Algra, Keimpe Arnoldus. 1997. "Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero. The Ethical Divisiones in Cicero’s Lucullus." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 107–139. Leiden: Brill.

"The last part of Cicero's own speech in the Lucullus (64-148) is devoted to the dogmatists' disagreement in the fields of physics (116-28), ethics (129-41), and logic (142-6).1 The section on the diaphonia of philosophical doxai in ethics in its turn falls into three parts. First, after a brief review of more or less obsolete views on the End (e.g. those of the Megarians and Aristo), there is a discussion of the famous Carneadea divisio (131), an overview of possible conceptions of the telos. Next comes a section which deals with the differences between the Stoics and Antiochus (132-7). Finally, Cicero discusses Chrysippus' way of dealing with the various views on the telos (138-41). Others have referred to the latter passage as the Chrysippea divisio, and for the moment I shall do so too, although I shall qualify the appropriateness of this term later on, and although it should be kept in mind that Cicero himself does not use this label (whereas elsewhere he does use the term Carneadea divisio)." (p. 107, a note omitted)

(...)

"Section 2 focuses on Chrysippus, and sketches the historical and philosophical background of the Chrysippea divisio.

Section 3 focuses on Carneades, studying the various versions of the Carneadean divisio and the way it relates to its Chrysippean counterpart. In section 4, finally, the focus will be on Cicero and on his own philosophical stance in the Lucullus as it is revealed by the way he applies the two divisiones in his own speech." (p. 108)
Allen, James. 1997. "Carneaden arguments in Cicero's Academic books." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 217–256. Leiden: Brill.

"What is more, I shall argue, though more speculatively, that all the views mentioned by Lucullus in the passage beginning at 32, including the view that everything is as nonevident as whether the stars are even or odd in number, could have been defended by Carneades and most likely were. This reading of Luc. 32-4 is, however, only a corollary of my principal thesis, viz. that Carneades could speak with as much dialectical freedom about epistemological issues as about any other matter. Indeed if I am right, the note of epistemological optimism sounded at Luc. 34, far from presenting a problem, is precisely what we should expect, inter alia, from him. If to be a sceptic is to be prevented by one's convictions from arguing in this way, then Carneades was not a sceptic. Whether there is another way of being a sceptic in which Carneades and other Academics qualified as sceptics is a question I shall touch on only at the end of this paper." (p. 219)
Altman, William H. F. 2008. "Tullia’s Secret Shrine: Birth and Death in Cicero’s de Finibus." Ancient Philosophy no. 28:373–393.

A revised version later appeared as chapter 4 in The Revival of Platonism in Cicero's Late Philosophy.
———, ed. 2015. Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Cicero. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Notes on Contributors IX; William H. F. Altman: Introduction 1

Part 1 Imitation or Criticism?

1 Martin McLaughlin: Petrarch and Cicero. Adulation and Critical Distance 19; 2 Kathy Eden: Cicero’s Portion of Montaigne’s Acclaim 39; 3 Gábor Kendeffy: Lactantius as Christian Cicero, Cicero as Shadow-like Instructor 56;

Part 2 The Politics of Reception

4 Robert G. Ingram: Conyers Middleton’s Cicero Enlightenment, Scholarship, and Polemic 95; 5 Carl J. Richard: Cicero and the American Founders 124; 6 Alex Dressler: Cicero’s Quarrels. Reception and Modernity from Horace to Tacitus 144

Part 3 Two French Receptions

7 Paul Allen Miller: Cicero Reads Derrida Reading Cicero. A Politics and a Friendship to Come 175; 8 Carlos Lévy: Ancient Texts, Contemporary Stakes. J. Carcopino as Reader of Cicero’s Letters 198;

Part 4 German Reception and Its Influence

9 William H. F. Altman: Cicero and the Fourth Triumvirate. Gruen, Syme, and Strasburger 215; 10 Elisabeth Begemann: Damaged Go(o)ds. Cicero’s Theological Triad in the Wake of German Historicism 247;

Part 5 Cicero Divided

11 Caroline Bishop: Roman Plato or Roman Demosthenes? The Bifurcation of Cicero in Ancient Scholarship 283; 12 John O. Ward. What the Middle Ages Missed of Cicero, and Why 307;

Part 6 Cicero Restored

13 Matthew Sharpe: Cicero, Voltaire, and the Philosophes in the French Enlightenment 329; 14 JoAnn DellaNeva: Following Their Own Genius. Debates on Ciceronianism in 16th-Century Italy 357;

Select Bibliography 377; Index Locorum 380; General Index 384-402.
———. 2016. The Revival of Platonism in Cicero's Late Philosophy: Platonis aemulus and the Invention of Cicero. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"This book is not intended to be an encyclopedic account of Cicero’s philosophical encyclopedia: even though it considers all of its parts, and does so in the order of the De divinatione catalogue, it is better understood as a preliminary attempt to see something new in the late writings of a much underestimated philosopher, and to validate that new kind of seeing against a well-entrenched opposition to it. In a variety of ways, and consistently throughout his writings, I have tried to give the reader evidence for embracing Quintilian’s assessment, but it is not the last word on Cicero as Platonis aemulus that I have tried to speak; it is rather an attempt to persuade others—using a variety of registers and venues—that Cicero deserves to be spoken of with more respect, and to be studied with greater care, and that an important part of doing so is the recognition that the character in the late dialogues named “Cicero” is not simply to be identified with Cicero himself. By using Plato’s influence on Cicero’s life and writings as a clue, I have tried throughout to reveal the ineffable combination of qualities—courage, originality, intelligence, sparkling wit, subtlety, deep respect for his teacher, and deadly seriousness of purpose—that not only enabled him to accomplish a revival of Platonism in the sewer of Romulus, but that also made him Plato’s rival, and his only one." (Preface , pp. XXI-XXXII)
Annas, Julia. 1989. "Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property." In Philosophia Togata I: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, edited by Griffin, Miriam and Barnes, Jonathan, 151–173. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Abstract: "In Book III of the De Officiis Cicero is discussing cases where what is morally right appears to conflict with what is advantageous. In the course of this he retails some examples and the conflicting treatment of them by two heads of the Stoic school, Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus. Both of these were long since dead: Diogenes was a pupil of Chrysippus, and one of the members of the famous embassy to Rome of the three leading Athenian philosophers in 155 Be; Antipater was Diogenes’ pupil, as was Panaetius, whose work On Duties Cicero is following, as he tells us, in the first two books of De Officiis."
———. 2013. "Plato’s Laws and Cicero’s De Legibus." In Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions in Philosophy, edited by Schofield, Malcolm, 206–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"It is, as we have seen, his knowledge of the Stoic idea of natural law that underlies both of Cicero’s notable divergences from Plato: the universality of his claim, and at the same time the fact that he is talking about a particular existing legal system, namely Roman law. We have seen that these two claims are not in conflict; they are perfectly compatible, given the Stoic understanding of the kind of claim to universal acceptance that natural law has. It is perhaps the fact that he focuses on Roman law which explains why Cicero, though following Plato on the need for law to persuade and not just compel, does not follow his precise practice with preambles. Cicero is giving us laws which are already established, based on tradition which is already familiar. Plato, in contrast, is putting forward proposals which, though often based on Athenian law, are put forward as improvements for the future, for an envisaged rather than an existing community. Citizens might well be thought to need a general exhortation to obey a new legal code rather than a familiar one." (pp. 222-223)

(...)

"Plato, with his less developed ideas about law in nature, can reasonably be seen as a philosophical as well as literary model for Cicero’s ideas. Cicero succeeds in ‘being himself’ by rethinking the Platonic connection of law and virtue in a different context, one where he takes advantage of Stoic developments of the idea of law and nature, and where, as a Roman, he looks to the better past rather than, as Plato does, to the better future." (p. 224)
Annas, Julia, and Betegh, Gábor, eds. 2016. Cicero’s De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of contributors VII; Julia Annas: Introduction 1; 1 Charles Brittain: Cicero’s sceptical methods: the example of the De Finibus 12; 2 James Warren: Epicurean pleasure in Cicero’s De Finibus 41; 3 Pierre-Marie Morel: Cicero and Epicurean virtues (De Finibus 1–2) 77; 4 Dorothea Frede: Epicurus on the importance of friendship in the good life (De Finibus 1.65–70; 2.78–85) 96; 5 Margaret Graver: Honor and the honorable: Cato’s discourse in De Finibus 3 118; 6 Brad Inwood: The voice of nature 147; 7 Anna Maria Ioppolo: Sententia explosa: criticism of Stoic ethics in De Finibus 4 167; 8 Thomas Bénatouïl: Structure, standards and Stoic moral progress in De Finibus 4 198; 9 Christopher Gill: Antiochus’ theory of oikeiōsis 221; Bibliography 248; Subject index 259; Index locorum 262-266.
Armstrong, David. 2011. "Epicurean virtues, Epicurean friendship: Cicero vs the Herculaneum papyri." In Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, edited by Fish, Jeffrey and Sanders, Kirk R., 105–128. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this chapter, I shall focus on three specific passages, or sets of passages, from Philodemus’ practical philosophy, each of which invoke the language of mystery religions. The first of these, from the treatise On Death (= cols. 33,37–35,34), was appealed to by Arnaldo Momigliano in his groundbreaking discussion of Roman Epicureans in politics.(19) These columns discuss how non-philosophical people as well as philosophers or philosophically minded politicians could manage to endure unjust condemnation to death by a mob or a tyrant. This form of heroism and tranquillity, claims Philodemus, is not reserved for Epicureans or philosophers generally, but manifests itself frequently even in common life.

