Levine, Philip. 1957. "The Original Design and the Publication of the De Natura Deorum." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology no. 62:7–36.

"Scholarly acumen has been liberally expended on the intricate problem of identifying the Greek sources used in Cicero's philosophical works, and the De natura deorum has received more than its fair share of such close analytic study."

(...)

"Moreover, in a work like the De natura deorum a special exercise of tact was required of the author. The subject under discussion, as he himself observed, vitally concerned a fundamental part of the Roman heritage, and for this reason, in probing the foundations of belief in the gods, he had to take particular care not to exceed the limits of discretion; otherwise he ran the risk of exposing himself to captious criticism,

which he always tried to avoid. The object of the present study is to demonstrate how far and in what ways the dramatic structure of the De natura deorum was affected by such external considerations.

The results of this examination, supported by evidence from his other works on philosophy, will then be directed to a clearer understanding of Cicero's technique in the dialogue form and to a plausible explanation of certain problems involved in the composition and publication of the De natura deorum." (pp. 7-8, notes omitted)

(...)

"As Mayor[*] points out, the author nowhere explicitly states that the De natura deorum was published; in fact, it is described merely as "completed" or "existing" in two instances where other writing is mentioned as already released to the public. In view of this and the other considerations previously discussed, it is not altogether improbable that the dialogue was at least withheld for some time from general circulation, and perhaps, as Mayor suggests, not even published while Cicero was alive. Although there is less certainty about a posthumous edition, the English scholar was in any case on the right track. To support any theory about the delayed publication of the work, however, it was obviously not enough simply to point to the roughnesses and inconsistencies in the dialogue; for these blemishes could be readily attributed by other scholars to hasty composition. Rather there was required a coherent explanation of the various factors responsible for the present state of the De natura deorum in the light of the author's usual practice and technique in this literary genre. This study, it is hoped, has provided that explanation." (p 25, a note omitted)

[*] J. B. Mayor in the introduction to his edition of De naturta deorum, Cambridge, 1880, , 3, xxvi.
Lick, Georg. 1978. "On Cicero, De Fato 5 and Related Passages." The American Journal of Philology no. 99:155–158.

"In the gap near the beginning of our text of De Fato must have presented Chrysippus' and Posidonius' doctrines of fate and their base, the idea of σῠμπᾰ́θειᾰ. When the text begins again, Cicero seems to have disposed of most of Posidonius' arguments, though he is ready to admit that, in some cases, the principle of σῠμπᾰ́θειᾰ works." (p. 155)
Linderski, Jerzy. 1982. "Cicero and Roman divination." La Parola del Passato no. 37:458–484.

Reprinted in J. Linderski, Roman Queestions: Selected Papers, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1995. pp. 458-484.

"Whatever the philosophical relationship between the gods and divination, Cicero was acutely aware of the constant political interconnection between divination, the belief in gods and the rule of the nobility. He tries therefore to draw a clear dividing line between religio and philosophy. When we wish to investigate what is bonum and what is malum, what is morally right or morally wrong, we do not turn to diviners, but to philosophers, to whom such problems rightly belong (Div. 2.10-11). But whether we believe in gods and divination or not, it is our civic duty to maintain the state religion, and divination forms part of it. No Roman critic of divination had ever disputed this proposition. Politically the only important question was who exercised control over the state cult." (p. 16)
Lintott, Andrew. 2008. Cicero as Evidence: A Historian’s Companion. New York: Oxford University Press.

"The aim of this book is to assist those who study late-Republican history to read Cicero, to introduce them to the variety of evidence available in the whole range of his writings and to suggest the kind of critical approach that is necessary if this evidence is to be given its proper value. It is this second aim that guides the first two parts of the book in particular. Here I seek to show how the historian must handle evidence that at first sight may seem both attractively immediate and transparent, but on further inspection proves to be far otherwise. The surviving texts of Cicero’s speeches present special difficulties. Chapter 2 is unashamedly technical and will be best appreciated by those who are already grappling with the problem of the speeches as historical evidence. Chapters 4 to 6 are equally technical about matters of private law, but that is inevitable, if one is to do justice to this aspect of Cicero’s writing and work. It is often neglected by philologists and historians, but one cannot judge Cicero as an orator or as a member of Roman society without taking it into account. Parts 3 and 4 follow a general path well trodden in Ciceronian biography, but will be found to differ considerably in their emphases from the majority of such works. Because my text focuses on Ciceronian writing it will be more of an intellectual history of the man than a history of his actions. In so far as it is biographical, it will for the most part neglect the tradition created by contemporary and later writers about Cicero.

Because the latter, though sometimes perceptive, is also sometimes misleading, it is important to clarify the vision to be found in Cicero’s own works." (Preface, p. V)
Litchfield, Henry Wheatland. 1913. "Cicero's Judgment on Lucretius." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology no. 24:147–159.

"It is my purpose in this paper briefly to review proposed interpretations of the text [Ad Q. Fr., 2, 9 (11)], so far as they have come to my notice, and to mention in passing the condition on which each seems to me to depend for its validity. So far as I am able to see, all except one1 are based on an uncertainty. In conclusion, I wish to suggest another interpre- tation which depends on a condition the reality of which is attested. I do not hope to convince any reader that this last explanation is neces- sarily the right one; but in our present darkness it has, I believe, at least a better chance than the others." (p. 151)
Llano Alonso, Fernando. 2013. "Cosmopolitanism and Natural Law in Cicero." In The Threads of Natural Law: Unravelling a Philosophical Tradition, edited by Contreras, Francisco José, 27–36. Dordrecht: Springer.

"Although jurisprudential questions arise frequently in Cicero’s writings, above all those questions surrounding situations which arise in everyday life and which have to do with justice and the law, the works that most interest us from a legal philosophical point of view are essentially the three treatises De Officiis, De Legibus, and De Re Publica.(11) The following section will focus on one of the more subtle aspects of Ciceronian legal philosophy: his conception of the natural law ( lex naturalis ) as a law born from right reason ( recta ratio ) and not from the edicts of the praetors or the laws of the Twelve Tables. As such, it entails an unwritten and universal law, distinct from positive law ( ius positum ) and whose understanding requires us to probe the very heart of philosophy ( ex intima philosophia ), wherein we learn that the Reason all of humanity holds in common is the source of the natural law.

Thus, Cicero concludes that the nature of Law is derived from Human Nature.(12)" (p. 29)

(1)) (...) The essay De Inventione (86 BC) from Cicero’s youth as well as the aforementioned De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum and Tusculanae Disputationes are also of interest despite their indirect connection with legal argument.

(12) De Legibus, I, 5, 17.
Lockwood, Jr., Thornton C. 2020. "Documenting Hellenistic Philosophy: Cicero as a Source and Philosopher." In The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Arenson, Kelly, 49–60. New York: Routledge.

"But even if Cicero incorporates the methods of the Academic school into the treatises written in the final years of his life, there is significant diversity amongst his works in the way that they make use of historical sources. The Academic model, for instance, is most prominent in On Moral Ends and On the Nature of the Gods (and its appendices, viz. On Divination and On Fate). In each of these works (which I will discuss further below), Cicero composes dialogues between a character who represents the views of one of the Hellenistic schools and a character (often that of “Cicero”) who presents an Academic critique of the school’s doctrines. Yet several important treatises, specifically On the Republic and On Duties, fail to follow the academic model even though they draw heavily upon (and thus present historical evidence about) the sources of Classical and Hellenistic philosophy.

Whether Cicero’s method of philosophical composition changed or his views about some aspects of practical philosophy departed from the Academic school are questions that go beyond my chapter. But the diversity of ways that Cicero incorporates historical sources into his philosophical works should caution us against the claim that his work lacks originality or simply present translations and adaptations of the major Greek schools of philosophy.

In the remainder of my chapter I survey Cicero’s actual use of historical sources in each of his philosophical treatises, proceeding chronologically (and identifying the conventional date of publication for each work)." (p. 51, a note omitter)
Long, Anthony Arthur. 1995. "Cicero's Plato and Aristotle." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 37–61. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reprinted in: A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 285-306.

"The aim of this chapter is to approach Cicero's philosophical work by studying his assessments and use of Plato and Aristotle. That could, of course, be a topic for a whole book. As assessed by Cicero, Plato and Aristotle constitute between them all that is best in philosophy, both in their own right and by the traditions they established via their successors in the Academy and the Lyceum.

(...)

By including Plato and Aristotle in his philosophical corpus, Cicero was less concerned with their individual doctrines than with the general impetus they had given to the subject, their diffused influence as expressed by the terms Academici and Peripatetici, and their literary distinction. In this last respect he contrasts them with the dialectically incompetent or inelegant Epicureans and the pedantically technical Stoics, whose two philosophies he does present and criticize in some depth.

Yet there is more, or so I will argue, to Cicero's Plato and Aristotle than can be ascertained from his purely philosophical background and sympathies. Cicero was not a purist in philosophy.

