adapted it to his own situation. Instead of references to the virtues and achievements of his own ancestors, Cicero presented himself as emulating specific historical figures with the purpose of building up and strengthening his public persona and thereby supporting his claim to political offices and influence." (Preface, P. IX)
van Zyl, D. H. 1990. "Cicero's eclecticism and originality." Akroterion no. 35:118–122.

Abstract: "One of the most strenuous debates in regard to Cicero turns upon the controversial subject of his eclecticism and originality, or lack of originality. Much of what is said on this subject, however, is simplistic or ill-considered, since it does not take account, on the one hand, of the relevant circumstances pertaining to Cicero's eclecticism nor, on the other hand, of the basis upon which his originality should be adjudicated."
Warren, James. 2013. "The Harm of Death in Cicero’s First Tusculan Disputation." In The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death, edited by Taylor, James Stacey, 44–70. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Many philosophical discussions of death draw their ultimate inspiration from questions and arguments found most prominently in ancient Epicurean texts, in particular the third book of Lucretius’ De rerum natura. But there were other important ancient discussions of death perhaps inspired by those Epicurean ideas. The first book of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, written just after Lucretius’ great Epicurean poem, is addressed to combating the fear of death. The eventual conclusion of the book is that a proper conception of the nature of the immortal soul is the only sound basis for a properly confident attitude toward death. But at the very beginning of the work, there is a dense section of argument (§9–16) that aims to show, in ‘Socratic’ style, that the following two beliefs are inconsistent: (i) There is no postmortem existence, and (ii) death is a deprivation and therefore an evil. The aim in this section is to demonstrate that the now-familiar Epicurean approach to dispelling concerns about the harm of death is sufficient at least for the conclusion that, if death is annihilation, then it is not a harm. For the two speakers in the book, however, even this is too weak a conclusion: They press on to attempt to show that death is not merely not a harm, but can actually be a positive benefit. My aim here is to discuss the content of Cicero’s argument in that early section of the book, emphasising in particular its dialectical method and the care with which it has been constructed." (p. 44)
Watson, Gerald. 1971. "The Natural Law and Stoicism." In Problems in Stoicism, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 216–268. London: Athlone Press.
White, Peter. 2010. Cicero in Letters: Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic. New York: Oxford University Press.

"The point of this study, then, is to relate the letters of Cicero to the letter writing habits of a particular Roman milieu. I assume that readers are already acquainted with handbook information about the life of Cicero and the components of his oeuvre. Points on which I wish to elaborate will be taken up as they become relevant to the argument. I assume as well that readers have already encountered some of the letters and that they are interested in them less as historical sources or literary compositions than as a peculiarly mannered form of social intercourse. I will focus on the manners. My primary purpose is to explain what Cicero and his correspondents took for granted about letters and about one another when they corresponded, and to investigate the significance of some of the topics they treated. I hope also to bring out the sense these letters convey that they were written in circumstances in which the principals had something to lose (a sense which, in my view at least, is almost completely missing from Pliny’s letters). Although I cover no more than a fraction of the nearly 950 letters that survive, I have tried to keep in view the entirety of the collection. I hope that readers of Cicero’s correspondence will find that what I write about those letters I do discuss will carry over to many I do not. Finally, I translate frequently from the letters, partly to anchor the argument and partly because I had an unexpectedly good time trying to channel the voices of Cicero and his correspondents." (Preface, p. IX)
Wood, Neal. 1988. Cicero's Social and Political Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press.

"I have written this study—to my knowledge the first if its kind in English—out of a conviction that Cicero the social and political thinker deserves far more attention than he has received in recent years, when few any longer read him. Long-standing concerns with the history of political theory and classical antiquity and my previous work on John Locke led me quite naturally to Cicero.

My interpretation of his ideas rests on a reading of his voluminous writings in their historical setting. Lengthy references to secondary sources and discussion of them have been kept to a minimum.