The second passage occurs in the context of an argument, which takes up most of Philodemus’ On Rhetoric (De rhetorica) 2–3, that rhetoric is not of the essence of politics. Rhetoric is acknowledged as an ‘art’ that may be politically useful but is nevertheless less beneficial in that regard than practical experience.

(...)

Finally, I survey Philodemus’ views in On Frank Criticism (De libertate dicendi), [On Choices and Avoidances] (De electionibus et fugis), and especially in On the Gods (De dis) 3 regarding why and how friendship constitutes a pleasure. While friendship for us ‘weak’ humans originates from considerations of utility, mutual defence and support, the pleasure of friendship is entirely independent of any such needs, as evidenced by the quasi-essential role friendship plays in the gods’ own existence. The desire of wise initiates to assimilate themselves to the gods as far as possible (or just to be their own best selves) serves as a basis for their mutual friendship and also helps create a more general attitude of goodwill to all men." (p. 109)

(91) Momigliano [‘Epicureans in Revolt’, Journal of Roman Studies 31: 149–57] 1941: 154;(...)
Asmis, Elizabeth. 2001. "The Politician as public servant in Cicero’s De re publica." In Cicéron et Philodème. La polémique en philosophie, edited by Auvray-Assayas, Clara and Delattre, Daniel, 109–128. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.

"In this paper, I aim to show how the Epicureans and Stoics influenced Cicero’s view of the political leader(2) . I do not deny that Cicero’s main philosophical inspiration is Plato, and that Aristotle and his followers had a decisive influence on Cicero’s response to Plato. At the same time, I shall argue, Epicurean hedonism and Stoic altruism provide a formative context for Cicero’s new concept of the politician. By opposing the one to the other, Cicero transformed traditional Roman patriotism into an ideal of political service that takes into consideration the aims of all human beings while promoting the wealth and security of the Roman state. I shall focus on the prologue to the first book, which delineates a foundation for the ensuing inquiry. The rest of the work will be discussed much more briefly." (p. 109, anote omitted)

(2) My paper is much indebted to E. Brown, who analysed the influence of Stoic ethics on Cicero’s political philosophy in his dissertation Stoic Cosmopolitanism and the Political Life, Chicago, 1997; see esp. the discussion of the first prologue of De re publica, p. 304-313.
———. 2004. "The State as a partnership: Cicero’s definition of 'res publica' in his work 'On the State'." History of Political Thought no. 25:569–598.

Abstract: "Abstract: This paper argues that Cicero develops a new view of the state as a partnership in his work De republica. Like any other partnership, the Roman state upheld by the agreement of its members and an allocation of rewards that is proportionate to the contributions. Cicero sketches an outline of this view in his definition of this state. By focusing on how Cicero uses the definition in the construction of his argument, the paper attempts to uncover a detailed view of the state as a partnership. The ancestral Roman constitution, Cicero argues, surpasses all other constitutions in offering the best division of contributions and rewards. Although the state is held together by the agreement of the whole people, there is an enormous disparity in the assessment of contributions and rewards among different social groups."
———. 2005. "A New Kind of Model: Cicero's Roman Constitution in "De republica"." The American Journal of Philology no. 126:377–416.

Abstract: "This article attempts to answer the question: What makes the Roman constitution "by far the best," as Cicero claims in De republica? Following Polybius, Cicero analyses the Roman constitution as a mixed constitution, which both regard as the best type of constitution. Cicero, however, does not merely impute the best type of constitution to the Romans. He elevates the Roman constitution above all other mixed constitutions as the single best constitution. In rivalry with Plato, he constructs a model of the Roman constitution as an exemplum that can unite the Romans in a common purpose. The constitution is distinguished by two main features: a fair system of cooperation among the whole citizen body and wise guidance by individual leaders. The moral unity of this constitution sets it apart from all other mixed constitutions."
———. 2008. "Cicero on Natural Law and the Laws of the State." Classical Antiquity no. 27.

Abstract: "This paper treats the relationship between natural law and Cicero’s code of laws, as presented in Cicero’s work On Laws. In response to recent interpretations, it argues that Cicero’s code is not identical with natural law. Instead, his laws participate imperfectly in the commands and prohibitions of natural law. Just as Cicero uses a Stoic conception of natural law, so he uses a speciﬁcally Stoic view of participation in natural law. His laws share imperfectly in the guiding power of natural law by prescribing intermediate duties as a means to the attainment of virtue.

Overall, Cicero’s code of laws preﬁgures modern written constitutions in the attempt to found the basic laws of a state on an unchanging moral norm."
Atkins, E. M. 1990. "’Domina et Regina Virtutum’. Justice and Societas in De officiis." Phronesis no. 35:258–289.

" 'This one virtue is the mistress and queen of all the virtues' (III.28). I want here to argue that in De Officiis justice is 'mistress and queen' in two ways: first, it is the most important of the four primary virtues; secondly, and consequently, it helps to define the other virtues, which must be limited by it. De Officiis contains the earliest theory of justice we possess that explicitly defines justice as that which builds up society; I hope then to show that the resulting conception of justice is very different from anything that we have seen before. Finally, I want to ask how Cicero came to articulate this view: is he merely transcribing a theory developed by someone else and appropriate to a different historical context? Or is he expounding views that his own life and thought have led him to adopt, to adapt, and to use?" (p. 289)
———. 2000. "Cicero." In The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, edited by Rowe, Christopher and Schofield, Malcolm, 477–516. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"I have described Cicero's political philosophy as creative. However, much scholarship since the late nineteenth century has been devoted to discovering the precise ways in which his thought is derivative. Cicero the philosopher has been supposed habitually to have imitated a lost Greek 'source'; and his texts have been mentally translated back into Greek in order to learn more about their alleged author. Unsurprisingly, Cicero's arguments have seemed both unoriginal and anachronistic. However, the presuppositions, the methods and the results of the source-hunters have not stood up to close scrutiny. In particular, we can no longer ignore the wealth of evidence for Cicero's wide reading in Greek philosophy and history, and his easy familiarity with philosophical concepts (shown, for example, by jokes in his letters) as well as his outstanding ability to organize ideas and arguments. Cicero exploited Greek philosophy intensively; but whatever he borrowed, he thoroughly appropriated and transformed for his own purposes. Consequently, his political philosophy needs to be illuminated by the concrete circumstances of his own age." (p. 477, a note omitted)
Atkins, Jed W. 2013. Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic and Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"My main business in this book is explication and interpretation.

Accordingly, it is primarily written for students and scholars working on Greek and Roman philosophy and political thought, particularly those focusing on Cicero, Roman and Hellenistic political philosophy, and the reception of Plato. However, I have tried as much as possible to make this book accessible to historians of political thought and political theorists who, though not necessarily specialists in ancient thought, may nevertheless find certain conclusions of this study to be of interest. This book restores Cicero’s Laws to its rightful place as an important and sophisticated treatment of natural law theory. As for the Republic, Cicero’s treatment of the mixed constitution forces us to revise our understanding of this important concept by revealing that there are in fact on offer in antiquity (and beyond) two competing theories based on alternative political sciences. The dialogue also calls into question the widely held view that rights is a modern concept which is inextricably linked to individualistic accounts of society." (pp. 12-13)
———. 2013. "Cicero on the Relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement no. 117:15–34.

"In Plato's Republic Socrates attempts to investigate justice in individuals by first examining the virtues in the city. He will be able to see justice more clearly, he reasons, if he familiarizes himself with justice writ large. He subsequently sketches in speech the details of what he believes to be a perfectly just city, which he later refers to as Kallipolis (Republic 527c). The basic details of this city are well-known: women and men are to receive the same education; there is to be communality of property and women among the guardians; and philosophers are to rule. However, Kallipolis is not the only city to be found in the Platonic corpus. In his last work, the Laws, the cast of characters led by the Athenian Stranger discuss a 'second-best' city (739e) whose details differ from that of the Republic in several notable respects, including the lack of provision for the communality of women and property, and the absence of the philosopher-king. How are we to account for such differences?

Perhaps the most common answer to this question is what scholars often refer to as 'developmentalist'. These differences between the Republic and Laws exist because Plato has changed his mind about key philosophical and political questions. Often the story told is a narrative of gradual decline from the optimism of the Republic to the pessimism of the Laws. However, scholars recently have questioned whether this developmentalist approach to reading Plato's Republic and Laws might be mistaken. Perhaps Plato intended the dialogues to be largely complementary?" (p. 15, two notes omitted)

(...)