His philosophical interests and judgements were constantly influenced by his Roman identity as an orator, statesman, and consistent supporter of the mos maiorum. He admired Plato and Aristotle chiefly, I think, because in his eyes their dialectical and political interests helped to bridge the gap between philosophy, where he was not completely at home, and rhetoric where he was on very firm ground. If the De Republica were not so fragmentary, it would be a good text to explore from this point of view. Instead, I have decided to focus upon two other points. First, Cicero's use of Plato specifically, by which I mean his interest in identifiable material from Plato's dialogues; secondly, his appeal to Aristotle and the Academic tradition for the methodology of pro and contra argument (in utramque partem dicere). That is the main agenda. But what it involves needs some prefatory remarks concerning general aspects of Cicero's philosophizing." (pp. 37-38, notes omitted)
———. 1995. "Cicero’s Politics in De Officiis." In Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Laks, André and Schofield, Malcolm, 213–240. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"These remarks on Cicero's reform of traditional ideology are merely a preface to the material that follows. There I shall first examine his political and ethical concerns at the time he was writing Off [DeOfficiis]. Next I propose to look, in some detail, at the contrasts he draws in Off between values anchored to his concept of honestum and those that lack this grounding. Those contrasts continuously bear upon contemporary politics, and especially on himself as a defender of the Republic and Caesar as the Republic's destroyer.

I shall refer to professional Stoic philosophers from time to time, but the question of how Cicero has used his sources, especially Panaetius, is not an objective of this essay. I seek to interpret Off. as a work whose political message is through-and-through Ciceronian.

What that message tells us about Stoic theory, as distinct from its possible application, is distinctly subordinate in this essay." (pp. 218-219, a note omitted)
———. 2015. "Academic Eloquence and the End of Cicero’s De Finibus." Ancient Philosophy no. 35:183–198.

Abstract: "The paper considers why the structure of Cicero’s De Finibus implicitly favours the Academy, even though Cicero avoids a decision between the Stoic theory and Antiochus’ theory. Cicero’s educational aims require him to illustrate not only a range of theories but a range of criteria by which theories and the exposition of theories should be judged. By one criterion – style of exposition – the entire Academic tradition, not Antiochus specifically, is endorsed."
MacKendrick, Paul. 1989. The Philosophical Books of Cicero. London: Duckworth.

With the collaboration of Karen Lee Singh.
Man, Andrei-Tudor. 2019. "Chrysippus’ Theory of Divination in Cicero, De divinatione." In Savoirs prédictifs et techniques divinatoires de l’Antiquité tardive à Byzance, edited by Magdalino, Paul and Timotin, Andrei, 39–70. Seyssel: La Pomme d’or.

"The goal of this paper is to identify within De divinatione the elements that originate in the work of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, to recontextualize and to recompose them into a coherent image of the ancient Stoic view on divination. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to read De divinatione as a repository of doctrinal elements of various philosophical and religious origins, and to extract and recompose the elements that are able to deliver an image of the ancient Stoic theory of divination and particularly of the theory argued for by the second founder of Stoicism, Chrysippus. The following pages will be organized in two parts. The first part will identify the textual moments that discuss the philosophical views on divination and will extract the Ciceronian references to the Stoic views on this religious practice. The second part will focus on those fragments that discuss Chrysippus’ views on divination and will use them to understand and to recompose a coherent Chrysippean doctrine of divination." (p. 41)
Manuwald, Gesine. 2015. Cicero. New York: I. B. Tauris.

"Since there is so much evidence about Cicero, inevitably every treatment is selective, presenting a particular point of view. This book tries to introduce Cicero’s life and works by focusing on themes rather than chronology, by providing paradigmatic examples instead of a comprehensive overview and by including a brief summary of the changing reception of him and his writings from antiquity until the present day. There will be less emphasis on historical facts and the technical aspects of rhetoric and philosophy and more of a focus on the question of how the different facets of his life and activities combine to create the interesting individual known as ‘Cicero’." (Preface, p. XII)
Marenbon, John. 2008. "Logic before 1100: The Latin Tradition." In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 1–63. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

"The earliest Latin logical text is also treatise in legal rhetoric. Cicero wrote his Topics (‘Topica’) [Cicero, 1924] in 44 BC, and professes that he will explain there to his friend Trebatius the doctrine of Aristotle’s Topics. In fact, the work reflects the Rhetoric as much as the Topics, and probably handbooks of rhetorical and Peripatetic doctrine even more [Long, 1995, 54-7; Stump, 1989, 57-66]. The subject of the Topics is said to be the finding of arguments; as his examples show, Cicero has in mind particularly the needs of an orator in the courts. The aim of argument is seen in terms of its persuasive effect: it convinces someone of something that was in doubt (§ 8). The tools for finding arguments are, as in Aristotle, the topics or loci. But whereas Aristotle’s topics are a proliferation of argumentative strategies, linked to his doctrine of the Categories, Cicero’s topics are a short list of types of relationships, consideration of which can help the orator to discover an argument.

(...)

For historians of logic, the most important passage in the book is where (§§53-7) Cicero sets out the modi dialecticorum — which consist of an extended and slightly mangled list of the Stoic indemonstrables, expressed, not as the Stoics did, using numbers as propositional variables (‘the first’, ‘the second’), but rather ‘this’ and ‘that’. In Cicero’s list, where there is some confusion because the example sentences do not always match the vaguely given definitions, the first five modes correspond roughly to the five Stoic modes, and Mode 6 is a re-formulation of Mode 3; whilst Mode 7 is (§57) ‘Not this and that; but not this; therefore that’ — that is to say: ∼ (p&q);∼ p; so q, an obviously invalid inference. (For discussion, see [Kneale and Kneale, 1962, 179-81; Hadot, 1971, 144-56]). This mistake suggests that, already by Cicero’s time, Stoic propositional logic was not properly understood (see below, p. 17)." (pp. 3-4)

References

Cicero, 1924]. Cicero. Divisions de l’Art Oratoire. Topiques, ed. et trad. H. Bornecque, Paris; Les Belles Lettres, 1924.

[Hadot, 1971] P. Hadot. Marius Victorinus. Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres, Paris; ´Etudes Augustiniennes, 1971.

[Kneale and Kneale, 1962] W. Kneale and M. Kneale. The Development of Logic, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1962.

[Long, 1995] A. A. Long. Cicero’s Plato and Aristotle. In Cicero the Philosopher, ed. J.G.F. Powell, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 37-61, 1995.

[Stump, 1989] E. Stump. Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic, Ithaca and London; Cornell University Press, 1989.
Marko, Vladimír. 2020. "On Cicero's Fabius argument." Filozofia no. 75:677–692.

Abstract "This article aims to show that it is impossible to put Cicero’s testimonies regarding The Fabius Argument [*] in a consistent inferential order. Either we must suppose that additional premises are tacitly assumed in the text or we must compare it with other sources, which leads to inconsistencies in the proof’s reconstruction.

Cicero’s reconstruction of the progression of the argument has formal shortcomings, and the paper draws attention to some of these deficiencies. He interpreted sources in a revised and intentionally simplified way, with the aim of undermining the views of his opponents, casting them as inconsistent and similar to views held by Diodorus. Rather than being a consistently interpreted argument faithfully transcribed from the Stoic sources, Cicero’s Fabius Argument is ultimately anti-Stoic."

[*]] De Fato. VI, 12 – VII, 14.
Maso, Stefano. 2016. Grasp and Dissent: Cicero and Epicurean Philosophy. Turnhout: Brepols.

Summarty: "The present study centers on the distinctive characteristics of Cicero’s philosophical training; for the first time in a volume, the Roman philosopher’s relationship with Epicurean philosophy is accurately recreated. Not only does Cicero exhibit his lofty philosophical proficiency anchored in the Academic school, but he also proves an excellent authority on Epicurus’s proposed philosophy.

At the conclusion of the research, of course, Cicero will prove to be a fierce opponent of Epicureanism – an intelligent adversary, capable of studiose dicere contra Epicurum: understanding and criticizing, but also (and this is surely quite important for us today) reiterating the opposing party’s thought with great acumen.

Epicureanism accordingly played a pivotal role in Cicero’s philosophical development within the fields of physics, theology and ethics, paradoxically proving useful both in the formulation of a more skeptical and probabilistic philosophy and in the individuation of a path open to ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων, but even more strongly bound to Stoicism. Unyielding and dogmatically binding, Epicurus’s doctrine endured throughout this dramatic historical moment situated at the end of the Roman Republic."
———. 2022. Cicero’s Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter.

"From the point of view of moral consistency and political choices, Cicero’s image is likely to remain damaged. But that does not matter. The Cicero I am dealing with here is above all a man of high culture; a scholar who discussed a number of philosophical-theoretical issues with scholars and masters belonging to different philosophical schools; a tireless protagonist of the political scene who tried to combine the time of action with the time of thinking; a passionate and enlightened investigator of the Roman tradition willing to confront without awe the Greek culture, whose revolutionary power he recognized.