Much remains to be assayed. So, for example, little in the following has been done to relate in detail Cicero's thought to the contexts of Roman law and rhetoric or to his own legal and rhetorical views; and the intellectual origins of his conceptions have been touched upon only briefly. I shall be content if students, social scientists, and the general public are further encouraged to think about Cicero, a process of enlightenment already begun by the stimulating scholarship of W. K. Lacey, Τ. Ν. Mitchell, Elizabeth Rawson, and D. R. Shackleton Bailey." (Preface, p. IX)
Woolf, Raphael. 2007. "Particularism, Promises and Persons in Cicero’s De Officiis." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 33:317–346.

"Perhaps, then, the quality of our ethical lives will be determined not by a set of action-guiding rules but by the ‘experience and practice’ that, as Cicero later stresses ([De officiis] ì1. 60), is an important component in our being able to do the right thing.

I want to suggest that this reading is, in broad outline, correct, and that the outlook of De officiis tends markedly in a particularist direction. Backing for this claim will come, firstly, from a more detailed examination of what Cicero has to say about the keeping of promises and its relation to the basic principles (Sections II–VI).

Further support will then be offered via an investigation of the ethical importance that the treatise allots to the character of persons or agents (Sections VII–X). According to Cicero, an agent’s individual character should play a prominent role in the determination of what counts as right or wrong action. Character differences being potentially unlimited, a fact Cicero himself draws our attention to, we may regard general rules as having a correspondingly questionable status in Cicero’s ethical scheme." (pp. 320-321)
———. 2013. "Cicero and Gyges." The Classical Quarterly no. 63:801–812.

"The tale of Gyges’ ring narrated by Cicero at De officiis 3.38 is of course originally found, and acknowledged as such by Cicero, in Plato (Resp. 359c–360b). I would like in this paper to address two questions about Cicero’s handling of the tale – one historical, one philosophical. The purpose of the historical question is to evaluate, with respect to the Gyges narration, Cicero’s quality as a reader of Plato. How well does Cicero understand the role of the story in its original Platonic context? The motivation for the question is that, at first blush, Cicero seems to have badly misunderstood it. I shall argue that the appearance is illusory, and that Cicero understands the tale’s Platonic provenance perfectly well.

(...)

This point leads on to my second, philosophical, question: what, if anything, does Cicero’s version of the Gyges story, a story which both authors are clear is supposed to help us understand the character of justice, tell us about the requirements for an adequate conception of justice? Here Cicero’s explicitness helps bring to the forefront the question of why exactly a tale so remote from everyday reality should have anything to tell us about justice at all. Cicero claims that those who argue that the tale’s remoteness makes it irrelevant to the issue are themselves missing the point. I shall assess this claim, though I will not attempt to provide a definitive resolution of it. I hope none the less, in the course of considering how the remoteness of the tale bears upon its efficacy as a piece of moral thinking, to bring into focus some problems that any such resolution would need to confront." (p. 801)
———. 2015. Cicero: The Philosophy of a Roman Sceptic. New York: Routledge.

"The book aims at coverage of what one might call Cicero’s core philosophical writings, with minor works, such as On Old Age, On Friendship and the difficult to classify Stoic Paradoxes by and large left to one side. It is organized thematically, the five chapters that follow this introduction (Chapters 2–6) representing broadly, in terms of modern philosophical divisions, respective treatments by Cicero of epistemology, theology and metaphysics, political philosophy, ethics and moral psychology. Some chapters cover a single work, some more than one. To sustain the book’s focus, I have not devoted any substantive discussion to Cicero’s letters, speeches or treatises on rhetoric, though these all contain material pertinent to a full assessment of his philosophical stance.

