Eijk, Philip van der. 1993. "Aristotelian elements in Cicero's "De divinatione"." Philologus no. 137:223–231.

"Before analyzing the texts in more detail, one general remark seems in order. Just as it can never be proved that Cicero actually consulted Aristotle's treatises (in the sense that he had the texts at bis disposal), neither can an alleged misinterpretation or distortion by Cicero of what we believe to be Aristotle's thought be regarded as evidence that Cicero did not have correct information about the contents of the Aristotelian texts. Being familiar with the Aristotelian treatises does not entail faithful rendering of their contents; nor, on the other band, does distortion of their contents prove unfamiliarity with them. Cicero, just as any other rbetorically skilled writer, may have had various motives for rendering or paraphrasing Aristotle's or another writer's text in a free or lacunose way or with reversed order of specific topics.

Moreover, it is important to distinguish between what Cicero explicitly attributes to Aristotle — what would count as a testimony in a collection of fragments of lost works of Aristotle or as an example of indirect transmission of works that have been preserved — and what he, by way of comments or criticism, adds to it, how he embroiders on it, or how he integrates it into bis own discourse. For these reasons, this paper starts from the assumption that if Cicero's rendering of Aristotle's views can be shown to be reasonably faithful, the possibility that he was familiar with the treatises should be regarded as plausible. Only when there are other arguments that cast doubt on this familiarity must the presence of an intermediary source be assumed.

This does not rule out the possibility that Cicero may have borrowed a number of arguments against divination from another source, e.g. Carneades (cf. 2.9—12), who in his turn may have been influenced by Aristotelian passages. Yet the fact that Cicero also quotes Aristotle in the account in defence of divination shows that this possibihty does not account for all passages." (pp. 224-225, two notes omitted)
Englert, Walter. 1990. "Bringing Philosophy to the Light: Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum." Apeiron no. 23:117–142.

"Philosophy as the Stoics (and others) practice it is usually done at leisure, in their schools, in technical language.

It has no place in the forum. Oratory as it is commonly practised at Rome is done as work, in the light of the forum, in popular language.

It has little to do with philosophy. In this work, Cicero proposes to take to an extreme Cato's and his own proclivity for introducing philosophical themes drawn from the philosophical schools into their speeches.5 It is one thing to discuss general topics such as greatness of mind, moderation, and death, in a public speech. It is another to raid the philosophical schools themselves, and bring to the light startling philosophical paradoxes (such as 'Only the wise man is free, all other men slaves,' or 'Moral worth is the only good') so that they could win the approval of a non-philosophical audience. Can these paradoxes, so contrary to ordinary opinion and so closely bound-up with the teachings of the Stoics, be proved to a general, non-philosophical audience? That is what Cicero wants to find out in the Paradoxa.

This paper explores Cicero's attempt to luring philosophy into the light, that is, into the forum' in the Paradoxa. Section II of the paper examines Cicero's stated aims in his introduction, and explores the nature of the form that Cicero employs, the commonplace. Section III analyzes how Cicero carries out his aims in the main body of the work, and argues that there is a tension between his aims and the form he chose. The conclusion, section IV, suggests that Cicero learned from this experiment, and that the Paradoxa was an important step in his philosophical and literary development. After the Paradoxa, he developed different methods to 'bring philosophy to the light': those he employed in his major philosophical writings of 45-44 BC." (pp. 118-119)

(5) In a letter to Cato (Fam XV 4) Cicero writes, "We two almost alone have brought the old authentic philosophy, which some regard as an amusement of leisure and idleness, down into the forum, into the public life, one might almost say into the battlefield.' The translation is Shackleton Bailey's (1978b) [Cicero's Letters to His Friends, vol. 1 and 2. Harmondswrth: Penguin], I 229-30, slightly modified.
Erskine, Andrew. 2003. "Cicero and the Shaping of Hellenistic Philosophy." Hermathena:5–15.