I am especially interested in showing that we are not dealing with a mere populariser; I am convinced that if, thanks to Cicero’s ‘philosophical’ work, we are able to reconstruct the history of the Academy in the Hellenistic era, we cannot for this reason renounce defining his personality and his purpose as a philosopher." (Preface, pp. V-VI)

(...)

"In planning this research, I favoured some paths over others, starting from the biographical picture that can illustrate Cicero’s training as a philosopher. In addition, I have placed the more explicitly philosophical works at the centre of the inquiry, even if I have neglected neither the corpus of speeches nor the rhetorical works or the letters. I discuss how Cicero combines politics and philosophy, rhetoric and philosophy, ethics and philosophy: how he approaches epistemological topics, and why the ‘sceptical’ method appears to him so fertile and decisive in his philosophical commitment. (Preface, p. VI)
McConnell, Sean. 2014. Philosophical Life in Cicero’s Letters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this monograph I adopt a different approach to the philosophical elements of Cicero’s correspondence, which, I hope, will raise the estimation of the letters’ philosophical value and encourage scholars of ancient philosophy in particular to approach this unique, yet sorely neglected collection of texts in a much more nuanced, sensitive fashion. I approach the philosophical elements in the letters as serious and important aspects of Cicero’s philosophical practice, worthy of systematic philosophical study in their own right. Moreover, I critically evaluate Cicero’s letters in the context of the ancient tradition of ‘philosophical letters’.

By approaching Cicero’s correspondence in this fashion, I establish that some of his letters are pieces of philosophical literature that stand alongside his recognised philosophical works as genuine components of his philosophical legacy and oeuvre.

Furthermore, I demonstrate that we can uncover in the letters plenty of technical philosophy – admittedly, frequently allusive, obscure, or bound up with other concerns – which, once analysed carefully, offers a wide range of important and novel insights into Cicero’s epistolography, his own philosophical knowledge, development, and practice, and the wider philosophical environment of the first century BC." (p. 4)
———. 2017. "Magnitudo Animi and Cosmic Politics in Cicero's De re Publica." The Classical Journal no. 113:45–70.

Abstract: "This paper offers a fresh interpretation of the role played by the Dream of Scipio in Cicero’s De re publica. It explores Cicero’s key distinction between the cosmic and the local levels of statesmanship and the problems he sees with localism, and it details fully for the first time the importance that Cicero attached to the virtue of magnitudo animi (“greatness of soul”). The paper makes the case that in De re publica Cicero promotes his own innovative cosmic model of politics, in which magnitudo animi is developed through an educational process situated in the traditional Roman mos maiorum."
McKeon, Richard. 2009. "Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero." In Cicero and Modem Law, edited by Brooks, Richard O., 3–73. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Originally published in Cicero, Brutus, On the Nature of Gods, On Divination, On Duties, trans. Hubert M. Poteat, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, pp. 1-65, 613-18.

"According to Cicero, interest in philosophy was no older in Rome than the generation of Scipio the Younger and Laelius, who appear as interlocutors in his dialogues, On Old Age (the action of which takes place in 150), and Republic (the dramatic date of which is 129, the year of Scipio's death), while Laelius is the chief speaker in On Friendship (which takes place in 129, a few days after the mysterious death of Scipio). But, although the Romans of that period were familiar with philosophy and although they set down in writing their civil law, their orations, and the monuments of their ancestors, "they pursued this most ample of all arts, the discipline of living well, in their lives rather than in their writings, "(41) while earlier generations of Romans, who had performed glorious deeds without the aid of learning, had been educated by nature rather than by philosophy.(42) When Cicero began to write, therefore, he found no books on philosophy in Latin except some popular expositions of Epicureanism, which he had not read but of which he expressed a low opinion.(43)

He was undecided whether this dearth of Latin writings on philosophy was due to the absorption of his ancestors in practical affairs or to their judgment that such reflections should not be brought to the attention of the unlearned; and he complained frequently that the Latin language was unsuited to the expression of philosophic subtleties without the invention of new terms and novel constructions. His formulation of his own philosophy, consequently, is intricately interwoven with an interpretation of the history of culture, the nature of philosophic method, and the interrelations of philosophic doctrines. Much of· the criticism and interpretation of his philosophy is based, in turn, on a different conception of culture, of philosophy, and of the relation of philosophic schools; and most of the estimates of his accomplishments are by standards which are considered and questioned or rejected in his philosophic dialogues." (pp. 21-22)

(41) Tusculanae Disputationes iv. 3. 5-6.

(42) Ibid. i. I. 2 and De Finibus iii; 3. II. Cf. De Officiis i. 33.121.

(43) Tusculanae Disputationes i. 3. 6; ii. 3. 7; iv. 3.6.
Mehl, David. 2002. "The Stoic Paradoxes according to Cicero." In Vertis in Usum: Studies in Honour of Edward Courtney, edited by Miller, John F., Damon, Cynthia and Myers, K. Sara, 39–46. München: K. G. Saur.

"In 46 BC Cicero wrote Paradoxa Stoicorum, a defense of the Stoic tenets known as the paradoxes. These paradoxes are concise assertions, such as "only the wise man is free, and every fool is a slave" and "all misdeeds are equal," which, as Cicero explains (Parad, pro. 4), are surprising (admirabilia) and run contrary to common belief (contra opinionem omnium).

A year or so after writing Paradoxa Cicero wrote De Finibus, books 3 and 4 of which are a systematic explanation and refutation of Stoic ethics, including the paradoxes. This apparent contradiction in Cicero's perspective, evident in this defense and refutation of the same Stoic teaching, is problematic. Was he serious in one work but not the other? Does one work and not the other reveal his true philosophical convictions? Does he refute the paradoxes in De Finibus only to an extent, while substantially agreeing with them? What I will attempt to show here is that Cicero was not favorable toward the paradoxes, because he disagreed with a fundamental point of early Stoic doctrine which gave the paradoxes their logical foundation; and that in Paradoxa Stoicorum, a rhetorical exercise that Cicero wrote for the purpose of amusement, he defends the paradoxes by turning them into principles of Roman rather than early Stoic virtue, thus making them palpable for a popular Roman audience." (p. 39)
Mitchell, Thomas N. 1979. Cicero: The Ascending Years. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"There is, of course, no shortage of political biographies of Cicero.

The present book differs from them, however, in several important respects. It concentrates on the first two-thirds of Cicero's life, the period least well documented in the ancient sources and least discussed in modern biographies. Specifically, it examines Cicero's political heritage, including the figures who shaped his thinking in his early years, and the way his ideas evolved and affected his political conduct during the most active and successful phases of his career-his years as a candidate and his term as Rome's chief magistrate in 63.

The relatively narrow range of the book makes possible a thorough exploration of the scattered and sometimes ambiguous evidence for Cicero's ascending years in Roman politics and a full discussion of the complex political conditions and events with which he had to deal and which often crucially shaped or circumscribed his political responses.

The result, I hope, is a more complete and fully documented account of Cicero's political life and thought in the most significant and revealing stages of his career and a more extensive discussion of the political background of his statesmanship than can be found in standard biographies." (Preface, p. VIII)
———. 1991. Cicero: The Senior Statesman. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"The present volume brings to a conclusion the study of Cicero's political life and thought begun in Cicero, the Ascending Years. It spans the last twenty years of his life, from the end of his consulship in December 63 to his death in December 43. 1 Its purpose is the same as that of my earlier volume: to provide a detailed and fully documented account of Cicero's political life that combines the story of his career with a comprehensive discussion of the political ideas and events that helped shape it. Its justification is also the same. Standard biographies tend to concentrate on biographical detail and have too little space to deal fully with Cicero's ideas or with the complexities of the political world in which he worked.

His abiding interest and importance as a man, statesman, writer, thinker, and as a uniquely valuable source for a crucial era of Roman history justify a more complete study of a type long absent in the English language.

It is hoped that these two volumes will help to bridge that significant gap." (Preface, p. VII)
Moatti, Claudia. 2015. The Birth of Critical Thinking in Republican Rome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Originally published as La Raison de Rome: naissance de l’esprit critique à la fin de la République, Paris, Seuil, 1997.

Translated by Janet Lloyd. With a foreword by Malcolm Schofield.

"This is a book about ‘the critical spirit’. It is also a book about crisis: political and cultural crisis in the Rome of the late Republic. The words ‘critical’ and ‘crisis’ – the one belonging to the discourse of knowledge, argument, rationality, the other a medical metaphor applied to analysis, particularly historical analysis, of social and political change – share a common Greek provenance. But it is comparatively unusual to find critical reason and political and cultural crisis examined in the same context, and even more unusual to find a writer conceiving what Claudia Moatti describes as the ‘vast yet precise ambition’ of understanding how political and cultural crisis prompted the birth of the critical spirit: at any rate in the Rome she brings before the reader’s eyes." (Foreword by Malcolm Schofield, p. VIII)

(...)

"The names of a great variety of writers and writings from the late Republic, many now obscure to us, will confront the reader of this book.