For similar reasons I have not engaged explicitly with the growing body of secondary literature on various aspects of Cicero’s philosophical thought, though I have learned much from that literature both in agreement and dissent. It is not my objective to expound, let alone resolve, one particular scholarly crux or another, but to try to complement the existing literature with a cogent reading of Cicero’s philosophical works both individually and as a whole. I have in this regard thought it appropriate to start afresh from the texts themselves, as it were, rather than from existing scholarly debates. Readers who wish to become better acquainted with recent scholarship on Cicero’s philosophy will find suggestions for further reading at the end of the book." (p. 8)
———. 2021. "Unnatural Law: A Ciceronian Perspective." In State and Nature: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Adamson, Peter and Eapp, Christopher, 221–245. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "Cicero recognizes general moral principles independent of human convention, to which the actual laws and conventions that human societies devise must conform. Yet he believes that differences in local circumstances mean that the way in which conformity is realized may vary considerably across time and place. Conformity need not, and perhaps should not, imply uniformity.

Furthermore, Cicero is attuned to the question of how societies develop towards a better realization of the natural law. Genuinely lasting improvement does not result from imposing wholesale change but by engaging reflectively and critically with tradition, custom and history. These points are established through a reading of three of Cicero’s philosophical works: De Re Publica, De Officiis, and especially

De Legibus."
———, ed. 2023. Cicero’s De officiis: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors; Acknowledgments; List of Abbreviations; R. Woolf: Introduction;

Part I: The Framework of De officiis

1. J. P. F. Wynne: The Family in De Officiis; 2. G. Tsouni, Conflict of Duties in Cicero’s De Officiis,

Part II: The Role of Virtue

3. B. Inwood: Oikeiōsis and the Origin of Virtue; 4. M. Schofield: Cicero’s Project in Book 2 of De Officiis; 5, C. Gill: Cicero’s De Officiis on Practical Deliberation;

Part III: £xemplary Ethics

6. R. Langlands, De Officiis and Exemplary Ethics; 7. G. White: Emulation and Moral Development in De Officiis;

Part IV: Self and SocietY

8. C. Bishop: Care of the (Written) Self: Literary and Ethical Decorum in De Officiis; 9. S. McConnell, Cicero and the Cynics;

Part V: Politics

10. J. W. Atkins, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in Cicero’s De Officiis; 11. I. Gildenhard, Cicero’s Extremist Ethics;

References.
———. 2023. "Cicero on Rhetoric and Dialectic." In Power and Persuasion in Cicero’s Philosophy, edited by Gilbert, Nathan, Graver, Margaret and McConnell, Sean 15–34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The purpose of this chapter is to offer a sketch of the relation between rhetoric and dialectic in Cicero’s thought and to identify a problem internal to his account and explore his resources for tackling it. I do not aspire to offer a comprehensive analysis of the role of either rhetoric or dialectic within Cicero’s writings, let alone within those of other thinkers or practitioners who influenced him. My hope, rather, is that investigation of some of the ways in which he conceives of the relation may illuminate some distinctive aspects of his own philosophical approach." (p. 15)
Wynne, J. P. F. 2014. "Learned and Wise: Cotta the Sceptic in Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 47:245–273.

"Some more radical sorts of ancient sceptic claimed to live, or to try to live, without beliefs. That invited and invites psychological questions. For example: even if you could live without beliefs, or could try to, what could it be like to live that way?

Cicero wrote dialogues. Dialogues allow their author to add a dimension to writing about philosophy. A character, if he wishes, can give an argument in expository prose. But the author of a dialogue, by putting this character in a drama, can also suggest for him a 'psychology'.

In On the Nature of the Gods [ = DND] Cicero presented a sceptical character, Cotta, who reports his inner life.(1)" (p. 245)

(...)