"For all his writing Cicero was not a Hellenistic philosopher. He was a Roman writing in Latin, an orator and politician who did philosophy in his spare time. He had his own perspective on philosophy. For Cicero philosophy should be useful and solve problems, an approach which we should be careful not to read back onto the Hellenistic schools. We can observe his frustration at fussy Stoic arguments that may prompt assent but they do not change the way you feel (Fin. 4.7). Essentially Cicero was more a user of philosophy than a participant.

This paper will focus on two texts, the Tusculan Disputations and the De officiis. These texts have been chosen because they can be seen as standing at opposite extremes in terms of the way in which Cicero employs Hellenistic philosophical material.

The Tusculan Disputations makes fairly free use of a range of Greek philosophical ideas, whereas the De officiis is usually believed to have followed the peri tou kathekontos of the Stoic Panaetius closely.(5)Nonetheless, in both works Cicero is confronting problems of his own and looking to Greek philosophy for solutions. In the Tusculan Disputations, written in the wake of his daughter's death, it is death and grief that feature prominently as Cicero searches for a cure for grief; this is philosophy as therapy. The De officiis grows out of the crisis of the 40s BC and the moral dilemmas facing Roman politicians. Panaetius famously fails to solve Cicero's problem of the conflict between morality and expediency, forcing Cicero to answer the question himself. Even here where Cicero is said to follow his source most closely it is Cicero's own situation and conception of philosophy that provides the driving force." (p. 5)

(5) P. MacKendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero (London 1989), 149-68, 232-57, gives a summary of the argument of each. On the De o.fficiis, note especially A. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De officiis (Ann Arbor 1996).
Essler, Holger. 2011. "Cicero’s use and abuse of Epicurean theology." In Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition, edited by Fish, Jeffrey and Sanders, Kirk R., 129–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The identity of the sources Cicero employed in writing his De natura deorum (hereafter ND) has been much debated. With regard to the first book’s account of Epicurean doctrine in particular, attention has naturally turned to the remains of the Epicurean library found at Herculaneum’s Villa dei Papiri. Many of the specifically theological works discovered among these remains have yet to receive a proper modern edition. In the case of their more poorly conserved passages, prudence dictates awaiting more securely established texts. But these same works also contain a good deal of material that may already be referred to with confidence, and which promises to shed new light on, among other things, Cicero’s sources for ND 1." (p. 129, two notes omitted)

(...)

"By looking to the points these authors choose to address, one could be confident of producing a relatively comprehensive list of arguments deemed pertinent by even the Epicureans themselves. It is of course no more certain in the case of On the Gods than with On Piety, On Signs or DRN [De rerum natura] that Cicero drew his material directly from Philodemus or Lucretius rather than from a common source or an available epitome. The best one can hope to establish in such cases is a certain plausibility. The dispersal of the arguments I have discussed over several different works might itself seem to weigh in favour of the latter alternative. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the most likely source or sources for Cicero’s anti-Epicurean arguments are in fact the works of Epicureans themselves. This surprising conclusion also suggests an answer to a related question that has long puzzled commentators on ND: why would Cicero have requested a copy of Phaedrus’ On the Gods after he had already started writing his refutation of Epicureanism?(91) I suspect that he was in search of yet more material for his anti-Epicurean polemics." (p. 151, a note omitted)

(91) Cicero’s request is found in Att. 13.38.1; 39.2; (...)
Everitt, Anthony. 2001. Cicero: A Turbulent Life. London: John Murray.
———. 2003. Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome's Greatest Politician. New York: Random House.

"This book is an exercise in rehabilitation. Many writers from ancient times to the present day have seriously undervalued Cicero’s consistency and effectiveness as a politician. Too often tactical suppleness has been judged to be indecisiveness. His perspective was narrower and less imaginative than that of Julius Caesar, but Cicero had clear aims and very nearly realized them. He was unlucky, a defect for which history has no mercy but for which historians are entitled to offer a discount.