But two well-known authors are the dominant figures, illustrating the two most characteristic forms taken by critical reason as they are delineated in The Birth of Critical Thinking in Republican Rome. One is Cicero, the great orator, by his own account saviour of the Republic in the year of his consulship, but also an indefatigable letter writer and author of a remarkable corpus of theoretical treatises and philosophical dialogues. The other is his contemporary Varro, the supreme Roman encyclopedist, whose literary output – mostly now lost – was vast. Treatises on agriculture and grammar survive, in the latter case only in part. Moatti discusses many aspects of these intellectual enterprises. But she explores at length one subject which was evidently a key focus for both writers: religion." Foreword by Malcolm Schofield, p. VIII-IX)
———. 2022. "Cicero’s Philosophical Writing in Its Intellectual Context." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 7–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"For Cicero, intellectual inquiry was intimately related to historical analysis.

When he took an interest in a specific discipline, dealt with a particular issue, or justified his interest in philosophy, Cicero situated the life of the mind in the long-term history of eloquence (Brut. 20), of Rome (Tusc. 1.1-6), or of humanity (Div. .1-3) – the forms of intellectual inquiry have a history. Cicero’s association of intellectual inquiry and history is especially evident in the passages (letters or prefaces) in which he looks back on his work, as in the beginning of the second book of De divinatione, which allows him to explain what he understands by “philosophy”: rhetoric, morality, theology, political theory, science itself, and of course logic, the art of demonstration (Att. 13.19.5).

The scholars of his time also sought to situate themselves within a broad historical horizon. They prepared chronologies or looked back on the past in order to define a word, an institution, or the sources of law. Antiquarians, grammarians, and jurists all broadened the horizon of the city by searching for origins, but also through comparatism or through the exercise of reason.

Cicero was therefore a true witness of his age. This is why it is important to put him into his context, provided we keep in mind that he himself contributed to create this context, which was influenced by his work, his thinking, and his erudition. Cicero was a historian and a witness, but he was also, among other things, an actor within an intellectual revolution." (p. 7)
Momigliano, Arnaldo. 1984. "The theological efforts of the Roman upper classes in the First Century B.C." Classical Philology no. 79:199–211.

"The thesis which I want to propose in this part of the paper is that Cicero basically agreed with Varro in his earlier philosophic works (De republica and De legibus), which were probably published before the Antiquitates divinae by Varro and may therefore even have influenced Varro. When, however, Cicero had before him Varro's works circa 46 B.C., he changed his mind and expressed profound skepticism both about the existence of the gods and about the validity of Roman divination. Whether Cicero in his later phase was shocked by Varro's sanctimonious attitudes is a secondary and not very interesting question. At this stage Cicero certainly worried about Caesar's religious policy, which Varro was supporting.

What matters is that Cicero became more skeptical when his contemporaries became more credulous or at least more sanctimonious. And his skepticism is even more surprising and dramatic because in 45 Cicero's daughter Tullia died, and her father wanted to believe in her immortality." (pp. 204-205)

(..)

"We are therefore brought back to my main point. In 51 B.C. or so we had found another Cicero-a man with ambitions to reform the Roman state on a religious basis. The Somnium Scipionis was a remarkable attempt to link the political program with religious aspirations: the good Roman leader was promised immortality in this precise sense. At the same time the book on Laws modified, but substantially defended, the traditional Roman attitude to sacred laws, to auspicia, and to the ancestral cults. Six or seven years later very little of that was left. The De natura deorum had paid lip service to the traditional values of Roman religious tradition, including auspicia, but had been a rigorous denial of the possibility of demonstrating the existence of the gods. In the De divinatione the game was inverted: lip service was paid to religion, but any form of divination, including the traditional forms of Roman religion, was denied any merit and probability." (p. 209, a note omitted)
Morford, Mark. 2002. The Roman Philosophers From the Time of Cato the Censor to the Death of Marcus Aurelius. New York: Routledge.

Chapter 3: Cicero and His Contemporaries, pp. 33-92.

"Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) was the most influential of the Roman philosophers. He most extensively interpreted Greek philosophy in Latin, and to do so he developed a Latin prose vocabulary that continued to be influential throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Only Seneca and Augustine matched his prolific output of Latin philosophical works, and they too each developed a new Latin style as the vehicle for their doctrines. All three were skilled orators, experienced in the arts of persuasion. It is usual to refer to “Cicero the Philosopher” (the title, for example, of a recent collection of papers on Cicero), but Cicero had as one of his ideals “the proper combination of philosophy and rhetoric”, which he saw (rightly) as a particularly Roman development in the history of philosophy.(1) The canonical definition of the orator was that of Cato the Elder: “a good man skilled in speaking” (vir bonus, dicendi peritus), implying that the orator who sought to be a political leader must be morally good as well as skilled in rhetorical techniques.(2)" (p. 33)

(1) Powell [J.G.F., Cicero the Philosopher, Oxford: Clarendon Press,] (1995). The quotation is from Long [A. A., Cicero's Plato and Aristotle] (1995), p. 50.

(2 Cato, frag. 14 Jordan, quoted by Quintilian, Inst. 12. 1. 1. See p. 22 above.
Motta, Anna. 2018. "The Philosophy of Artistic Creation: Phidias, the Ideas, and Cicero." Apeiron no. 51:325–344.

Abstract: "Since Antiquity Phidias seems to be the best sculptor of Gods, because he carved great statues with his human hands and succeeded in giving a physical look to that which is not visible to human eyes. This paper is devoted to Cicero’s attention on the imaginative creation of the artist and on the philosophical features of that demiurgical activity which the Roman philosopher links to his interpretation of the Platonic theory of the Forms. The survey led on some Ciceronian texts shows, from a philosophical and philological point of view, the way in which Cicero reconsiders the role of the phantasia, offering a revalution of the art."
Murrell, John. 2008. Cicero and the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The period of Cicero’s life (106-43 BC) witnessed the struggle of the Roman nobility to maintain their political supremacy against leaders of the people and warlords who opposed them. To understand the life and career of Cicero, a knowledge of the political institutions and the politics of the Roman Republic is essential. This introduction aims to provide some of that knowledge." (p. 1)
Natali, Carlo. 2007. "Carneades’ argument in Cicero's De fato §§ 23b-25." Lexis no. 25:69–82.

"As Epicurus did in Peri phuseos XXV, here Carneades tries to distinguish different levels of causality in order to establish a form of causation that can produce opposite results. If in nostra potestate nobisque pareat is the Latin for par’hemas, there is nothing in the expression that hinders from using it in order to indicate a ‘two sided’ capacity of acting and choosing. Indeed, in Carneades it must have this meaning, since at § 31 he uses it to indicate the premise (est autem aliquid in nostra potestate) from which derives that there is no fate. If we take in nostra potestate as indicating a one sided causality, the conclusion non igitur fato fiunt, quaecumque fiunt simply does not follow." (p, 79)
Nederman, Cary. 2021. "Socio-Political Naturalism and the History of Republican Thought: Cicero contra Aristotle." The European Legacy no. 26:1–21.

Abstract: "Recent scholarship on republicanism often looks back to Aristotle as the Greco-Roman epitome of the history of republican theory. This article contends that Aristotle offers a poor model in comparison with the premiere political philosopher of the Roman Republic, Marcus Tullius Cicero. The argument concentrates on the implications of the respective conceptions of Aristotle and Cicero of the origins of social and political association rooted in human nature.

Cicero’s theory of the natural foundations of society has generally been ignored or trivialized by scholars who presume it to be merely a weak imitation of Aristotle’s. This article demonstrates that the Ciceronian account of the naturalistic grounding of human social engagement differs from Aristotelian naturalism in a way that brings into question major approaches to the history of republicanism and also has implications for contemporary republican theory."
Nemeth, Charles P. 2007. A Comparative Analysis of Cicero and Aquinas. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

"The question of whether St. Thomas Aquinas and Cicero are philosophically, morally, and ethically compatible at any level has been considered in various settings throughout the history of the West. Each figure brings his own, exceedingly rich background and intellectual preparation to the forefront in a wave, almost a horde of publications and texts. Both are extraordinarily prolific writers on a wide range of topical considerations. Both are considered major intellectual forces in their own lifetimes— held to account for their oft en provocative viewpoints and critiques. In many ways, while their occupations were vastly different from one another, Cicero, the lawyer- philosopher, and Aquinas, the theologian, philosopher, Dominican priest— their intellectual interests met at many a compatible crossroad and each thinker thought about similar subjects in curiously similar ways. This uncanny complementariness provided the initial impetus for this undertaking, asking how two figures so vastly far apart in time and space, in culture and occupation, and in station and position, could be on the same page so to speak. Despite all the anecdotal evidence of these similarities, no text of any substantial coverage had ever been written on this comparison. In short, what of Cicero and Aquinas— at least in a comparative sense?" (p. 1)
Nicgorski, Walter, ed. 2012. Cicero's Practical Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Contents: List of Contributors IX; Acknowledgments XI; Abbreviations XIII; Introduction 1; 1 J. G . F. Powell: Cicero’s De Re Publica and the Virtues of the Statesman 14; 2 Malcolm Schofield: The Fourth Virtue 43; 3 Carlos Lévy: Philosophical Life versus Political Life: An Impossible Choice for Cicero? 58; 4 Catherine Tracy: Cicero’s Constantia in Theory and Practice 79; 5 Margaret Graver: Cicero and the Perverse: The Origins of Error in De Legibus 1 and Tusculan Disputations 3 113; 6 Harald Thorsrud: Radical and Mitigated Skepticism in Cicero’s Academica 133; 7 David Fott: The Politico-Philosophical Character of Cicero’s Verdict in De Natura Deorum 152; 8 Xavier Márquez: Between Urbs and Orbis: Cicero’s Conception of the Political Community 181; 9 J. Jackson Barlow: Cicero on Property and the State 212; Appendix: Walter Nicgorski: Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy 242; Bibliography 283; Index of Citations of Cicero 298; General Index 305-313.
———. 2013. "Cicero on Aristotle and Aristotelians." Hungarian Philosophical Review no. 57:34–56.