"Of course, we can only ascertain that Cicero believed the regime of the Laws completed the investigation of the Republic because he used the former as an important philosophical model for his own version of the mixed constitution. Indeed, it is first and foremost the Romanized mixed constitution of Rep. that Scipio presents as the remedy for the principle of the Republic that political affairs do not typically follow reason. The mixed regime of Rep., no less than that of Plato's Laws, completes the teaching of the Republic concerning politics and regimes. And so it is that our investigation into Cicero's understanding of the relationship between the Republic and Laws ultimately illuminates the way in which Cicero intended for his own Republic to relate to Plato's. Perhaps here too modifications in content are better seen as part of an effort to complete and complement rather than to reject and revise." (p. 34, a note omitted)
———. 2023. "The Political Theory of Cicero’s De officiis." In Cicero: De officiis, edited by Brüllmann, Philipp and Müller, Jörn, 198–213. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Cicero’s On Duties (De officiis) was among the first books printed on Gutenberg’s press, second only to the Bible, and it ranks alongside Aristotle’s Politics as the most important work for the development of Western political philosophy (Nussbaum [Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid. Cicero’s Problematic Legacy, in: The Journal of Political Philosophy 8.2, 176–206] 2000). It is impossible to read such an influential work with fresh eyes. Still, the key presupposition guiding this chapter is that Cicero’s political theory in De officiis is worth considering for its own sake. The list of political topics that Cicero raises in the work is long and substantial: patriotic devotion to one’s republic, cosmopolitan demands of justice, natural law, the justice of war, individual rights, the rule of law, liberty, government as requiring responsiveness to the interests of the ruled and guidance by the purpose of one’s office, political trust, private property, corporate responsibility, tyrannicide, and glory. In what follows, I will treat all these topics as I draw Cicero’s political theory in De officiis into a coherent whole. I shall argue that the key insight for interpreting the central political topics in the work comes from understanding, on one hand, the relationship between Cicero’s “political naturalism” and the republic as the most important socially productive political fellowship and, on the other, that the relationship between ethics and politics admits of imperfectability and requires ccommodation to necessity.

Thus, Cicero’s political theory can be described as commending a “realistic eutopia” and “patriotic cosmopolitanism." (p. 197, a note omitted)
Atkins, Jed W., and Bénatouïl, Thomas, eds. 2022. The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors page IX; Preface XIII; Cicero’s Philosophical Works XVI; A Note on Abbreviations XVIII; Thomas Bénatouïl: Introduction 1; Claudia Moatti: Cicero’s Philosophical Writing in Its Intellectual Context 7; 2 Charles Brittain and Peter Osorio: The Ciceronian Dialogue 25; 3 Sophie Aubert-Baillot: Philosophy in Cicero’s Letters 43; 4 Catherine Steel: Philosophy in Cicero’s Speeches 59; 5 Carlos Lévy: Cicero and the Creation of a Latin Philosophical Vocabulary 71; 6 Malcolm Schofield: Cicero and Plato 88; 7 Tobias Reinhardt: Cicero’s Academic Skepticism 103; 8 Clara Auvray-Assayas: Cosmology, Theology, and Religion 120; 9 Elisabeth Begemann: Determinism, Fate, and Responsibility 134; 10 Sean McConnell: Cicero on the Emotions and the Soul 150; 11 Raphael Woolf: Ethical Theory and the Good Life 166; 12 Gretchen Reydams-Schils: Nature and Social Ethics 184; 13 Gary Remer: Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Politics 200; 14 Walter Nicgorski: Cicero’s Republicanism 215; 15 Jed W. Atkins: Empire, Just Wars, and Cosmopolitanism 231; 16 Anne-Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic: Cicero and Augustine 252; 17 Daniel J. Kapust: Cicero and Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 184; 18 Martha C. Nussbaum: Cicero and Twenty-First-Century Political Philosophy 284; Bibliography 301; Index of Cicero’s Texts 327; General Index 331-335.
Aubert-Baillot, Sophie. 2019. "Terminology and Practice of Dialectic in Cicero’s Letters." In Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle, edited by Bénatouil, Thomas and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 254–282. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"If Cicero’s practice of dialectic has been quite often analysed in his philosophical or rhetorical treatises, it seems it has never been studied in his letters, although several aspects of this corpus could justify such an approach: epistolary style is called sermo(1) for example, and the term is also applied to philosophical dialogues (Platonic dialogues are sermones Platonis),(2) often full of dialectic; exchange and dialogue are striking features of the letters." (p. 254)

(...)

"In this chapter, I shall study – among letters which in most cases were not meant to be published and were not designed to be short treatises dedicated to philosophical concepts or technical questions of logic, contrary to Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius – the heterogeneous, diffuse and sometimes tenuous presence of dialectic, upon which Cicero himself made a balanced judgement, considering it sometimes as a tool (albeit an important one) with which the orator could make his style more abundant and richer, sometimes as an instrument necessary to the intellectual rigour of philosophical reasoning. In order to define more precisely my field of investigation, I shall begin with a study of vocabulary and practice of dialectic in Cicero in most of his works and in his letters. Then I shall analyse the influence of disputatio in utramque partem on the correspondence as well as its dialogical, and sometimes agonistic, nature." (pp. 255-256)

(1) See Gavoille [‘Lettre et sermo’, in Epistulae antiquae. 3: actes du IIIe colloque international ‘L’épistolaire antique et ses prolongements européens’ (Université François–Rabelais, Tours, 25-27 septembre 2002), eds. L. Nadjo and É. Gavoille. Leuven and Paris] 2004, 33-52.

(2) Cic., De or. 3.60
———. 2022. "Philosophy in Cicero’s Letters." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 43–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"To conclude, philosophy in Cicero’s letters does not typically take the form of long, coherent, and rigorous arguments such as those we find in the dialogues. It is necessarily less abstract and theoretical, as it is applied to the vicissitudes of Cicero’s life, from exile and political struggles to grief at his daughter Tullia’s death. It is also enhanced by many literary devices – fictional dialogues, images, proverbs, literary quotes – and illustrated by a more concrete, less technical vocabulary, and by a terminology which was not yet definitively established in the Latin language when the letters were written, hence the abundance of a Greek philosophical vocabulary in these texts." (p. 58)
Banato, Damian Fernandez. 2020. "Cicero's demarcation of science: A report of shared criteria." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science no. 83:97–102.

Abstract: "The problem of establishing intensional criteria to demarcate science from non-science, and in particular science from pseudoscience, received a great amount of attention in the 20th century philosophy of science. It remains unsolved. This article compares demarcation criteria found in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s rejection of genethliac astrology and other pseudo-divinatory techniques in his De divinatione (44 BCE) with criteria advocated by a broad selection of modern philosophers of science and other specialists in science studies. Remarkable coincidences across two millennia are found on five basic criteria, which hints at a certain historical stability of some of the most fundamental features of a concept of “science” broadly construed."
Baraz, Yelena. 2012. A Written Republic: Cicero’s Philosophical Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

"The goal of this book, from its inception, has been to approach the corpus of philosophical works that Cicero produced under Caesar as a whole, as a coherent project. The questions that interest me have to do with writing philosophy as a cultural act specific to its place, its time, and its agent. Given the scale of Cicero’s production during this period, it would, however, be impossible to tackle these questions by engaging with the corpus as a whole: I could not hope to do justice to every dialogue, and a focus on some in favor of others would inevitably result in a skewed picture. But in choosing to explore the prefaces, I have not simply followed the lead of Genette[*] and others who have found these transitional and transactional moments fertile ground for investigation. More importantly, in framing my project in this way I have also taken a cue from Cicero himself. That Cicero thought of the works he was producing as a unifi ed project and that he treated the prefaces as a distinct rhetorical space in which the nature of both the project and the individual work was to be negotiated is abundantly clear. The evidence comes, in the first place, in the preface to the second book of De Divinatione, the first preface composed after Caesar’s death, in which Cicero looks back at the state of his project to date; second, it is demonstrated by the existence of the volumen prohoemiorum, a book of draft prefaces; and, fially, it is inherent in the nature of the prefaces themselves." (p. 5)

[*] Gérard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1997. "Logic in Academica I and Lucullus." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academica, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 140–160. Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted in J. Barnes, Logical Matters, as Chapter 2: Cicero on logic, pp. 22-42.

"I consider first the conception of logic which Cicero manifests in his Academic works; and then I look at the attack on logic which he delivers at Luc. 91-8. I use the English word 'logic' as a rough translation of the Latin dialectica and the Greek διαλεκτική. I am interested in the views which Cicero expresses: I do not discuss the sources of these views or the extent to which they are original to Cicero; nor do I offer any opinion as to whether Cicero himself accepted all or any of the views which he expressed." (p. 140)
Beard, Mary. 1986. "Cicero and Divination: The Formation of a Latin Discourse." The Journal of Roman Studies no. 76:33–46.

"This article is intended to be read in association with that of Schofield which follows.(°)

They share a common outlook-for we both believe that an understanding of the literary form of De Divinatione is integral to an understanding of its philosophical and historical point. But in detail our approaches are rather different. My own paper is the work of an historian and is concerned principally with the intellectual and cultural context of De Divinatione. My analysis of the text, highlighting its tensions and unresolved contradictions, follows from my analysis of that broader context. Schofield, by contrast, studies De Divinatione as an example of Hellenistic philosophical argumentation and explores the ways Cicero translates this not merely into Latin, but into a specifically Roman rhetorical mode. Other differences-in particular some disagreement as to how far it is possible to identify a 'Ciceronian position' on religion-are signalled in the text and notes of what follows.