More generally, I shall be happy if I have succeeded in showing, first, how unrecognizably different a world the Roman Republic was from ours and, second, that the motives of human behavior do not change. Concepts such as honor and dignitas, the dependence on slavery, the fact that the Romans ran a sophisticated and complex state with practically none of the public institutions we take for granted (a civil service, a police force and so forth) and the impact of religious ritual on the conduct of public affairs make ancient Rome a very strange place to modern eyes. But, as we feel the texture of their daily lives, we can see that its inhabitants are not alien beings but our neighbors." (from the Preface)
Ferguson, John. 1962. "Cicero's Contribution to Philosophy." In Studies in Cicero, edited by Ferguson, John, 99–111. Rome: Centro di Studi Ciceroniani.
———, ed. 1962. Studies in Cicero. Rome: Centro di Studi Ciceroniani.

Contents: John Ferguson: Preface 7; John Ferguson: Some Ancient Judgments of Cicero 11; LLoyd A. Thompson: Cicero the Politician 37; John Ferguson: The Religion of Cicero 83; John Ferguson: Cicero's Contribution to Philosophy 99; Arthur R. Hands: Humour and Vanity in Cicero 115; W.A. Ladlaw: Cicero and the Arts 129-142.
Fernandez-Beanato, Damian. 2020. "Cicero's demarcation of science: A report of shared criteria." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A no. 83:97–102.

Abstract: "The problem of establishing intensional criteria to demarcate science from non-science, and in particular science from pseudoscience, received a great amount of attention in the 20th century philosophy of science. It remains unsolved. This article compares demarcation criteria found in Marcus Tullius Cicero’s rejection of genethliac astrology and other pseudo-divinatory techniques in his De divinatione (44 BCE) with criteria advocated by a broad selection of modern philosophers of science and other specialists in science studies. Remarkable coincidences across two millennia are found on five basic criteria, which hints at a certain historical stability of some of the most fundamental features of a concept of “science” broadly construed."
Ferrary, Jean-Louis. 1995. "The Statesman and the Law in the Political Philosophy of Cicero." In Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Laks, André and Schofield, Malcolm, 48–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The vagaries of the manuscript tradition, direct and indirect, prevent us from having a clear idea of Cicero's two great political dialogues. In the case of the De re publica, the Vatican palimpsest gives us a reasonably good picture of the first two books and the beginning of the third, Augustine and Lactantius give us a general idea of the debate on justice in the third book, an independent manuscript tradition has preserved the Dream of Scipio. But we have only scattered fragments of the fourth, fifth and sixth books (apart from the Dream of Scipio). Of the De legibus, we have only the first three books, containing general reflections on law, sacra and priests, distributio magistratuum; there were originally at least five (Macrobius, Saturnalia VI.4.8) and perhaps six; and we have lost notably the laws on iudicia (III. 47) and on education and disciplina (III.30).

What is more, the gaps in one dialogue are not made up by the other, but compounded: in both cases, it is the material on the optimus status rei publicae which is the best preserved, and hence the most studied.

I am naturally aware that De republica is the title chosen by Cicero himself, which proves that the optimus status is indeed the principal theme (Leg. 1.15, cited above). But the work is also de Optimo cive, as Cicero told Quintus, and it is the importance and richness of this second theme that I should like to emphasize. Even here, one must not be distracted by a problem to which much attention has been devoted, but which is a false problem: the so-called 'Ciceronian idea of a principate'." (p. 51)
Fortenbaugh, William W. 1998. "Cicero, On Invention 1.51–77. Hypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatetics." Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric no. 16:25–42.