"My analysis of Cotta will be as follows. I contend that of the various sorts of Academic sceptic Cicero describes, Cotta follows Clitomachus' interpretation of Carneades. That is to say, he avoids beliefs like those of a dogmatist, which the dogmatist takes to be true. Instead he has Views' (sententiae) which he does not take to be true but rather like the truth or persuasive. Thus to somebody with dogmatist assumptions, what it is like to be Cotta seems surprisingly normal in many ways (he navigates the world using his views) but strange in some (he reports only psychological histories for his views, never epistemic justifications). Nevertheless, I argue, Cotta harbours hope of discovering the truth one day and can be affected if a view seems to be true or false. In this way he is an Academic radical sceptic worth contrasting with the Pyrrhonist." (p. 247)

(1) 1 'Cotta' in DND is a fictionalization of a flesh-and-blood man, C. Aurelius Cotta (RE 'Aurelius' 96). Cicero knew the real Cotta and admired him as an orator (see testimonia in H. Malcovati, Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta, 4th edn. (Turin, 1976), 286-91).(...)
———. 2018. "Cicero." In Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, edited by Machuca, Diego E. and Reed, Baron. London: Bloomsbury.

"In Section 1, I sided Cicero with Clitomachus in the internal debates of the skeptical Academy. I shall now try to bring Cicero’s skepticism to life: why did Cicero choose to be a skeptic of this kind, when his charismatic teacher, Philo, was not? In answer to this question, I shall suggest that Cicero reports a strong intuition about what we call today the ethics of belief debate, an intuition for which he found a theoretical model in some Stoic psychology. A focus of the debate over the ethics of belief is this question: ought we, or may we, ever form a belief in the absence of sufficient evidence for its truth? For example, suppose that there is insufficient evidence for the truth of the proposition that God exists. But suppose also that those who believe in Him act more justly and have a unique source of comfort. In such circumstances, would we be permitted, or obliged, to form the belief that God exists? The contemporary version of this debate was begun by W. K. Clifford, who held firmly the “evidentialist” line that we ought never to form a belief in the absence of sufficient evidence (Clifford [W. K., “The Ethics of Belief,” Contemporary Review 29: 289–309] 1877). I wish to suggest that Cicero describes a similar evidentialist intuition."
———. 2019. Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"For the purpose of interpreting DND [De natura deorum] and Div. [De divinatione]. I can sum up what I want to add to the encyclopedia view in two principles. The other chapters of my book aim to show these principles’ worth by putting them into action. They are:

The learned reader principle: to get the most from Cicero’s dialogues, we should read them as though we were learned readers, who are already aware of many of the philosophers, views, and arguments we read about, or could find out about them for ourselves fairly easily. For us, this means reading the dialogues with our other sources for Hellenistic philosophy at our elbow.

The literary unity principle: we should read the dialogues as though Cicero has an overall goal in writing each of them, which influences his choice of schools for presentation and criticism, his characters, their arguments, and so on, and we should read each speech as written for a coherent character who chooses a set of arguments in response to a given dramatic setting.(41)

In the remaining sections of this introduction, I shall proceed as follows.

In section 0.3 I shall re-xamine an old challenge to a position like mine, the single-source hypothesis. In sections 0.4 and 0.5 I look at the evidence for two approaches that Cicero took to his literary project: the dialogue form at large, and his application of it to skeptical writing in particular. In section 0.6 I look ahead to the two dialogues with which I shall be concerned in the rest of the book." (p. 18)

(41) It is not my view that Cicero never made mistakes in pursuit of his goals. For some exceptions to the literary unity principle in Div., see Chapter 5 Secttion 5,2, but cf. Chapter 5 section 5.1.
———. 2020. "Cicero's Tusculan disputations: a sceptical reading." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 58:205–238.