Both papers were originally given in a series of seminars on Cicero's De Divinatione which we organized together at the Institute of Classical Studies, London. The other contributors to this series were Nicholas Denyer (with a paper now published in PCPhS 1985)(**), and Elizabeth Rawson, who presented material now published in her book, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic." (p. 33)

(*) Malcolm Schofield, Cicero for and against Divination (1976)

(**) Nicholas Denyer, The Case against Divination: an examination of Cicero's De Divinatione (1985)
Begemann, Elisabeth. 2014. "Cicero’s Theology and the Concept of Fate." Archiv für Religionsgeschichte no. 15:225–246.

Abstract: "This article examines Cicero’s discussion of theology in the context of providing Rome with philosophical writings. I argue that in his treatises de natura deorum, de divinatione and de fato, Cicero conceptualized a traditional, idealized version of Roman theology under the premise that religio and cultus deorum are indispensable for a moral society as it is outlined in de re publica and de legibus. In continually stressing active divine participation in the lives of men, Cicero underlines the importance of goodwill between the divine and human spheres which finds expression in cultus deorum. As concepts such as Stoic fate run counter to the belief that the gods can be ritually influenced by prayer or ritual, the gods can neither be identified with fate itself nor be subject to it. Cicero rather stresses free will in all contexts to uphold the moral society, both human and divine."
Beltrão, Claudia. 2020. "Cicero on Greek Women Philosophers." Mètis. Anthropologie des monds grecs anciens no. 18:1–24.

Dossier : Des femmes qui comptent : Genre et participation sociale en Grèce et à Rome.

Abstract: "This paper deals with three mentions of Greek women philosophers in Cicero’s theoretical work. Through a study of the ways in which he refers to them and of the contexts and circumstances in which it happens, the main objective is to observe the discursive mechanisms structuring Cicero’s mentions these figures. Dealing with brief references to Aspasia in De inventione, Themista in De finibus, and Leontium in De natura deorum, one can see that praise or reproach depend on the point to be defended or attacked in each argumentative context. Cicero’s references to intellectual women give us a varied picture, as each of these references is designed to produce a precise effect in Cicero’s discourse."
Beltrão da Rosa, Claudia, and Santangelo, Federico, eds. 2020. Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Contents: Acknowledgements 7; Claudia Beltrão da Rosa), Federico Santangelo: Introduction 9; Valentina Arena: Cicero, the Augures, and the Commonwealth in De Legibus 23; Claudia Beltrão da Rosa: The God and the Consul in Cicero’s Third Catilinarian 45; Patricia Horvat, Alexandre Carneiro C. Lima: The Ontophanies of Diana in Segesta (Cicero, Verrines 2 4 72–82) 59; María Emilia Cairo: A Reading of Cicero’s De Haruspicum Responso. Some Reflections on Roman Identity 73; Maria Eichler: Epicurean pietas and Political Action in Lucretius and Cicero 87; Federico Santangelo: Cicero on Divine and Human Foresight 105; Greg Woolf: Foreign Gods in the Age of Cicero 117; Katherine A. East: Editing Ciceronian Religion in the Enlightenment 135; General Index 147; Index Locorum 151-154.
Benardete, Seth. 1987. "Cicero's De Legibus I. Its Plan and Intention." American Journal of Philology no. 108:295–309.

Reprinted in S. Benardete, The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy, Edited by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis,l South BHend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2012, pp. 281-293.

"Although the Laws' transitions from one topic to another are managed adroitly if one considers them dialogically, their thematic purpose is obscure. It is easy to see how historiography yields to legal philosophy, and that the poorness of Roman historians matches the narrowness of Roman jurists (5-7, 14), but not how the opposition between poetry and history, and in particular that between Cicero the published poet and Cicero the historian yet to be, introduces properly the question of law.

Cicero, however, has suggested how we can go about trying to put together the argument with the form of the dialogue.

Perhaps the clearest suggestion lies in the contrast implied between the published de re publica, which Quintus and Atticus have read, and de legibus, which is happening now and turns out to be written behind the backs of Quintus and Atticus. They have read a book that assigned the death of the Roman republic to the moment at which Scipio, through a natural death or assassination, could not assume the dictatorship (6.12). de legibus is meant to supply the legislation for a regime that no longer exists except in speech. It is accordingly even more imaginary than the idealized version of the Roman republic that Scipio gave. His had a chance; this has none (cf. 3.29)." (p. 295, two notes omitted)
Bennett, Michael James. 2015. "Cicero's "De Fato" in Deleuze's Logic of Sense." Deleuze Studies no. 9:25–58.

Abstract: "The arguments of the Stoic Chrysippus recorded in Cicero's De Fato are of great importance to Deleuze's conception of events in The Logic of Sense. The purpose of this paper is to explicate these arguments, to which Deleuze's allusions are extremely terse, and to situate them in the context of Deleuze's broader project in that book. Drawing on contemporary scholarship on the Stoics, I show the extent to which Chrysippus' views on compatibilism, hypothetical inference and astrology support Deleuze's claim that the Stoics developed a theory of compatibilities and incompatibilities of events independent of corporeal states of affairs."
Berno, Francesca Romana, and La Bua, Giuseppe, eds. 2022. Portraying Cicero in Literature, Culture, and Politics: From Ancient to Modern Times. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Contents: Preface V-VI; Introduction XI-XXi;

SECTION I: Portraying (and Defending) Himself

Robert A. Kaster: Cicero Portraying Cicero 3; Alfredo Casamento: Mihi cane et populo: Cicerone e l’autorappresentazione del successo oratorio. La questione del consenso popolare (Cic. Brut. 183–200) 13; Alejandro Díaz Fernández: A Ciceronian exemplum: Cicero’s Self-Portrait as Provincial Governor through his Letters 33; Rita Degl’Innocenti Pierini; Cicerone esule: dall’autorappresentazione all’esemplarità letteraria (da Livio a Petrarca e Ortensio Lando) 61; Rosalie Stoner: The Difficult Defense of Cicero’s Goodness in Institutio oratoria 12.1 83;

SECTION II: Cicero’s Exemplarity

Giuseppe La Bua: Homo novus and nobilis: Cicero and the formation of the ‘modern’ aristocracy 103; Thomas J. Keeline: Cicero at the Symposium XII Sapientum 119; Cristina Martín Puente: Iconografía de Cicerón en manuscritos: Un testimonio de Recepción

clásica 143; Fabio Gatti: Il «santissimo» Cicerone. La Quaestura di Sebastiano Corradi (1555) nella tradizione biografica sull’Arpinate 169; Joanna Kenty; Tully the Naïve: John Adams on Cicero 195; Kathryn H. Stutz: Law & Orator: Depicting Cicero through Modern Mystery Fiction 211;

SECTION III: The Portrait of the Ideal Orator

Catherine E.W. Steel: The reception of Cicero’s speeches in the early empire 233; Henriette van der Blom: Quintilian on Cicero’s Deliberative Oratory 247; Andrew J. Sillett: Quousque tandem: The Reception of a Catchphrase 267; Barbara Del Giovane: Da iocosus a consularis scurra. Rappresentazioni del Cicerone umorista 283; Leanne Jansen, Christoph Pieper, and Bram van der Velden: Reperforming Cicero’s Voice: Constructions and Negotiations of his vox publica 313;

SECTION IV: Cicero in Politics

Igor Moraes Santos: Montesquieu on Cicero. Historiographical, political, and philosophical dimensions of a modern portrait 341; Francesca Romana Berno: Cicero in the Shadow of the Bastille 369; Philippe Rousselot: Cicéron face aux dictateurs, 1920–1945 391;

Bibliography 429; Index locorum 477: General Index 483-486.
Bishop, Caroline. 2019. Cicero, Greek Learning, and the Making of a Roman Classic. New York: Oxford University Press.

"I begin this study of Cicero’s engagement with the products of Greek literary and intellectual culture with an examination of the text in which it is most clearly visible, the Aratea. This youthful translation of Aratus’ Phaenomena must have owed much of its motivation to Cicero’s belief in the efficacy of translation for honing rhetorical proficiency (e.g. De or. 1.155), and it was also very much a product of the literary fashion of the day, in which adaptations of Hellenistic authors were au courant." (p. 35)

(...)

"In the years that followed, Cicero saw first political success, then political failure, and with the latter, as we have seen, became increasingly interested in his political and literary Nachleben. It was at this stage that he turned to classical Athens for his models, and took a much freer hand in adapting them into Latin. His decision to imitate Plato in De Oratore, De Re Publica, and De Legibus, the three philosophical dialogues of the 50s, is the first evidence of this new programme, and his partial translation of the Timaeus is also a sign of his Platonic ambitions." (p. 36)
Blyth, Dougal. 2010. "Cicero and Philosophy as Text." The Classical Journal no. 106:71–98.

"Philosophy for Cicero implies not only a way of life taught orally in a school but also reading and writing. This foreshadows his influence on the later Latin tradition, which identified philosophy with the meaning and evaluation of texts, and ultimately replaced its conception as an autonomous way of life. I propose four factors in Cicero's influence: initiating the tradition of Latin philosophical prose; developing its vocabulary; the choice of a rhetorical over a dialectical mode; and locating discussion in the context of libraries, reading and book production."
Boscarino, Giuseppe. 2020. "The Traditions of Thought Between Progress and Reaction. Cicero: An Interpreter and a Latin Creator of the Aristotelian Platonic Tradition of Thought." Philosophy Study no. 10:320–328.