Abstract: "In On Invention, Cicero discusses both induction and deduction. In regard to the latter, Cicero presents a controversy between those who advocate a five-part analysis of deductive reasoning and those who prefer three parts. The issue is not practical or pedagogical, but conceptual in nature. Cicero himself prefers analysis into five parts, and rather confusingly he presents the argument of the advocates of five parts as if it were his own. The argument is striking in that it makes elaborate use of mixed hypothetical syllogisms in order to argue for five parts. Cicero claims that the five-part analysis has been preferred by all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus. A survey of what Theophrastus is reported to have said concerning the hypothetical syllogism renders Cicero's claim intelligible. That is not to say that Theophrastus himself advocated a five-part analysis. Most likely the association with him derives from his known interest in hypothetical syllogistic. Later rhetoricians who identified themselves with the Peripatos made the cormection with the founders of the school, thereby gaining authority for a controversial analysis."
Fortenbaugh, William W., and Steinmetz, Peter, eds. 1989. Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Contents: Note on Contributors XI; List of Cicero's Philosophical Works XIII-XVII; J. G. F. Powell: Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical Works and their Background 1; 1. A. A. Long: Cicero's Plato and Aristotle 37; 2. Malcolm Schofield: Cicero's Definition of Res Publica 63; 3. Woldemar Görler: Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus 1.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Scepticism 85; 4. John Glucker: Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms 115 5. Michael C. Stokes: Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures 145; 6. M. R. Wright: Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3 171; 7. A. E. Douglas: Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations 197; 8. Stephen A. White: Cicero and the Therapists 219; 9. R. W. Sharples: Causes and Necessary Conditions in the Topica and De Fato 247; 10. J. G. F. Powell: Cicero's Translations from Greek 273; 11. Philippa R. Smith: 'A Self-indulgent misuse of leisure and writing'? How Not to Write Philosophy: Did Cicero Get It Right? 301; 12. Miriam T. Griffin: Philosophical Badinage in Cicero's Letters to his Friends 325; Indexes 347-360.
Fox, Matthew. 2007. Cicero's Philosophy of History. New York: Oxford University Press.

"So Cicero’s philosophy of history requires a readjustment of our approach to Cicero. His writings do certainly produce a form of philosophy of history, but that philosophy does not revolve around positive doctrine. Cicero explores history as a discourse that can provide a foundation for social stability and continuity. But throughout his writings, he retains a scepticism about any such foundation, a scepticism which has several sources: his philosophical schooling; his rhetorical expertise, and sensitivity to the provisional quality of argument; a lack of credulity about processes of commemoration and representation typical of Roman political history. In order to allow this philosophy to emerge, it is necessary, therefore, to establish why it is that such a sceptical and even aporetic encounter with Rome’s identity has been invisible in the dominant readings of Cicero; we need to investigate the roots of Cicero’s disengagement from the ideological centre at Rome, while also tracing the tradition of reading that works in exactly the opposite direction: the vision of Cicero as somehow the typical Roman, a vision which is hard to square with the view of historical process that can be found in his writings. In the final chapter, I bring these currents together, in order to explore how far the multi-voiced Cicero could in fact fulfill his original purpose in providing useful guidance for the formation of citizens: not citizens whose highest aim was the grasp of an immutable truth, but citizens with the flexibility and self-awareness to remain open to a range of competing discourses." (p. 21)
———. 2023. "Cicero and the Evolution of Philosophical Dialogue." In The Oxford Handbook of Roman Philosophy, edited by Garani, Myrto, Konstan, David and Reydams-Schils, Gretchen, 159–172. New York: Oxford University Press.

"So I leave aside the aspiration to look at Cicero’s interventions in terms of his close predecessors and successors, to focus instead on the character of Cicero’s encounter with the tradition of dialogue, and I examine its most significant aspects. Cicero’s major contributions to the form of dialogue can be summarized as follows: he is the first to use the different speakers in dialogues to act as representatives of different philosophical schools;(4) he adds a particular kind of preface, situating philosophical conversation within a specific historical and political setting; by these means he emphasizes the practical and contingent aspects of philosophy, sometimes at the expense of the abstract; he uses historical references both to highlight the need for philosophy and also to keep readers aware of the artificiality of his textual practice, and the conventional quality of the form itself. A more detailed examination of these topics makes up the remainder of this chapter." (p. 160)

(4) To some extent, the different philosophers who act as Socrates’s interlocutors in Plato and Xenophon are a model. But Cicero’s approach reflects the establishment of rival institutions and traditions for philosophical education that took place later. Mediating the differences between rival schools was evidently important both to Cicero and his Roman audience.
Frisch, Hartvig. 1946. Cicero's Fight for the Republic: The Historical Background of Cicero's Philippics. Copenhagen: Gkydendal.