Abstract: "Set against tendencies in the Renaissance and later political theory to see Cicero in tension with Aristotle, this research essay reports the results of a close study of all of Cicero’s texts that bear on his reading, understanding and assessment of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. The essay necessarily attends to Cicero’s sources for his encounter with Aristotle and affirms, with some qualifications, Cicero’s overall continuity with the moral and political thought of Aristotle."
———. 2016. Cicero’s Skepticism and His Recovery of Political Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"The book’s title draws attention to Cicero’s skeptical allegiance: an identification with the school of philosophy known, already well before Cicero’s time, as the New Academy. That allegiance often troubles those attracted by the many edifying Stoic formulations found in Cicero’s ethics and politics. It also troubled Christians such as St. Augustine, otherwise attracted to Cicero and seeking at one time or another the synthesis of the truths of Christian faith with those philosophically developed by Plato or Aristotle. That Cicero professes skepticism along with his commitment to the recovery of Greek political philosophy and ennobling Stoic truths can be seen as a puzzle that feeds the view that Cicero is an eclectic in some fashion, even if not in the hasty and nearly mindless way as suggested by earlier detractors. The recovery of Cicero’s political philosophy, so that it might be more widely appreciated, requires attention to the nature of his skepticism and to how he finds the assurance or moral certitude from which to critically assess and present anew the teachings of his Greek predecessors. The recovery offered in this book necessarily draws us into Cicero’s own recovery in and for his time as well as for posterity" (p. 2)
Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. "Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero's Problematic Legacy." Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences no. 54:38–52.

"Our theories of international law and justice have been dealing with them at least from the first century B.C., when Cicero described the "duties of justice" in his work On Duties (De Officiis)-a work enormously influential in forming the education of statesmen and of thinkers such as Grotius, Kant, and the founders of international law and modern political philosophy.

I argue that some of our valuable insights into the "duties of justice," as well as our primitive thinking about material aid, can be attributed to Cicero. In On Duties he argues that duties of justice are very strict and require high moral standards across national boundaries. Duties of material aid, however, are elastic and give room to prefer the near and dear. Indeed, Cicero thinks we positively ought to prefer the near and dear, giving material aid outside our borders only when that can be done without sacrifice to ourselves." (p. 40)
Obdrzalek, Suzanne. 2012. "From Skepticism to Paralysis: The Apraxia Argument in Cicero’s Academica." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:369–392.

"In this paper, I offer a close examination of the apraxia charge. In the first part, I offer a general analysis of the charge. I propose that it appears in two modes. The first of these is the evidential mode: if the skeptical thesis of ἀκαταληψία (the thesis that there are no kataleptic impressions) were true, then certain phenomena, such as purposive action, could not occur. These do occur, so skepticism is false. The second of these is the pragmatic mode: whatever the truth of the skeptical thesis, it is inadvisable to buy into it. If you do, you’ll find yourself incapable of certain desirable forms of behaviour, such as ethical conduct, and you may even find yourself totally paralyzed. In the second section, I develop a tension between the two modes of the argument as they relate to ἐποχή (suspension of judgement). In the third, I attempt to motivate the Stoic argument, by explaining why they thought that apraxia follows from akatalēpsia. I conclude the paper by considering why the Academics felt compelled to respond to apraxia and by exploring some differences between ancient and contemporary skepticism. For purposes of brevity, I focus my discussion on the apraxia charge as it occurs in Cicero’s Academica. While later sources, such as Plutarch and Sextus, offer us important evidence for the apraxia charge, Cicero is our earliest and most extensive source for the argument as raised against the Academics." (pp. 370-371, note omitted)
Paulson, Lex. 2023. Cicero and the People's Will: Philosophy and Power at the End of the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Genealogies of the will have traditionally centered upon Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE), whose treatises in Latin framed the debates of medieval Christians and secular moderns in turn. Those pushing further back find antecedents to Augustine’s notion of will in the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. And yet, these scholars largely agree: voluntas, Augustine’s word for will, has no direct equivalent in Greek.(2) The etymological problem is compounded by a historical one: Augustine admits he did not enjoy reading Greek, nor did he ever master it. But he loved Cicero.

Until now, the statesman and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) has played a minor role in the history of will. As some have remarked, his is the best-documented life of any man or woman before the Christian era. His orations, treatises, and letters were recopied through the centuries out of reverence, not necessarily for his achievements, but for his language. Readers of all faiths agreed that the magnificence of Cicero’s prose was without precedent or peer. And regarding the will, digital archives confirm a curious fact. All extant texts prior to the 1st century BCE yield around two dozen occurrences of voluntas and its cognates. In Cicero’s corpus it appears 644 times (see Table 1)." (pp. 1-2, some notes omitted)

(2) Voelke, [A.-J. L’idée de volonté dans le stoïcisme. Paris: Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, 1973], 5; Kahn [Kahn, C., “Discovering the will from Aristotle to Augustine,” in J. M. Dillon & A. A. Long, eds., The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press.1988], 248; Frede [Frede, M., A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2011], 19-21, 258.

(3) August. Conf. 1.13.20, 1.14.23.

(6) As I explore later in this Introduction, these primarily take the ablative form voluntate, though voluntas, voluntatem, voluntates, and voluntatibus also occur. The genitive voluntatis, “of or belonging to the will,” and the more technical voluntarius are both unattested before Cicero.

(7) Some 74 of these occurrences are found in the philosophical treatises, 84 in the rhetorical treatises, 180 in the orations, and 206 in the letters. At least four of these occurrences are questioned in the manuscript tradition (e.g. voluntatem for voluptatem); following scholarly consensus, I also do not credit Cicero for authorship of the Commentariolum petitionis, in which voluntas occurs seventeen times.
Pease, Arthur Stanley. 1913. "The Conclusion of Cicero's De Natura Deorum." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 44:25–37.

"At the end of the book the discussion is terminated by the approach of night. Balbus, the Stoic, hopes for another occasion to answer the arguments of Cotta, who, with the tolerance of one free from dogmatic ties, expresses willingness to learn and openness to conviction. Velleius, remembering his own discomfiture at the hands of Cotta in the presence of his Stoic opponent, delights in the refutation of the Stoic argument by the same Cotta. "And when these things had been said," writes Cicero, who has re- mained through the discussion an absolutely dumb listener,(1) " we separated, the upshot being(2) that to Velleius the argument of Cotta seemed truer, but to me that of Balbus ap- peared more inclined to probability."(3) So ends the dialogue. But why does Cicero, who in the first part of Book i declares himself an Academic, and who, at his entrance into Cotta's house is recognized by his friends as the fellow-schoolman and natural supporter of Cotta,(4) now cast his vote,(5) not with Cotta and Academicism, but with the Stoic speaker and those views which Cotta has been refuting? (6) This question I desire briefly to consider, not in con- fidence of adding anything essentially new, but ready, like Cotta himself, to speak both for and against all views, if the greatest probability may thus be ascertained." (pp. 25-26, two notes omitted)

(1) And save in ii, I04 practically ignored by the disputants.

(2) Mayor's translation of ita.

(3) III, 95.