Abstract: "Farington’s interpretation of the philosophies of Plato and Cicero as reactionary philosophies is discussed. In the light of our interpretative category, such as that of Traditions of Thought, understood as complex rational, historical constructions, within which metaphysical and epistemological principles are mediated with socio-economic-political-cultural conflicts, all denominated as ideologies, instead it is believed that scientific theories are not actually progressive or regressive, but rather the ideologies, when they interpret the concepts of scientific fact, scientific theory and, more strongly, that of philosophy, within general conceptions of the world. In the light of our interpretative category, they thus appear more than regressive philosophers instead of regressive ideologues, if we consider that the philosopher moves within the narrower fields of the so-called metaphysics and epistemology. Cicero also appears to be the great Latin creator of a way of understanding philosophy and its history with the dominant triad Socrates-Plato-Aristotele in it. All this must be considered within my broader historical-philosophical-epistemological elaboration, enclosed in my published books and papers, cited in references."
Bragova, Anina. 2020. "Analysis of Cicero's concept of cognitio." Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology no. 7:5–11.

Abstract: "The article is devoted to the analysis of the Latin concept of cognitio in Cicero’s writings. Based on the continuous sampling method, 173 cases of use of the concept were found. The meaning of 23 of them does not correspond to the semantic field “cognition” and the Stoic virtue of knowledge, therefore they are not analysed in the article. The concept of cognitio in the meaning of “cognition” is more often found in the singular form (143 times), less often – in the plural form (7 times). Cognitio is found in the synonymous series with the words contemplatio, exercitatio, perceptio, prudentia, ratio, scientia (most of all – with the word scientia). Cognition (cognitio) is opposed to action (actio) and ignorance (ignoratio). Cognitio sometimes has a dependent word: rerum (33 cases), less often – animi, artis, deorum, naturae, virtutis, vitiorum, etc.

In turn, cognitio itself is used as a complement to the words amor, appetitio, consultatio, cupiditas, genus, quaestio, studium, etc. In the same context with cognitio there are such words as res, natura, ratio, scientia, etc. Cicero’s reasoning about cognition (cognitio) is found mainly in his philosophical writings when he analyses the views of ancient Greek philosophers (Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics), in particular – the Stoics and their teaching on virtues, which includes cognition as well."
Brittain, Charles. 2016. "Cicero’s sceptical methods: The example of the De Finibus." In Cicero’s De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches, edited by Annas, Julia and Betegh, Gábor, 12–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this chapter I will argue that the dialogue form in Cicero’s later works serves the essential philosophical function of expressing his radical Academic scepticism. The form is essential to this purpose, not just as a matter of structure – the pattern of paired arguments pro and contra – but all the way through, including the characterization, the narrative persona, and the focus on the Roman context of the conversations the dialogues represent. I use the De Finibus as an example, in part because it is a hard case: if it can be shown that Cicero’s presentation of Hellenistic ethics in this dialogue is an expression of his deep scepticism, the case for the sequence it belongs to should be relatively easy. The specific case I will try to make is that reading De Finibus in the light of Cicero’s discussion of epistemology in the Academica explains how Cicero’s sceptical outlook produced the attitudes towards goods and ethical ends that we find his character adopting in the De Finibus. In particular, I will argue that Cicero’s apparent vacillation in the De Finibus over the unique goodness of virtue is parallel to his vacillation, in the Academica, over the correctness of the Stoic conditions on rational assent – and that this vacillation stems from the same sceptical stance in both the epistemological and ethical cases." (p. 12)

(...)

"This chapter has three parts. In the first section, I lay out some rival interpretations of Cicero’s position in the De Finibus, and quickly rule out one that does not allow that he writes as a sceptic of any kind. In the second section, I consider what kind of sceptic Cicero is, and argue that he is not a mitigated sceptic, but rather a radical or, as I shall describe him, a Carneadean sceptic. In the final section, I try to show how Cicero’s sceptical approach emerges from the dialogue as a whole, and I elaborate the parallel mentioned above, between Cicero’s attitude towards assent and his attitude towards goods subject to fortune." (p. 13)
Brittain, Charles, and Osorio, Peter. 2022. "The Ciceronian Dialogue." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 25–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In the first part of this chapter, we review the central scholarly disagreement about the Academic dialogues, which derives from uncertainty about Cicero’s epistemological stance. We suggest that this dispute should be put to rest in the light of the shared pedagogic aim of the later dialogues.

Cicero may propose views of his own, but he does so in the service of effecting a change in the reader’s powers of judgment, not in order to construct or advocate a philosophical system. We outline a number of textual devices by which the Academic dialogues seek to effect such a change in their readers, and use them to argue that Cicero’s pedagogical aims constitute the core of his philosophical dialogues (rather than being merely a set of standard literary tropes)." (p. 25)
Brooks, Richard O., ed. 2009. Cicero and Modem Law. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Reprint: New York: Routledge 2016.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Series Preface XI; Introduction XIII-LX;

PART I CICERO'S LIFE, PREDECESSORS AND WORKS

Richard McKeon (1950), 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero', in Cicero, Brutus, On the Nature of Gods, On Divination, On Duties, trans. Hubert M. Poteat, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-65, 613-18. 3

PART II THE ROMAN LAW AND RHETORICAL PRACTICE

2 Andrew J .E. Bell (1997), 'Cicero and the Spectacle of Power', Journal of Roman Studies, 87, pp. 1-22. 77

3 Jill Harries (2002), 'Cicero and the Defining of the Ius Civile', in Gillian Clark and Tessa Rajak (eds), Philosophy and Power in the Greco Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 51-68, 68a. 99

PART III CICERO'S WORKS

Rhetoric

4 Michael Mendelson (2002), 'De Oratore and the Development of Controversia', in Michael Mendelson (ed.), Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice, and Pedagogy of Argument, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.135-72, 269-70, 276-77. 123

De Republica

The Overall Structure

5 Elizabeth Asmis (2005), 'A New Kind of Model: Cicero's Roman Constitution in De Republica', American Journal of Philosophy, 126, pp. 377--416. 167

The Nature of Res Publica

6 Malcolm Schofield (1995), 'Cicero's Definition of Res Publica', in J.G.F. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.63-83. 207

Natural Law

7 John R. Kroger (2004), 'The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, the Stoics and Roman Theories of Natural Law', Wisconsin Law Review, 905, pp. 905-44. 229

Mixed Government

8 Andrew Lintott (1997), 'The Theory of the Mixed Constitution at Rome' , in J. Barnes and M. Griffin (eds), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 70-85. 269

Property

9 Neal Wood (1983), 'The Economic Dimension of Cicero's Political Thought: Property and State', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16, pp. 739-56. 287

De Legibus

10 C.W. Keyes (1921), 'Original Elements in Cicero's Ideal Constitution', American Journal of Philology, 42, pp. 309-23. 307

De Officiis

11 E.M. Atkins (1990), '''Domina et Regina Virtutum": Justice and Societas in De Officiis', Phronesis, 35, pp. 258-89. 325

PART IV CICERO'S METHOD OF THOUGHT

12 Michael J. Buckley (1970), 'Philosophic Method in Cicero', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8, pp. 143-54. 359

13 Walter Watson (2001), 'Invention', in Thomas Sloane (ed.), Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 389-404. 371

PART V THE COLLAPSE OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE DEATH OF CICERO

14 Louis J. Sirico, Jr (2006), 'The Federalist and the Lessons of Rome', Mississippi Law Journal, 75, pp. 431-94. 389

PART VI CICERO'S INFLUENCE ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION

15 Philip Mitsis (1999), 'The Stoic Origin of Natural Rights', in K. lerodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 153-77. 455

PART VII CICERO AND MODERN POLITICAL, LEGAL AND RHETORICAL IDEALS

Republicanism

16 Daniel T. Rodgers (1992), 'Republicanism: The Career of a Concept', Journal of American History, 79, pp. 11-38. 485

17 Mortimer Sellers (1997), 'Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law', Kentucky Law Journal, 86, pp. 1-30. 513

18 Philip Pettit (1993), 'Liberalism and Republicanism', Australian Journal of Political Science, pp. 162-89. 543

Rhetoric

19 Michael Frost (2005), 'Greco-Roman Rhetoric: The Canon and its History', in Michael Frost (ed.), Introduction to Classical and Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 1-22. 573

Name Index 595-602.
Brüllmann, Philipp. 2021. "Nature and Psychology in Cicero’s Republic." In State and Nature: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Adamson, Peter and Eapp, Christopher, 201–220. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "This paper defends two claims about Cicero’s Republic. First, the argument of Books I and II calls for a discussion of psychological issues. If the ideas about the best constitution outlined in these two books are to make any sense, then certain assumptions about human psychology need to be true, or at least plausible. Second, in order to show that these assumptions are true or at least plausible, Cicero introduces, in Rep. III, a certain view of the cosmos. The dispute over naturalism vs. conventionalism about justice is used by Cicero as a vehicle for a discussion of psychological topics."
Buckley, Michael J. 1970. "Philosophic Method in Cicero." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 8:143–154.

Reprintedf in Richard O, Brooks, Cicero and Modern Law, Aldershot Asgate 2009, pp. 359-370.