"The years after Caesar’s death were a confused period, in which all political dividing lines were in a state of dissolution, and for a short time Cicero thus became the leader of the Republican opposition in the Senate. The Philippics and Cicero’s letters during the same months leave a strong impression of his indefatigable energy, his parliamentary resourcefulness, and his courage to burn his boats in the fight he believed would lead to the preservation of liberty. By his wrong valuation of Octavian and by his blind hatred of Antony, Cicero turned out the loser, but his death signed and sealed the fall of the Roman republic and confirmed his words in the Thirteenth Philippic (section 30) directed against Antony: It is my destiny to stand or fall with the liberty of the state.

The truth expressed in these words is apt both as regards Cicero and the Roman state; and the demonstration of this is the purpose of the following account." (Preface, p. 9)
Fuhrmann, Manfred. 1992. Cicero and the Roman Republic. Oxford: Blackwell.

Translated by W. E. Yuill from Cicero und die römische Republik: eine Biographie, München, Artemis 1990.

"The present undertaking stands in a long line of Cicero biographies.

It may be justified by its particular purpose: I am concerned above all to present Cicero's life to those readers who do not possess extensive previous knowledge of the subject and to whom ancient languages and the history and culture of the ancient world are relatively unfamiliar. I have consequently aimed at a clear and generally comprehensible style of presentation which pays due regard not only to Cicero's life but also to the relevant premises of Cicero's thought and actions, to the Roman state and its history, as well as to contemporary cultural factors, particularly Greek rhetoric and philosophy. Whatever is here stated as fact is vouched for by sources and, wherever possible, Cicero is allowed to speak for himself." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII)
Furley, David J. 1989. "Aristotelian material in Cicero's De natura deorum." In Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter, 201–219. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

"Our concern now is with Cicero's De natura deorum. There is one work of Aristotle's quoted by name here (1.33), and only one: the dialogue On Philosophy. I shall return to this passage later, but for the moment all I will say is that it establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Cicero knew that the dialogue contained in its third book material about theology, and linked theology with cosmology.

There are other places in ancient literature where this dialogue is mentioned by name. lt is mentioned once by Aristotle himself in Physics 1.2 (194a27-36). The name occurs in the catalogue of Aristotle's books in Diogenes Laertius 5.22 and this confirms that it had three books. Apart from Cicero and Diogenes, it is mentioned by at least six authors: by Philodemus (26), Porphyry (3), Alexander of Aphrodisias (11), Syrianus (11), Simplicius (16), and Philoponus (7 and 8).2 These citations are enough to establish that the dialogue discussed, to some extent, each of the following topics: the wisdom of the Seven Sages, the Magi, Orpheus, the relation between Ideas and numbers, the relation between god and the cosmos, and the nature of the final cause. lt is a reasonable guess, but no more than a guess, that Book 1 was concerned with the early history of philosophical thought, Book 2 with Plato and the Academy, and Book 3 with Aristotle's own cosmology.

There is evidence that Cicero was perfectly well aware of important differences between the cosmologies of Aristotle and the Stoics. lt is enough to quote the well known passage from the end of the Lucullus." (pp. 202-203)
Galli, Daniela. 2019. Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum: Text and philological commentary. Roma: Carocci.
Garsten, Bryan. 2006. Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press.

Part II For Rhetoric; Chapter 5: Conviction and Controversy: Cicero 142-173.

"In this chapter I argue that Cicero’s political thought provides an example of how the simple commitment to protecting a role for persuasion in politics can ground a substantial set of firm moral and political convictions. Cicero’s convictions were the Stoic principles of natural law and duty that he elaborated in the Republic and the Laws, and in his long letter to his son, On Duties. These convictions offered him a source of guidance distinct from the immediate approval of his listeners and therefore provided a check on the orator’s natural tendency to pander. Cicero was keenly aware of his audience’s fickle nature. Hailed as a hero of the republic at one moment and exiled the next, he was profoundly frustrated with his listeners, whom he thought had been seduced by Caesar’s populism. Forced by personal and political circumstances to reflect on the conditions under which persuasion could succeed, he found himself firmly defending a set of Stoic principles that were unpopular with the audience to whom one might expect him to have pandered." (p. 143)
Gersh, Stephen. 1986. Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition. Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press.