(4) I, I5; I, 17.
Pieper, Christoph, and van der Velden, Bram, eds. 2020. Reading Ciceroʼs Final Years: Receptions of the Post-Caesarian Works up to the Sixteenth Century. With two Epilogues. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Contents: Summary of the Chapters IX; Christoph Pieper and Bram van der Velden: Introduction 1; Thomas J. Keeline: Were Cicero’s Philippics the Cause of his Death? 15; Caroline Bishop: The Thrill of Defeat: Classicism and the Ancient Reception of Cicero’s and Demosthenes’ Philippics 37; Andrew James Sillett: Ille regit dictis animos. Virgil’s Perspective on Cicero’s Final Years 57; Giuseppe La Bua: Man of Peace? Cicero’s Last Fight for the Republic in Greek and Roman Historical ‘Fictions’ 79; Lex Paulson: Libera uoluntas. The Political Origins of the Free Will Argument in Cicero’s De fato and Augustine’s Confessions 97; Bram van der Velden: Ciceronian Reception in the Epistula ad Octauianum 121; Carole Mabboux: Can it Ever be Wise to Kill the Tyrant? Insights from Cicero in the Debate on Rightful Government during the Middle Ages (Especially in the 13th–14th Centuries) 137; Leanne Jansen: Bruni, Cicero, and their Manifesto for Republicanism 155; Christoph Pieper: Multilayered Appropriation(s). Josse Bade’s Edition of Cicero’s Philippicae tribus commentariis illustratae 175; Barbara Del Giovane: Marc-Antoine Muret and his Lectures on Cicero’s De officiis 197; Gesine Manuwald: First Epilogue.Dramatic Representations of the Final Years of Cicero’s Life 221; Christoph Pieper and Bram van der Velden: Second Epilogue. Scholarly Appraisals of Cicero’s Final Years 239; Bibliography 255; Index Locorum 281; Index Nominum 295-298.
Powell, Jonathan G. F. 1994. "The rector rei publicae of Cicero’s De Republica." Scripta Classica Israelica no. 13.

"Cicero’s answer to Plato’s Republic was entitled simply De Republica, “On the State”, but in a letter to his brother Quintus (Q. fr. 3.5Ἰ) the author referred to it more fully as being de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive, “on the best condition of the state and the best citizen”. It is generally agreed that the optimus civis, or best citizen, is to be identified with the person referred to as rector rei publicae, ruler or director or helmsman of the state; and that the almost entirely lost fifth and sixth books of the dialogue were devoted to some sort of delineation of the character and attributes of the rector, though the phrase itself occurs as early as Book II. Clearly, therefore, this aspect of the work was a very important one, and our view of Cicero’s purpose in this work must depend to a large extent on how we interpret the concept of the rector rei publicae. Scholarship on the subject is voluminous; it is unnecessary to record it all here in view of the excellent published survey by Ρ.E. Schmidt [Cicero ‘De re publica’: Die Forschung der letzen fünf Dezennien] (Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 1.4 [1973], 262-334, esp. 326-332); the debate on this particular problem has not been very far advanced since that survey appeared. I believe that the right interpretation was found, in all essentials, by Richard Heinze in 1924 ([Ciceros 'Staat' als Politische Tendenzschrift,] Hermes 59, 73-94). Although Heinze’s views have found some acceptance, alternative interpretations still surface from time to time. Not being content to choose between the rival interpretations on grounds of general probability alone,1 I thought it opportune to re-examine the textual evidence. In fact I had come to the same conclusion as Heinze before reading his article; but I think I also have one or two things to add, which are not made explicit in his discussion." (p. 19)

(1) As e.g. Ν. Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, CA 1988), 178.
———, ed. 1995. Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Contents: Note on Contributors XI; List of Cicero's Philosophical Works XIII; J. G. F. Powell: Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical Works and their Background 1; 1. A. A. Long:: Cicero's Plato and Aristotle 37; 2. Malcolm Schofield: Cicero's Definition of Res Publica 63; 3. Waldemar Görler: Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus 1.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Scepticism 85; 4. John Glucker: Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms 115; 5. Michael C. Stokes: Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures 15; 6. M. R. Wright: Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 171; 7. A. E. Douglas: Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations 17; 8. Stephen A. White: Cicero and the Therapists 219; 9. R. W. Sharples:: Causes and Necessary Conditions in the Topica and De Fato 247; 10. J. G. F. Powell: Cicero's Translations from Greek 273; 11. Philippa R. Smith: 'A self-indulgent misuse of leisure and writing'? How Not to Write Philosophy: Did Cicero Get it Right? 301; 12. Miriam T. Griffin: Philosophical Badinage in Cicero's Letters to his Friends 325; Indexes 347-360.
———. 1995. "Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical Works and their Background." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G. F., 1–35. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"We have exceptionally good evidence from Cicero's own writings about the progress of his philosophical interests throughout his life, the processes of composition and publication, and the reasons which induced him to undertake this programme of writing; and there are even occasional indications about the reception accorded to these works by contemporary readers. From internal evidence and from Cicero's letters, it is possible to give fairly exact dates of publication in many cases. Many of the philosophical books have elaborate prefaces(10) in which Cicero dedicates them to one or other of his contemporaries, expands on his reasons for writing, and defends himself against his critics." (p. 5)

"I have attempted in the above discussion to fill out, to some small extent, the historical and intellectual context in which Cicero's philosophical works were conceived. The picture is naturally sketchy, and dependent on the limitations of our evidence, much of which comes from Cicero himself. Enough, however, emerges to suggest the variety and range of philosophical activity in the first century BC (which was only one aspect of the general cultural life of that period) and to help us to define Cicero's place within it. My purpose has not been to deal with any of these questions exhaustively, but simply to say enough to serve as an introduction to the issues discussed by the contributors to this volume; and it is now high time for me to leave the stage and let the cast speak for themselves." (p. 32)

(10) Cf. M. Ruch, Le Préambule dans Ies oeuvres philosophiques de Cicéron (Paris, 1958). We learn from Att. 16. 6. 4 that Cicero kept a separate collection of prefaces for use as needed, and once inadvertently made use of the same one twice.
———. 2006. "Cicero’s Adaptation of Legal Latin in the De legibus." In Aspects of the Language of Latin Prose, edited by Reinhardt, Tobias and Adams, J.N., 117–150. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter argues that some apparent archaisms in the laws composed by Cicero in the De legibus should not be regarded as archaisms in a legal context. It also demonstrates that Cicero does indeed scatter about features of archaic laws for particular effects. The chapter then mentions that it is ‘typical of Cicero’s processes of literary composition that he should sometimes archaize vigorously when the context inspires him to do so, and at other times use archaic features more sparingly’. In addition, it describes the cases of ‘false archaism’, where an archaic word, form, or construction is used in a way that is different from its use in older material for archaisms which are in fact innovations in Latin poetry. Moreover, the chapter reports the Twelve Tables as Cicero’s model for his law code. The contemporary legal style in the law code and the ciceronianisms are addressed. The chapter then presents a more detailed consideration of the question of archaism and the problem of the transmission of the text."
———. 2007. "Cicero." In Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC - 200 AD. Vol. II, edited by Sharples, Robert W. and Sorabji, Richard, 333–345. London: Institute of Classical Studies.

"Cicero wrote much of his philosophy in dialogue form, following Plato's example in spirit if not always in detailed format; and for the purposes of this volume it seemed possibly good idea to continue the tradition. Most dialogues are written by a single author who is at liberty to attribute whatever views and preoccupations he or she thinks fit to the various characters; here, however, I have been fortunate to have a real interlocutor, Professor Richard Sorabji, who has formulated a number of questions about Cicero which may also reflect the potential interests of the readers of this volume, and Ï have undertaken to suggest answers to them."
———. 2013. "Cicero's Reading of Plato's Republic." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 117:35–57.

"I suspect, however, that the topic of Cicero's engagement with Plato's Republic and Laws deserves renewed investigation, and that despite the differences just noted, it will appear that Cicero's message is still fundamentally Platonic in a number of ways which have not always received due attention. The enquiry should be of interest from two points of view: on the one hand, as a chapter in the history of the reception of Plato's Republic and Laws, and on the other, as an element in the interpretation of Cicero's work in its own right. Even in the context of the present volume, I make no apology for treating it less from the former point ofview than from the latter. The wider subject of the history of the interpretation of Plato in the first century BC is a difficult one, as there is very little evidence; Cicero in fact provides by quite a long way our fullest evidence for how Plato was being read in that period. However, partly because of the fragmentary nature of the text of these works, the interpretation of Cicero himself presents a number of problems that need to be resolved before we can sensibly form a view of his role in Platonic reception." )p. 38)
———. 2018. "Philosophising about Rome: Cicero’s De Re Publica and De Legibus." In Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie? Kultur-, literatur- und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven, edited by Müller, Gernot Michael and Mariani-Zini, Fosca, 249–267. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Given this framework, my primary aim in this chapter is to work towards a coherent understanding of Cicero’s thought in his writings on political theory, rather than to isolate elements of it that can be identified as “original” or “Roman”.

Almost all Cicero’s basic political concepts are, in fact, both Greek and Roman: they originate in Greek political thought, but in applying them to Roman subject-matter Cicero is able either to suggest amendments to them, or to draw out their significance for Rome. Cicero himself made claims for originality largely in regard to his method of exposition; it is difficult for us to check on this objectively as we do not have the full range of Greek writings on which he could have drawn, but there is no compelling reason to disbelieve his claim." (pp. 250-251, a note omitted)
Powell, Jonathan G. F., and North, J. A., eds. 2001. Cicero's Republic. London: Institute of Classical Studies.