Abstract: "At the turn of the century, Wilhelm Windelband's Geschichte der Philosophie laid a judgment upon Cicero which would perdure, almost without challenge, through the decades that followed: his works exhibit an ability for compilation and a talent for expression, but they lack any power of philosophizing---a lack demonstrated in their eclectic selection among philosophic systems. Earlier Friedrich Uberweg had indicated the derivative nature of Cicero's thoughts but praised his rhetorical enhancement of ethical values; later German historians would commend his eclecticism as a major source of Hellenistic philosophy, though agreeing with Windelband that Cicero was neither original as a thinker nor significant as a philosopher. Emile Brehier and Joseph Owens treat him accordingly, citing his works for the doctrines and arguments of others, while omitting any serious analysis of them as philosophic in their own right. Contemporary historians of philosophy may recognize within his dialogues articulate proponents of divergent philosophies and their systematic unity through exposition and refutation, but they relate these works to literary or rhetorical exercises. It is an unexamined assumption of our times that rhetoric and philosophy are univocally separate and exclusive provinces, connected neither by common topics, identifiable subject-matters, nor universal methods. Cicero's view of philosophic method questions the dogmatism of so rigid a disjunction and compels us to consider another possibility within the plurality of philosophic methods."
Bufacchi, Vittorio. 2023. Why Cicero Matters. London: Routledge.

"The ultimate goal in writing this book is to suggest a different way to think about political engagement today, and how Cicero can help us realize this new political imaginary. This book is primarily a reflection on where philosophy overlaps with politics, although it wants to be much more than an analysis of an important historical figure in the distant history of Western philosophy. Above all, this book is also about the precarious state of democracy in the twenty-first century, and how a philosopher wearing a toga in Ancient Rome can lend us a hand to reinforce our republic. In the last analysis, this book wants to show that our world today needs a Cicero more than it needs (yet another) Julius Caesar." (p. 15)
Burnyeat, Myles F. 1997. "Antipater and self-refutation. Elusive arguments in Cicero's Academica." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 277–310. Leiden: Brill.

"Cicero's Academica, begun in 45 BCE, takes stock of some 200 years of epistemological debate for which we have all too little evidence outside the Academica itself.

The only way to compensate for the truncated, allusive nature of our text is to speculate about the missing details. Such speculation, I contend, is a positive duty for those who write on the Academica.

Better to chance one's arm than ignore the rich texture of argument and counter-argument that lies, out of reach, just off the page." (pp. 279-280)
Cabrera, Frank. 2020. "Evidence and explanation in Cicero’s On Divination." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science no. 82:34–43.

Abstract: "In this paper, I examine Cicero’s oft-neglected De Divinatione, a dialogue investigating the legitimacy of the practice of divination. First, I offer a novel analysis of the main arguments for divination given by Quintus, highlighting the fact that he employs two logically distinct argument forms. Next, I turn to the first of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Here I show, with the help of modern probabilistic tools, that Marcus’ skeptical response is far from the decisive, proto-naturalistic assault on superstition that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Then, I offer an extended analysis of the second of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Inspired by Marcus’ second main argument, I formulate, explicate, and defend a substantive principle of scientific methodology that I call the “Ciceronian Causal-Nomological Requirement” (CCR). Roughly, this principle states that causal knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. Although I go on to argue that Marcus’ application of the CCR in his debate with Quintus is dialectically inadequate, I conclude that De Divinatione deserves its place in Cicero’s philosophical corpus, and that ultimately, its significance for the history and philosophy of science ought to be recognized."
Cappello, Orazio. 2019. The School of Doubt: Skepticism, History and Politics in Cicero’s Academica. Leiden: Brill.

"The School of Doubt conducts a parallel philological and philosophical examination of Cicero’s Academica, a work on Hellenistic epistemology written in the first half of 45 bce. The treatise has a unique history, insofar as fragments of two different versions are extant: the second of a two-volume first edition, a dialogue known as the Lucullus; and, forty-six paragraphs of the first book of a four-volume second edition, the Academic Books. Both versions ostensibly explore a controversy that divided Plato’s Academy at the turn of the first century bce, pitting Philo of Larissa against his pupil Antiochus of Ascalon. Their dispute was centered on a disagreement over the foundation of knowledge. As the story goes—a story in large part drawn from the pages of the Academica—Antiochus took issue with certain teachings of Philo’s Academy, whose tradition, developed during the school’s Hellenistic period, came to stand for the unknowability of all perceptual and conceptual objects (impressions, or visa) and for withholding assent to any such impression. These two postures, which defined Academic teaching in the third and second centuries bce, were known as akatalêpsia and epochê respectively." (p. 1, a note omitted)

"By the time Cicero had taken an interest in philosophy, the skeptical current in the Academy still controlled the school under Philo’s stewardship; Stoicism was still the enemy, despite a growing interest, felt most acutely in Antiochus, in less virulent forms of doubt and more constructive approaches to philosophy’s problems.(2) Notwithstanding these tendencies, in Cicero’s account the argument between Antiochus and Philo rehearsed the Hellenistic conflict between Stoa and Academy." (p. 2)

(2) We have no evidence to suggest that Cicero, his teachers or the Academic sources he refers to in his philosophica used the label ‘skepticism’ (in Greek, σκεπτικός or σκέπτεσθαι). We find the first attested use in antiquity referring to a philosophical movement in the second century CE and the term is canonized in the second or third century CE (§III.10.1).(...)
———. 2023. "The Shape of the Tradition to Come: Academic Arguments in Cicero." In The Oxford Handbook of Roman Philosophy, edited by Garani, Myrto, Konstan, David and Reydams.Schils, Gretchen, 256–274. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This contribution set out to interrogate the role and influence of the Academy in Cicero’s thought, beyond the usual attempts to interpret his personal viewpoint or survey the epistemological basis of his arguments. Cicero’s prefaces evidence a rich and complex engagement with what it means to adopt Academic arguments to write philosophy, and how this approach relates to the epistemic condition of humanity as well as to philosophy as an institution.

The author often defends his late cycle of philosophica as a service to Rome and to Latin literature. In this respect, his writings and their concern with method and history actively bring to life the philosophical tradition through his Academy— a protean designation for school, method, and privileged position within a field encompassing other positions, histories, and trajectories. Choreographing the struggle between philosophers and schools is the primary dynamic through which Cicero manages this process, priming a conflict with the existing literature of ignorant Stoics and self-serving Epicureans. He takes a position against them, making them antagonists over the question of openness to dialogue and rhetorical craft. It is through dialogue that Cicero appropriates, structures, and originates philosophy as a regimented field of ongoing cultural production tightly entwined with its history. Cicero frames philosophical practice and integrates the project of philosophy within a series of discrete debates, spelling out for his novice audience what philosophy is, what doing philosophy (successfully) looks like, and the rules of engagement by which philosophical thought moves, influences, progresses." (p. 271, a note omitted)
Caspar, Timothy W. 2010. Recovering the Ancient View of Founding: A Commentary on Cicero's De Legibus. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Clark, Mark Edward, and Ruebel, James S. 1985. "Philosophy and rhetoric in Cicero's Pro Milone." Rheinisches Museum für Philologie no. 128:57–72.

"The focal point of this study will be Cicero's "theory" of tyrannicide, as manifested in the Pro Milone. Buchner has sufficiently proven that a connection exists between Cicero's view of the tyrant in De Republica 2.47 and the portrayal of Clodius as tyrannus in the Pro Milone and, conversely, between the concept of the remover of the tyrant in De Republica 2.51 and Cicero's elevation of Milo to the status of tyrannoktonos in his defense(4)."

(4) 4) K. Büchner, "Der Tyrann und sein Gegenbild in Ciceros 'Staat'," Studien zur römischen Literatur II (Wiesbaden 1962) 116-47 (...)
Clarke, M. L. 1968. The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius. New York: W, W. Norton Co.

Chapter V. Cicero ad philosophy, pp. 54-65.

"has said the worst that can be said of them: ‘They are copies, done with little labour; I only add the words, of which I have an abundance.(36) Certainly there is much hasty work in them; there are changes of mood which leave us bewildered, and an indifference to consistency which verges on irresponsi¬ bility. None the less the works are impressive, if only as evidence of the high culture of the age. At no time were the Romans better read in philosophy or more keenly interested in it. It may be that under the Empire philosophy was a more powerful influence in moulding men’s lives, but in the late Republic it was combined with a general culture and an active political life in a way that is hardly found later. Cicero himself is the great example of this all-round culture, but we should not forget that many other leading statesmen of the period had philosophical interests." (p. 65)

(36) Cic. Att. XII. 52, 2.
Cole, Spencer. 2013. Cicero and the Rise of Deification at Rome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Cicero’s daughter Tullia died in the middle of February 45 bce, thirteen months before the assassination of Julius Caesar. Cicero tried to assuage his grief at the loss of his daughter by steeping himself in the consolation literature that he found in his friend Atticus’ library at Astura. Cicero then turns to what he claims to be an innovative project: writing his own consolation (Att. 12.14, 8 March 45 bce). In the literary composition he speaks of, the Consolatio, Cicero initiates another project that departs from convention: he proposes to turn his deceased daughter into a god." (p. 1)

(...)