See Vol. I Chapter 1, Cicero pp. 53-154.

"But what precisely is Cicero's own philosophical position? In passages where he describes his methodology, he seems to align himself primarily with the New Academic tradition from Carneades onwards: in other words he adopts a general skepticism regarding the attainment of absolute truth, at the same time holding that some philosophical views are more probable than others. Thus, Cicero argues that he will not be bound to the dogmatic assertions of any particular school but will always seek the 'most probable' (maxime probabile) solution to any philosophical problem, or that he belongs to a school which pursues the probable and will not 'advance beyond the point where likelihood has revealed itself (ultra id quod veri simile occurrit progredi).(8) Another passage makes it clear which school Cicero is following on this topic: 'What, then is to prevent me from following those things which seem to me probable, while rejecting what seems to be improbable; and from shunning the rashness of assertion which is most removed from

wisdom while avoiding the arrogance of dogmatism? Our school argues against everything only because that which is probable cannot shine forth unless an evaluation of the arguments on both sides has been made. But this topic has, I think, been adequately expounded in my Academica(9) Thus, the doctrine of probabilism which Cicero espouses is derived from the New Academy, yet he clearly believes that it goes back to ancient times. as shown by the introductory remarks in the Tusculanae Disputationes where he states that he will examine various philosophical questions by using the method of hypothesis and refutation after the manner of Socrates, for the latter believed that in this way 'the most probable truth' (quid veri simillimum esset) could be found.(10)" (pp. 58-59)

(8) Cicero: Tusc. Disp. II, 5.

(9) Cicero: De Offic. II. 8 (,,,)

(10). Cicero: Tusc. Disp. I, 8.
Gilbert, Nathan, Graver, Margaret, and McConnell, Sean eds. 2023. Power and Persuasion in Cicero’s Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Note on Texts and Translations IX; Nathan Gilbert, Margaret Graver, and Sean McConnell: Introduction 1;

Part I Techniques and Tactics of Ciceronian Philosophy 13

1 Raphael Woolf: Cicero on Rhetoric and Dialectic 15; 2 James E. G. Zetzel: Cicero’s Platonic Dialogues 35; 3 Georgina White: Mos dialogorum: Scepticism and Fiction in Cicero’s Academica 52; 4 Geert Roskam: Nos in diem vivimus: Cicero’s Approach in the Tusculan Disputations 77; 5 Nathan Gilbert: Cicero the Philosopher at Work: The Genesis and Execution of De officiis 3 97;

Part II Political Philosophy and Ethics 117

6 Malcolm Schofield: Iuris consensu Revisited 119; 7 Margaret Graver: The Psychology of Honor in Cicero’s De re publica 140; 8 Jed W. Atkins: Cicero on the Justice of War 170; 9 Katharina Volk: Towards a Definition of Sapientia: Philosophy in Cicero’s Pro Marcello 205; 10 Sean McConnell: Old Men in Cicero’s Political Philosophy 218;

References 241; Index Locorum 259; General Index 265-268.
Gildenhard, Ingo. 2007. Paideia Romana: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.

"The view of the work that I would want to advocate can be summarized as follows: written in the summer and autumn of 45, at the height, that is, of Caesar’s power and Cicero’s despair, the Tusculans represent both a climax of, and a watershed in, his literary career.(10) In this dialogue Cicero thematizes in a uniquely compelling fashion the connection between his renewed interests in philosophy and the ‘tyranny’ of Caesar.(11) On inspection, the Tusculans emerge as an arresting pendant to the three dialogues that Cicero penned in the 50s, the de Oratore, the de República, and the de Legibus. With the commonwealth he idealized in these earlier texts crushed under the heel of Caesar, Cicero was forced to rethink and adjust fundamental tenets of his political philosophy. As recent scholarship has shown, all his late philosophica are implicated in this project, from the Paradoxa Stoicorum and the Brutus onwards. But it is only in the Tusculans that Cicero manages to confront the challenge posed by Caesar to the senatorial tradition of republican government in a way that is equally compelling from an intellectual and a literary point of view. The work, through its very design, registers an outraged protest against the dictator and offers a practical ethics for a Rome in which the republic has been lost and a despot reigns supreme. Hence it arguably is his most successful and certainly his most original continuation of politics by literary means." (p. 2, a note omitted)

(10) 10 For the date of the Tusculans see further Appendix A.