Contents: J. G. F. Powell & J. A. North: Introduction 1; 1 . P. L. Schmidt: The Original Version of and the De Legibus 7; 2. J. G. F. Powell: Were Cicero's Laws the Laws of Cicero's Republic? 17; 3. T. J. Cornell: Cicero on the Origins of Rome 41; 4. J. Glucker: Carneades in Rome - some Unsolved Problems 57; 5. J. E. G. Zetzel: Citizen and Commonwealth in De Re Publica, Book 4 83; 6. M. S. Kempshall: De Re Publica 1.39 in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought 99; Bibliography 137; Indexes 147-153.
Radford, Robert T. 2002. Cicero: A Study in the Origins of Republican Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Cicero's political philosophy is the principal focus of investigation in this work. That philosophy includes political and legal theories that stress the basis of society, laws, and the state to be found in nature and natural law. The laws and the rights of citizens must be clearly grounded in the natural moral law, not in whatever legislation happens to be put into effect at a particular time and place. Justice is essential in a cooperative undertaking that functions for the advantage of all its citizens, which is what a state or commonwealth is, according to Cicero. Cicero advocated a mixed constitution for the state: one that incorporates elements of a monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The moral character and other needed qualities of the Ieaders of the state receive extensive attention in The Republic and in On Duties.

In subsequent chapters, I will explore the primary influences on Cicero's political philosophy, his conception of the nature of the state, principal elements of the ideal state, characteristics of the ideal statesman, Cicero's natural law theory, and the central features of the legal framework for the ideal state. I will conclude this study with an examination of the influences Cicero's political philosophy exerted on others in Rome and beyond, throughout the centuries." (pp. 2-3)
Rawson, Elizabeth. 1973. "The Interpretation of Cicero's 'De legibus'." In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Teil I: Von den Anfängen Roms bis zum Ausgang der Republik, Band 4: Geschichte und Kultur Roms in Spiegel der Neueren Forschung, edited by Temporini, Hildegard 334–356. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Cicero is not usually thought of as an enigmatic author. His style is generally full and explicit; he is sufficiently self-conscious to explain in detail his intentions in writing many of his literary works, which also often act as mutual commentaries. But the 'De legibus' forms the exception; uncertain in date, debated as to its sources, fragmentary in preservation, ignored, it seems, both in the letters and the other treatises, in parts oracular and mock-archaic in style (and, partly as a result, seriously corrupt in text), it poses innumerable problems. As a result, too many students of its author bypass it altogether, or devote to it only a few conventional words; and though it has recently had a fair amount of special attention devoted to it, and has been edited several times, it is depressing to see how little solid advance has been made in the last hundred years, since Vahlen's edition laid the basis for the text and the last full commentary was made by A. Du Mesnil(1). All too often, since then, good ideas have been dropped, while new ones have been wrong-headed." (p. 334)

(1) J. Vahlen [De legibus] 1871 and [M. Tvllii Ciceronis De legibvs libri] 1883; A. Du Mesnil, with commentary, [M. Tullii Ciceronis De legibus libri tres] Leipzig 1879 (...)
———. 1978. "The Introduction of Logical Organisation in Roman Prose Literature." Papers of the British School at Rome no. 46:12–34.

Reprinted in: E. Rawson, Roman Culture and Society: Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991, pp. 324-351.
———. 1983. Cicero: A Portrait. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chapter 13: The Consolations of Philosophy 45-44 B.C., pp. 230-247.

"This book, then, tries to give a balanced picture of the whole man, except that it says little of his strictly stylistic achievements, which cannot be conveyed in English; nor does it discuss the philosophical work from a technical point of view. Since it is for the ordinary reader, it does not hesitate to re-tell the well-known episodes and to quote the famous phrases. It aims at making Cicero and his world understandable - and here, paradoxically, it runs the risk of making them too understandable. Such a book, comparatively brief, quoting in translation and not fully annotated, must inevitably smooth out some of the most alien features of this world. In particular, readers should remember that in his letters to Atticus, who had lived long in Greece, Cicero is for ever dropping from Latin into Greek, which was also the natural language of literary criticism, medicine and other learned sub-political system of the Roman Republic, the senatorial oligarchy re-established by Sulla, collapsed into chaos, and the lineaments of the Roman Empire, that was so deeply to influence the future of all Europe, began to emerge. In creating this synthesis, especially in the fields of rhetorical prose style, and of philosophy, Cicero played a great part; as he did also in the political collapse, and the attempts to avoid it. (Introductionm pp. XIII-XIV)
Reinhardt, Tobias. 2006. "The Language of Epicureanism in Cicero: The Case of Atomism." In Aspects of the Language of Latin Prose, edited by Reinhardt, Tobias and Adams, J.N., 151–178. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter provides a discussion on Cicero’s treatment of Epicureanism. Cicero’s and Lucretius’ renderings of Epicurean terms and notions are radically different: whereas Lucretius’ seem colourful, suggestive, and rich, Cicero’s seem flat and matter-of-fact to the point of tedium. The purpose of atomism is to make all kinds of potentially frightening events in the world of experience less frightening by providing a rational explanation for them. The survey of terms for ‘atom’, namely atomus, corpora indiuidua, indiuidua, and corpusculum, is presented. The interpretation of the evidence from Cicero is also shown. Moreover, the chapter illustrates that Cicero read Epicurus’ texts with close attention to stylistic detail, and it is hence plausible to assume that imitating this particular aspect of Epicurus’ terminology was a relevant consideration for him. It then discusses the uses of terms for ‘atom’ and turns to the issue of what atoms ‘do’ in Cicero."
———. 2018. "Cicero and Augustine on Grasping the Truth." In Philosophie in Rom – Römische Philosophie? Kultur-, literatur- und philosophiegeschichtliche Perspektiven, edited by Müller, Gernot Michael and Mariani Zini, Fosca, 305–323. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Sometimes the history of philosophy can be illuminated by studying the development of philosophical terminology. The particular way in which Cicero renders in Latin the Hellenistic debate about the cataleptic impression influences the way in which Augustine talks about, and possibly conceives of, certain epistemological problems and in which he formulates new views – views which were to remain seminal long after the end of antiquity.(1) The purpose of this study is to describe this process with greater precision and accuracy than earlier attempts have done." (p. 305)

(1) Noted by, e.g. Charles Brittain: Cicero – On Academic Scepticism, Indianapolis/Cambridge 2006, xliii–iii.
———. 2019. "Pithana and probabilia." In Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle, edited by Bénatouil, Thomas and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 218–253. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Introduction

What accounts for the pithanotês, the persuasiveness, of the Carneadean pithanon, how do Carneadean and Stoic pithanotês relate to each other, and can the picture which emerges from the Greek evidence be sustained in the light of the Latin evidence from probabilia in Cicero’s Academica?

While much has been published on the subject of the pithanon, the question of what accounts for the initial persuasiveness of impressions which Carneades termed pithana has rarely been addressed specifically (and however one answers this question then has implications for other issues). I will argue that an impression’s initial persuasiveness, prior to any testing or scrutiny, is taken to be due to the fact that its propositional content is consistent with views antecedently held by the subject, and that an impression’s phenomenal clarity is an enabling not a constitutive property of persuasiveness as conceived by Carneades. I will reject that the initial persuasiveness of a persuasive impression is a brute fact, not capable of explanation; that it is exclusively or primarily due to the phenomenal clarity of an impression; or that it is linked to probability, pre-theoretical or otherwise (where probability is defined in terms of statistical likelihood, evidence, or a combination of the two)." (p. 218, a note omitted)
———. 2019. "Linguistic Naturalism in Cicero’s Academica." In Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World, 153–170. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.

"The Academica is a dialogue completed in  BC, near the beginning of the second of the two phases in his life when Cicero produced broadly speaking philosophical dialogues. The work is devoted to epistemology, and specifically the question of whether there is empirical knowledge as the Stoics defined it, an issue which had been debated by Stoics and Academics since the third century BC." (p. 153)

(...)

"I will first look at some material in which the Antiochian speaker Lucullus defends the Stoic view that there are cataleptic impressions with reference to linguistic usage, arguing that the way in which people express themselves reveals assumptions about the nature of knowledge which are consistent with the Stoic conception of knowledge but incompatible with other conceptions (or competing conceptions of belief). On Lucullus’ argument, as I hope to show, the expressions in question presuppose such assumptions because they reflect how things actually are, rather than as a result of convention." (p. 154)
———. 2022. "Cicero’s Academic Skepticism." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 103–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"With these qualifications in mind, we can then ask what the nature of Cicero’s Academic skepticism is. Is it to be characterized as radical or mitigated skepticism (a subject which has received considerable attention)?

More specifically, is it to be characterized as something we would call mitigated skepticism, or is to be so characterized given distinctions between different types of skepticism which are drawn in the Ciceronian texts themselves? Is there a development over time, or an adaptation to particular contexts like the expository or dramatic needs of particular works? In order to address the last question, we shall discuss the evidence in roughly chronological order." (p. 104)
———. 2023. Cicero's Academici libri and Lucullus: A Commentary with Introduction and Translations. New York: Oxford University Press.