"A major religious transformation emerging from the tumult of the late Republic, and a religious change arguably among the most important at Rome before the spread of Christianity, was the deification of human beings.(35) This book tells a part of the back-story to this significant development. It proceeds chronologically, considering the dynamic interplay of Cicero’s approximations of mortals and immortals with a gamut of artifacts and activities that were collectively closing the divide between humans and gods in the innovative religious atmosphere of late Republican Rome. Due attention is therefore given to examining the vital relationship between Cicero’s works and the religious initiatives focused on figures such as Pompey, Caesar, and Octavian. The analyses are a series of close readings that cover the innuendo-laden, divinizing encomia of late Republican dynasts as well as Cicero’s explorations of apotheosis and immortality in his theoretical works." (pp. 10-11)

(35) See Beard 2007: 233–38 on deification as a contested concept “high on the cultural and political agenda of the late Republic” that was “constantly debated, recalibrated, negotiated, and ridiculed” and Beard, North, and Price 1998: 140–49 on the earlier Republican background to these distinctive religious developments of the first century bce.

References

Beard, M. (2007) The Roman Triumph. Cambridge, Mass.

Beard, M., North, J., and Price, S. (1998) Religions of Rome. [Vol.1: A History; Vol. 2: A Sourcebook] Cambridge.
Cole, Thomas A. 1997. "Canonicity and Multivalence: The Case of Cicero." In The Rhetoric Canon, edited by Schildgen, Brenda Deen, 33–45. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

"A canonical text in the modern world is, almost inevitably, a multivalent text: a verbal artifact, secular or religious, whose enduring value and continuing relevance to successive generations can be maintained only by means of a succession of different or even contradictory rereadings. It was not so—or, at any rate, not always so—in the ancient world. For the Augustan rhetorician Dionysius of Halicarnassus and, presumably, for most of his predecessors, a kanén is not a text or a body of texts but an unvarying extratextual standard, a literary rule or set of rules—those governing the plain style or the Ionic dialect, for example—adherence to which makes a given author (Lysias is Dionysius’s choice for the simple style, Herodotus [Letter to Pompeius 3] for the Ionic dialect) a valuable exemplification of the kanén and so, secondarily, a kanén (or quasi-kanén) himself." (p. 33)

(...)

"The obvious model for all such efforts at preeminence or monopoly came two generations earlier, in the form of Cicero’s comprehensive Latinization of large areas of Greek philosophy and political theory, and of his related efforts, through a series of three dialogues, to establish himself as, first, the perfect synthesis of the two traditions of practical and “philosophical” oratory whose claims are debated by his predecessors M. Licinius Crassus and Marcus Antonius in the De Oratore (55 3.c.e.), then the culmination of the entire Greco-Roman oratorical tradition studied in the Brutus (46 B.c.e.), and finally the earthly embodiment of the Platonic form of the perfect orator whose existence is posited in the Orator (45 B.c.e.)." (p. 35)
Coleman, Robert. 1964. "The Dream of Cicero." The Cambridge Classical Journal no. 10:1–14.

"In stressing the Pythagorean colouring of the de Re Publica we must not of course overlook Cicero's debts to other thinkers. But these have been fully explored by earlier scholars. It is the argument of this paper that Pythagoreanism provides both the unifying theme for the whole treatise, which redeems it from the charge of being a mere scissors-and-paste composition, and also an important clue to Cicero's own political ideals. In his rhetorical writings he was not content, as the author of the ad Herennium or Quintilian certainly were, to follow the narrow tradition of the Hellenistic τέχναι, but preferred the nobler, more philosophical concept of rhetoric embodied in the works of Isocrates. In this he was following the lead of one who had been both a great theorist and an outstanding practitioner of his art. So in his political writings Cicero has chosen as his chief source of inspiration a school of practising philosopher-statesmen, whose reincarnation, as he believed, had produced the finest flowering of Roman political genius. Nostalgic though it is, the Dream of Cicero is by no means an unworthy or contemptible one." (p. 14)
Coleman-Norton, P. R. 1939. "The Fragmentary Philosophical Treatises of Cicero." The Classical Journal no. 34:213–228.

"Of the twenty-two treatises on philosophical problems which Cicero composed in swift succession during the last years of his life(1) more than half-fourteen, to be exact-have reached us in fragmentary condition." (p. 213, a note omiited)

(,,,)

"Habent sua fata libelli. Yet, so far as content is concerned, we need not greatly lament the loss of the Oeconomicus, the Protagoras, and the Timaeus, for we have their originals. Nor could we miss much the Chorographia, the Consolatio, the Hortensius, the De Auguriis, the De Fato, the De Gloria, and the De Virtutibus, for most of what they could have contained has been elsewhere made available by ancient authors. But in the case of the remaining four there is more cause for complaint. What we have of the Academica makes us long for the rest, since the problem which it treats is still unsolved, viz., the possibility of arriving at certitude in human knowledge. When we recall that Cicero had been for years the foremost orator of the Roman bar and yet has left us

only four speeches concerned with civil suits,(41) we realize what we have suffered in the failure of his De lure Civili in Artem Redigendo to survive. But to all generally and especially to historians the greatest loss is that of the missing sections of the De Re Publica and the De Legibus. And it is not an exaggeration to maintain that to recover these two treatises in their entirety the majority of scholars would cheerfully resign to oblivion the other twelve fragmentary parts of Cicero's philosophical collection." (pp. 227-228)

(1) Cf. Nat. Deor. I, 3, 6; Off. III, 1, 4. The Oeconomicus was translated ca. 85. The Chorographia was begun in 59, but we do not know when it was completed. The De Re Publica was initiated in 54 and issued in 51. The Paradoxa Stoicorum was started in 53 and finished in 46. The De Legibus was inaugurated in 52, but we have no evidence about its publication. The Protagoras is of uncertain date and is not mentioned by Cicero; however, some scholars suppose that it was translated in Cicero's youth. The De lure Civili in Artem Redigendo is also of uncertain date, but is promised in the De Oratore (II, 33, 142), written in 55. The remaining fifteen were composed between 45 and 43.

(41) These are all from his early practice: Pro P. Quinctio, Pro Q. Roscio Comoedo, Pro M. Tullio, Pro A. Caecina.
Colish, Marcia. 1985. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill.

Vol. I: Stoicism in Classical Latin literature (1985); Vol. II: Stoicism in Christian Latin thought through the Sixth century (1990).

See Vol. I, Chapter Two: Cicero pp. 61-158.

"Cicero holds a special place in the history of the Stoic tradition, a place second only to that occupied by the middle and Roman Stoics themselves.

His importance as a late Republican statesman, as a historical source for the political life of the first century B.C and as an authoritative exponent of classical Latin oratory and rhetorical theory have long been recognized. However, Cicero's contributions as a philosophical thinker have attracted sustained scholarly interest only in the modern era. In or study of the Stoic tradition it is Cicero's philosophical work that will command our primary attention. But his position as a philosophical thinker can by no means be detached from the other aspects of his mentality or from the vicissitudes of his political career and his personal life." (p. 61, a note omitted)
Connolly, Joy. 2016. "Reflection: Cicero on moral motivation and seeing (how) to be good." In Moral Motivation: A History, edited by Vasiliou, Iakovos, 87–92. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In the sixth book of Cicero’s De Republica, in a scene that reworks Plato’s myth of Er, the younger Scipio dreams that he meets his dead grandfather, the famous victor over Carthage, Scipio Africanus.

Africanus informs him that a place in the heavens awaits men who devote their lives to preserving the patria (De Republica 6.13). The younger Scipio must not be motivated by desire for mortal glory, which is fleeting (6.20), but “virtue should tug you by its own charms toward true glory” (verum decus, my translation, 6.25).

Though he expresses his wish to escape from the bondage of the body and live a “real” life in the heavens, the younger Scipio commits to living out his time on earth motivated by two ends: the ultimate reward of immortality and his immediate desire to imitate the examples of his father and grandfather." (p. 87)

(...)

"A key point in Cicero’s thinking about moral motivation (and from the perspective of his influence on early modernity, the most important one) is the fundamental role played in sustaining sociability and action by aesthetic perception, above all, sight.

Scipio is motivated to live the best life by the sight of his father and grandfather, whose actions and demeanor he watches, remembers, and imitates. In turn, he will appear in public to be seen by others, who will be motivated to imitate (and compete with) him. Similarly, the strongest bonds among humans, as described in De Officiis, are formed by friendship between men that flourishes when two men see the onorableness in one another that each individually strives for (cernit, videtur, 1.55)." (p. 88)
Cowell, F. R. 1948. Cicero and the Roman Republic. London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons.

"Despite the fact, therefore, that the events in the history of Rome have been narrated afresh in almost every generation, and in every land, and although the lives and characters of the chief personalities in that great drama have been described again and again, the work of reinterpretation cannot cease. As we learn more about the arts of government and administration, as we develop our knowledge of economics, agriculture and trade, and above all as we seek to penetrate deeper into the mind of man and into social psychology, we naturally hope to look to the past with more understanding eyes. The fact that so great a task can hardly ever be brought to an end must be a sufficient excuse for any attempt, however partial and imperfect, to deal with it at all.

It is in this spirit that an effort has been made in the pages that follow to understand and to take the measure of the Age of Cicero, to see how he and his countrymen were formed by a style and way of life not of their own devising, how they tried to reshape their inheritance, what strains and stresses they endured and how far by their own efforts they were able to modify the destiny of mankind." (p. 2)
Davies, J. C. 1971. "The Originality of Cicero's Philosophical Works." Latomus no. 30:105–119.