"But to some, the Tusculans have a monstrous aspect: they seem both to be a vital organ of Cicero’s philosophical corpus, and also not to fit into it. For the Tusculans differ in many ways from the other members of the body of philosophical dialogues Cicero wrote between 46 and 44 BCE. Yet we know Cicero thought the Tusculans a part of this body. One response is to decide that, although the Tusculans make much use of philosophical material, Cicero’s final aim in writing them was not philosophical. I shall offer a version of the other answer: even those features of the Tusculans that seem at odds with Cicero’s philosophical ambitions are, in fact, designed to serve them(4) In particular, I hope to solve the puzzle that, at first sight, the Tusculans seem much less sceptical than Cicero’s otherdialogues of the period would lead us to expect." (pp. 206-207, a note omittedf)

(4) I do not deny that the Tusculans might also have had other goals, nor is anything I say here inconsistent with that thesis. For example, it is at least consistent with what I say that Cicero may have had immediate and practical political goals for writing the Tusculans when he did.
Yavetz, Zvi. 2002. "Cicero: A Man of Letters in Politics." In Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, edited by Clark, Gillian and Rajak, Tessa, 173–180. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter argues that Cicero, so immediately recognizable as a human being, has carried the burden of unreasonable expectations. It evokes, with firmness and sympathy, the pressures on a power-holder who must make political judgements without time for philosophical reflection. Cicero is not a philosopher or even an intellectual in politics: he is an intellectual politician, a man of letters."
Zarecki, Jonathan. 2009. "Cicero’s Definition of ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ." Arethusa no. 42:251–270.

"If Powell [J. G. F., 1994 "The Rector Rei Publicae of Cicero's De Republica," Scripta Classica Israelica, 13.19-29] is correct, as I believe he is, that Cicero translates the Platonic πολιτικός; as rector rei publicae, we are left with the following uestion: what is the meaning of πολιτικός; when Cicero renders it in the original Greek? This article will investigate Cicero's use of 7tOA.tttK6<; and, through an examination of its occurrences, elucidate its particular Ciceronian meaning. I will first give a brief overview of both the Platonic πολιτικός; and the Ciceronian rector rei publicae. Then by examining the context of its use and Cicero's overall consistency in its application, I will show that πολιτικός; has a Ciceronian meaning that is much narrower in scope than either the πολιτικός; of Greek philosophy or the Ciceronian rector.(9) Cicero uses this word as a noun, an adverb, and an adjective. As a noun, the Ciceronian πολιτικός; is depicted as the rectifier of immediate and pressing political crises, a transitory figure used to eliminate aberrations in the functioning of the Roman state and thus ensure its continuation. As an adjective and adverb, it is used to describe those situations that require a πολιτικός; of the Ciceronian style for their resolution." (p. 253)

(9) The Greek form πολιτικός; appears only thirty-two times in the entire Ciceronian corpus, and of these thirty-two, twenty-seven are found in the letters to Atticus - and over half of those in the letters from 51-49 B.C.E. It also appears once each in the letters to his brother (Q. fr. 2.13.1) and his friends (Fam. 2.8.1 ), and thrice in the philosophical works (Brut. 265, Fin. 4.5, 5.66). It appears twice transliterated into Latin (de Orat. 3.109, Fam. 8.1.4); Oksala [P. 1953. Die griechischen Lehnworter in den Prosaschriften Ciceros. Helsinki] does not make note of it. Cicero also mentions the Tripolitikos of Dicaearchus in Att. 13.32.2.
———. 2014. Cicero’s Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

"Since the publication of Karl Büchner’s commentary in 1984 [M. Tullius Cicero, De Re Publica (Heidelberg: Carl Winter)] there has been a resurgence of interest in Cicero’s treatise on the State. It has been the subject of no fewer than seven critical editions, including the first Oxford Classical Text in 2006, four English translations, and a great number of articles by classicists, philosophers, and political scientists. Yet despite the attention paid to both De Re Publica in general and the rector rei publicae in particular, there is still disagreement about the exact role of the ideal statesman within the dialogue and whether or not it played a role in Cicero’s philosophy outside of De Re Publica. Cicero’s discourse on the State—the capitalization is intentional—has been enjoying a renaissance in the last two decades. I hope to add a new interpretation of one aspect of De Re Publica to the discussion, and by doing so resurrect the ideal statesman as an integral part of Cicero’s life-long political philosophy." (p. 2)
Zetzel, James E. G. 1972. "Cicero and the Scipionic Circle." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology no. 76:173–179.