"As a work of Roman literature, Acad. is a set of dialogues. Thus it needs to be read against other dialogues by Cicero as well as Greek philosophical dialogues, and there is a small set of passages which are central to the philosophical interpretation of the text whose appraisal in the round requires attention to their literary form. First-person speakers called Cicero are a presence throughout the Ciceronian corpus, and they demand to be considered together.

For the cultural history of Europe Acad. is significant, as a substantial and self-contained body of evidence for one of two sceptical schools in antiquity, as evidence for Stoic thought presented on its own terms and in interaction with objections as opposed to, say, in occasionally hostile doxographical reports, as a key text in a broader tradition which is devoted to the possibility of knowledge arising from perceptual experience, and as evidence for the fate of Plato’s Academy in its final phase as a functioning school. Acad. had an extensive reception in late antique, Renaissance, early modern, and even twentieth-century thought, and it is to be hoped that work on this reception will be facilitated by this commentary, whose aim it is to explain Acad. in its complexity, without trying to replace the elementary linguistic and stylistic elucidation which Reid(1) provided in an exemplary way." (Introduction, pp. XXi-XXII)

(1) James S. Reid, M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica, a text revised and explained, London 1885.
Remer, Gary. 2022. "Philosophy, Rhetoric, and Politics." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero's Philosopy, edited by Atkins, Jed W. and Bénatouïl, Thomas, 200–214. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"How Cicero conceives of the unity between philosophy, rhetoric, and politics is the subject of this chapter. In the next section, we shall examine how Cicero melds rhetoric and politics together – an approach that was obvious to Cicero, but which became less apparent after the end of the Republic, when the populus was largely excluded from political participation.

Then, in the subsequent section, we shall discuss Cicero’s argument that rhetoric and politics must be reconciled with philosophy, which is an argument consistent with Cicero’s conviction that the moral cannot be separated from the beneficial." (p. 201)
Remer, Gary A. 2017. Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

"The characteristics of Cicero’s rhetorically grounded political morality examined in my book include the following: true rhetoric/politics as a moral activity; decorum (or prudence) as a moral imperative; decorum’s roots in the sense of the community (communis sensus); the distinct moral status of the politician; the balancing of the demands of the moral (honestum) and the useful (utile); the (explicit or implicit) recognition that moral ends may sometimes justify the employment of ordinarily immoral means; the common benefit, especially the safety of the res publica, as the ultimate moral good; the use of argument in utramque partem, on either side of a question, to arrive at the probable truth and to facilitate change; and the determination of the proper equilibrium between the political liberty of the people, on the one hand, and the politician’s obligation to counsel and lead the people, on the other hand. These elements of Cicero’s political morality are not discrete but, as I show, interrelated." (p. 20)
Reydams-Schils, Gretchen J. 2013. "The Academy, the Stoics, and Cicero on Plato's Timaeus." In Plato and the Stoics, edited by Long, A. G., 29–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The fundamental realization that a division of philosophy into physics, ethics and logic does not always preclude a thinker from positing transcendent ‘first’ principles is relevant for all the sections of this chapter: it allows us to reassess the evidence from the Old Academy and throws new light on Antiochus’ and Cicero’s hermeneutical strategies. If in treating physics one brackets the question of any supra-physical principles, it becomes much easier to align Platonist and Stoic interpretations of the Timaeus. But if the broader debate was indeed cast in terms of alternative explanations for the ordered kosmos, which line of thought did the first heads of the Academy after Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates, pursue?" (p. 32)
———. 2016. "Teaching Pericles: Cicero on the Study of Nature." In Roman Reflections: Studies in Latin Philosophy, edited by Williams, Gareth D. and Volk, Katharina, 91–107. New York: Oxford University Press.

"My immediate purpose in this chapter is to examine how physics fits into the histories of philosophy that Cicero includes in his works on oratory.

But this investigation also has implications for the much larger, and hotly debated, issue of how he presents the connection between physics and ethics.

It has been argued that Cicero’s rendering of Stoicism, especially in his De finibus, demonstrates that it is possible to make sense of Stoic ethics independently from physics. Although it may seem a detour, an examination of Cicero’s accounts of the history of philosophy in his rhetorical works allows us to distinguish more clearly between his specific perspective as a Roman homo novus and that of Stoicism itself; and ultimately, I argue, it also challenges the above-mentioned view of the De finibus. Although it is true that Cicero minimizes the role of nature in that account, or more correctly, gives it a clearly delineated task because of his own leanings, and in line with his other works, I would argue that physics is still unmistakably foundational for ethics both in his own view and in the Stoicism he presents." (pp. 91-92, a note omitted)
Ronnick, Michele V. 1991. Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum: A Commentary, an Interpretation, and a Study of its Influence. Bern: Peter Lang.

"This book represents my examination of the nature of the Paradoxa Stoicorum, the shortest of Marcus Tullius Cicero's extant philosophical works, and its influence on the western intellectual tradition. Its seven chapters provide a detailed account of the Paradoxa Stoicorum from the time of its composition in 46 B. C. E. through the Middle Ages and Renaissance up to the present day.

The first three chapters place the work in its social and historical nexus, and establish its importance as a well-crafted work, rhetorical and philosophical in nature, that evinces the technical and artistic brilliance of the mature Ciceronian style. In chapters four and five I have applied the principles of codicology and techniques of historical bibliography to demonstrate that the Paradoxa Stoicorum was a work that enjoyed a heretofore unacknowledged popularity, and whose influence as a standard text in school and university curricula from the Middle Ages onward has had a lasting impact on literature, philosophy, educational theory and the history of the early printed book. Chapter six offers the reader a Latin text along with an exegetical commentary in which I point out interesting aspects concerning the Paradoxa Stoicorum that have gone unnoticed by earlier scholars. Chapter seven complements chapter six with my own translation of the received text.

Finally, a triad of appendices provide new compilations of data: a table of library catalogue entries for the Paradoxa Stoicorum covering the Middle Ages and Renaissance, a list of 157 manuscripts that have gone uncollected until now which contain or pertain to the Paradoxa Stoicorum, and a full catalogue of 422 items covering its history in print from 1465 to the present. Six charts and seven photographs have been added to illustrate the significance of the data, and amplify this "biography of book"." (Preface, p. V)
Rothkamm, Jan. 2014. "Cicero's Orientalising Rhetoric of Law in the De legibus." Museum Helveticum no. 71:155–171.

Abstract: "This study analyses Cicero's theory of persuasive legislation as developed in the dialogue De legibus. It discusses three criteria selected by Cicero from standard rhetorical theory - verba prisca, brevitas, and prooimia - as well as their adaptation to the particular task of drafting laws. Special attention is drawn to the fact that these criteria are not only features of Cicero's own fictive law codes in book 2 and 3 of the De legibus, but also of real laws, including very ancient ones from the Eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor, and the Fertile Crescent."
Runia, David T. 1989. "Aristotle and Theophrastus conjoined in the writings of Cicero." In Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter, 23–38. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

"An analysis is given of the 16 passages in Cicero's rhetorical and philosophical works where the names of Aristotle and Theophrastus are mentioned together. Cicero joins them together so often (1) because of his great interest in philosophical successions, and (2) because he regards the encyclopedic research carried out in the early Peripatos as an example to follow in his own attempt to present philosophy to a Roman audience."
Santangelo, Federico. 2013. Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 8: Foresight, prediction and decline in Cicero’s correspondence, pp. 174-181.
———. 2020. "Cicero on Divine and Human Foresight." In Cicero and Roman Religion: Eight Studies, edited by Beltrão da Rosa, Claudia and Santangelo, Federico, 105–116. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

"It is by now fairly uncontroversial that Cicero has a central place in any attempt to write the history of Roman religion in the late Republic No serious student of this period embraces the view that he was a hypocrite or that he had a dissociated and inconsistent position on religious matters – that he was a skeptic in private who made public statements of allegiance to traditional religion that contradicted his actual views. The more recent prejudice, advocating that Cicero’s philosophical work be disregarded by historians of Roman religion because it is uninformative on matters of ritual, has lso been overcome by a growing body of work over the last decade or so. There is a great deal of information on the workings of public religion that may be drawn from his treatises, and this is even more emphatically the case with some of his political speeches While it is clear that Cicero’s assessment of religious problems reflects an intellectually sophisticated perspective, it is also apparent that his views are those of a very informed and involved witness of Roman religion" (p. 105, a note omitted)

(...)

"The earliest attempt to define foresight in Cicero’s work may be found in his rhetorical treatise, De Inuentione, probably written between 91 and 88 BCE, and certainly dating from his youth. At 2 159–169, Cicero confronts the problem of how to define what is honourable (honestum), which he divides into two components, uirtus and utilitas; uirtus is in turn divided into four parts, the first of which is prudentia (2 160) The whole discussion is built upon a dialectical mode: definitions are chiefly achieved through careful attempts to divide up complex problems into relatively simpler ones, which, in turn, may likely be subdivided into further units." (p. 109)

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