"One of the less commendable results of the upsurge of Hellenism in the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the effect it had upon Latin studies (1). In the field of Ciceronian studies it was marked by a new enthusiasm on the part of many scholars in their attempts to trace the Greek sources, real or apparent, for the various philosophical works, and by an unprecedented obsession in revealing the indebtedness of Cicero to an earlier age, with a consequent revaluation of the esteem which had previously been accorded to him. In this paper I shall be attempting to review the various aspects in which originality has been claimed for Cicero and to suggest that, even if, as the specialists in source-hunting were eager to demonstrate, it did not lie in the advancement of a novel philosophical system, it may nevertheless be claimed that Cicero's contribution was a very real and valuable attempt to introduce a new and peculiarly Roman genre into the monopoly of philosophical activity previously enjoyed by the Greeks (2)."

(1) See R. M. Ogilvie, Latin and Greek, London (1964), p. 76 ff.

(2) (2) On the relationship of Cicero to his sources cf. inter alios: Pohlenz's introduction to his revision of Heine's edition of the Tusculans, especially p. 17-18 ; R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften (passim), e.g. Vol. II, p. 488, note 1, on Cicero's earlier fluctuations in his philosophical adherence to Philo; Pease's introduction to his edition of the De Natura Deorum, Harvard (1955).
DeFilippo, Joseph. 2000. "Cicero vs Cotta in De Natura Deorum." Ancient Philosophy no. 20:169–187.
———. 2022. "Cicero and the Stoic Defense of Divination." In Philodemea: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis. Fonte Aretusa: Parnassos Press

"It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive account of how ND [De Natura Deorum] and Div [De Divinatione] fit together. It is intended rather to constitute a significant step toward such an account by elucidating the aim and nature of the arguments Cicero makes against divination in Div 2. I shall be concerned primarily with the quality of Cicero’s attack on divination in the context of his skepticism. I defend the general thrust of his arguments against the Stoics, but I also want to elucidate the larger context in which these arguments occur, the context of the terms by which a theological dispute between a skeptic and a dogmatist can be decided. For quite apart from the validity of individual arguments offered in Div 2, Cicero’s debate with Quintus illustrates an interesting fact about his sort of skepticism. This is not only that, unlike the dogmatist, he does not have to be right to “win” the debate.

Because of the importance Cicero places on the persuasive appearance as a practical and intellectual guide, he may “approve” the broad outlines of a theory, such as Stoic theology, while withholding assent from many of its particulars. This feature of his skepticism explains ultimately why the discordance between the two dialogues (on which more below) is merely apparent. This is a point one can easily miss if he considers Cicero’s arguments in isolation, divorced from their skeptical purpose and orientation, and from their context in a dialogue whose intention is to counter specific ambitious claims of the Stoics." (p. 317)
Denyer, Nicholas. 1985. "The Case Against Divination: An Examination of Cicero's De divinatione." Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society no. 31:1–10.

"Hereafter, instead of concentrating on the parallels between science and divination, I will consider this difference and others consequent upon it. The Stoics, I will argue, were well aware of how divinatory prediction differs from its scientific counterpart; and for all the parallels between Stoicism and scientific realism, the Stoics consciously invoked these differences in their rationale for divination.

Because of this, we will see that their rationale is remarkably successful. For since divination on the Stoic account does not even pretend to be scientific, it is altogether immune from the charge of being no more than pseudo-science. These points I will substantiate by setting out the Stoic case for divination, and by showing how ineffective against it are the arguments of Cicero's De Divinatione." (pp. 1-2)
Douglas, Alan Edward. 1965. "Cicero the Philosopher." In Cicero, edited by Dorey, Thomas Alan, 135–170. London: Routledge.

Abstract: "Not only do Cicero’s letters provide much vivid detail about his plans, methods, and progress and the actual processes of publication: it was also his habit to provide each work, and often each book of a work, with a preface which served both as a dedication and as an explanation and, if necessary, justification of his scope and purpose. At its beginning and again at its end, Cicero indicates that he had been led to write these works through his determination ‘to help his fellow-citizens’ and ‘never to stop seeking the good of the community’. The Hellenistic Greeks and Cicero devoted much attention to theory of knowledge and theology, and the Stoics, though not Cicero, were deeply concerned with problems of logic. But it is much more to the point that the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is much less dominated by metaphysics than is conventionally supposed."
———. 1968. Cicero. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chapter V: The philosophical writings, pp. 27-34.
Dressler, Alex. 2016. Personification and the Feminine in Roman Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 4: Girl behind the woman: Cicero and Tullia, Lucretius and the life of the body-mind, pp. 129-166; Chapter 6: Nature's property in On Duties I: the feminine communism of Cicero's radical aesthetics, pp. 205-248.
du Plessis, Paul J., ed. 2016. Cicero’s Law: Rethinking Roman Law of the Late Republic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors VII; List of Abbreviations VIII; A Note on Translations IX;

1. Paul J. du Plessis: Introduction 1;

Part I On Law

2. Philip Thomas: A Barzunesque View of Cicero: From Giant to Dwarf and Back 11; 3. Olga Tellegen-Couperus and Jan Willem Tellegen: Reading a Dead Man’s Mind: Hellenistic Philosophy, Rhetoric and Roman Law 26; 4. Benedikt Forschner: Law’s Nature: Philosophy as a Legal Argument in Cicero’s Writings 50;

Part II On Lawyers

5. Yasmina Benferhat: Cicero and the Small World of Roman Jurists 71; 6. Christine Lehne-Gstreinthaler: ‘Jurists in the Shadows’: The Everyday Business of the Jurists of Cicero’s Time 88; 7. Matthijs Wibier:: Cicero’s Reception in the Juristic Tradition of the Early Empire 100; 8. Jill Harries: Servius, Cicero and the Res Publica of Justinian 123;

Part III On Legal Practice

9. Saskia T. Roselaar: Cicero and the Italians: Expansion of Empire, Creation of Law 145; 10. Jennifer Hilder: Jurors, Jurists and Advocates: Law in the Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione 166; 11. Michael C. Alexander: Multiple Charges, Unitary Punishment and Rhetorical Strategy in the Quaestiones of the Late Roman Republic 187; 12. Catherine Steel: Early-career Prosecutors: Forensic Activity and Senatorial Careers in the Late Republic 205; Paul J. du Plessis: Postscript 228;

Index 231-241.
Dyck, Andrew R. 1996. A commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

"I have tried to bear in mind that nowadays commentaries are not (if indeed they ever were) read for their own sake but serve merely as an aid to the understanding of the author. A note of excessive length and prolixity can actually block a reader's approach to the text. I have tried to come quickly to the point by citing the relevant ancient evidence, often verbatim, so that the reader can judge a question independently, and then draw conclusions as appropriate. I have not tried to create a repertory of miscellaneous learning attached to the text; instead I have referred the reader to standard works where such background information can be found. To orient the reader, I iudicium to set the emphasis in Books 1-2 by attributing, for instance, even the attacks on the Gracchi to his Greek source, Panaetius, as well as the degree to which Cicero, rather than Pohlenz's putative Greek source, Athenodorus Calvus, has shaped the direction of the argument of Book 3.4.The separation of Greek and Roman elements has needed rethinking with greater

attention to the personal and political agenda of Cicero at the time of composition." (Prefacw, pp. IX-X)
———. 2004. A commentary on Cicero, De Legibus. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

"Incomplete, bristling with lacunae and other textual problems as well as archaic or pseudo-archaic language, with a problematic relation to Plato's Laws on the one side and Cicero's own de Republica on the other, more than most ancient works, Leg. needs to be read in a high quality critical edition with the aid of a detailed modern commentary. The need for a new text has been catered for by J.G.F. Powell, whose new OCT should appear next year.[*] In presenting a commentary, I am keenly aware that the task requires a formidable array of specialized knowledge—in philology, history of philosophy and religion and constitutional history, in each of which I can hope, at best, to approximate a beta. The method and goals outlined in the Preface to my commentary on de Officiis apply here as well; here I can focus on the needs of scholarly readers in the knowledge that the general reader has been catered for in the recent annotated translations by Rudd-Powell! and Zetzel." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII, a note omitted)

Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Republic and the Laws, edited by Niall Rudd; J. G. F .Powell, Oxford University Press, 2008.
———. 2006. A commentary on Cicero, De Divinatione II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Latin text and commentary in English.

Presentation: "Andrew R. Dyck ranks among the top Latinists in Ciceronian studies.

In this new volume, he offers the first commentary on Cicero’s De Divinatione II in nearly a century. This commentary aims to equip students and scholars of Latin with the kinds of historical and philosophical background and linguistic and stylistic information needed to understand and appreciate Cicero’s text on Roman religion and divination. Dyck situates Cicero’s text in the context of Roman religion in antiquity, and he traces the subsequent reception of the text. The introduction reviews recent interpretations of De Divinatione.

Dyck rejects the view that has recently been widespread in Anglophone studies that De Divinatione stages a debate between roughly equal opponents and without the emergence of a clear authorial point of view. Instead he argues that a careful reading shows that Cicero as author is invested in the argument, with the particular aim of countering superstition."

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