"In the nineteenth century, the existence of the Scipionic Circle was inferred from the settings of the De Republica and the De Amicitia, as well as a few other minor references,(2) and since then few historians have stopped to consider whether or not the evidence supports the far-reaching conclusions often drawn from it. It is only too easy to assume that the two dialogues employing that setting are historical documents, and to forget that, for Cicero, the choice of speakers and background for his dialogues was a matter of literary artifice, not of historical reconstruction.

To start by asking how Cicero viewed the Scipionic Circle is misleading: one should rather question whether or not the dialogues give any good reason to believe in its existence. Recently, some starts have been made in this direction; Strasburger, for instance, sees in Cicero's Scipionic Circle an idealized portrait based on the "Circle of Crassus" of Cicero's youth.(3) This solution only creates one problem in place of another. In fact, we must look again at the two dialogues themselves to see how much historical evidence they actually give us. By doing this, and by examining the De Republica and the De Amicitia separately, we may gain useful insights, if not into second-century history, at least into the composition of the two dialogues." (pp. 173-174)

(2) By Bernhardy, Grundriss der R6mischen Litteratur² (Halle 1850) 191ff, according to R. M. Brown, "A Study of the Scipionic Circle," Iowa Studies in Classical Philology I (1934) 16f. The most important of the lesser references is De Or. 2.154.

(3) H. Strasburger, "Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman Empire," JRS [The Journal of Roman Studies,] 55 (1965) 4If, 52f, and "Der Scipionenkreis," Hermes 94 (1966) 60-72.
———. 2013. "Political philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero, edited by Steel, Catherine, 181–195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The scope, the style and the careful attention to setting and context in all three dialogues [De oratore, De republica, De legibus] display the goals and the magnitude of Cicero’s project: on the one hand, to create a philosophical literature in Latin comparable to Plato’s major dialogues; on the other, to explore the moral and intellectual underpinnings of Roman public life at a time when they were all in question.

Each dialogue addresses an area of social and cultural theory – rhetoric, politics, law – of critical importance to the success of civil society; at the same time, however, each one focuses less on the grand structure of theory than it does on the ways in which individual citizens inform and are informed by these practices." (p. 183)
———. 2017. "Cicero on the Origins of Civilization and Society: The Preface to De re publica Book 3." American Journal of Philology no. 138:461–487.

Abstract: "A re-examination of the preface to Book 3 of Cicero’s De re publica leads to a rearrangement of the order of the fragments as presented in Powell’s recent OCT; a fragment that Powell had moved from Book 5 to Book 3 is given a new location in Book 4. The article reconstructs Cicero’s argument in the preface and in De re publica as a whole, and includes discussion of Cicero’s views of the relative values of philosophy and public life and of the parallels in structure and argument between De re publica and De oratore."
———. 2022. The Lost Republic: Cicero's De oratore and De re publica. New York: Oxford University Press.

"The two works discussed here are closely related, but they pose very different problems of interpretation. The first part of this book deals with De oratore on its own, both because it is the earlier work and because it is complete, beginning with a discussion of the form of Ciceronian dialogue and Cicero’s choice of setting and characters, then examining the major elements of the argument: Cicero’s theory of rhetoric; the relationship between oratory and philosophy; and the complex relationships between Greek theory and Roman practice and between law and philosophy. The second part focuses on De re publica, and because of its fragmentary condition I have paid much more attention to reconstructing what Cicero in fact said; in this, the relationship between De oratore and De re publica is a useful guide to the interpretation of the latter’s structure and argument. My goal is to locate these works in three different contexts, all of which were of some importance in the years before the civil war in Rome, and all of which I believe Cicero had in mind when writing: the place of Greek philosophy in Roman life; the literary developments of the late Republic; and the loss of that Republic itself." (pp. 12-13)

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