(11) For Cicero’s stigmatization of Caesar as a tyrant, ever since his crossing of the Rubicon, see Gildenhard (2006) [‘Reckoning with tyranny: Greek thoughts on Caesar in Cicero’s letters to Atticus in early 49’, in

S. Lewis (ed.) Ancient tyranny, Edinburgh, 197-209.]
———. 2010. Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This book argues that a distinctive hallmark of Cicero's oratory is a conceptual creativity that one may loosely characterize as philosophical. A range of case studies show how this creativity manifests itself in striking and original views on human beings and being human, politics, society, and culture, and the sphere of the supernatural. After an introduction that defines the outlook of Cicero's philosophical oratory and addresses methodological issues, the volume contains three parts with four chapters each, devoted, respectively, to the anthropology, the sociology, and the theology contained within his speeches. Each of the three parts begins with a substantial introduction that situates Cicero's thought within its wider historical and intellectual context, not least by identifying where and how he departed from the established habits of thought in the late‐republican field of power. The nature of the argument requires close philological study of key terms or concepts including natura, humanitas, tyrannus, and conscientia as well as attention to larger figures of thought, such as agency and accountability, the ethics of happiness, laws vs. justice, the enemy within, civilization vs. barbarity, the problem of theodicy, and life after death. Examples are drawn from the entire corpus of Ciceronian oratory, from the pro Quinctio to the Philippics, with in‐depth analysis of a representative cross‐section of particularly relevant speeches. Overall, the book offers a fundamental reappraisal of a canonical body of texts and should appeal not just to scholars of Cicero and Latin literature, but also Roman historians, and students of the history of rhetoric."
———. 2013. "Cicero’s Dialogues: Historiography Manqué and the Evidence of Fiction." In Der Dialog in der Antike. Formen und Funktionen einer literarischen Gattung zwischen Philosophie, Wissensvermittlung und dramatischer Inszenierung, edited by Föllinger, Sabine and Müller, Gernot Michael, 235–274. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"In a nutshell, Cicero’s basic project, its enabling premise, and its overriding purpose can be summarized as follows: the project is the recovery of perceived ancestral wisdom and excellence in personal conduct and civic affairs with the help of Greek (philosophical) thought and intellectual techniques; its premise is the ultimate identity of the nomological knowledge evolved, practiced and enacted by the Roman ancestors and the theoretical knowledge that the best of Greek philosophy formulated in discourse; and its purpose is to help solve the current political malaise of the Roman res publica. Even when the body of a work addresses subject matter seemingly tangential to this overarching mission, Cicero usually frames his exposition or discussion so as to underscore the civic import of his authorial efforts.

Most other aspects of his philosophica can ultimately be subsumed under this core mission, including his aim to create a philosophy in Latin that would render Greek precedents (including Plato) redundant and his striking investment in education. For he conceived of his project of Latin philosophy in civic-patriotic terms and construed the reason for the breakdown of the ancestral commonwealth as a failure in traditional educational discipline, which he set out to remedy both within and by means of his literary works." (p. 239)
———. 2013. "Of Cicero’s Plato: fictions, Forms, foundations." In Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions in Philosophy, edited by Schofield, Malcolm, 225–275. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The presence of Plato’s Forms in Cicero’s oeuvre has been the subject of much discussion and (ongoing) controversy; the heuristic interests brought to bear on the relevant passages, however, are by and large doctrinal in orientation: scholars tend to ask to what extent Cicero replicates or deviates from Plato’s own theory (or theories) and to what extent (if at all) such replications (or deviations) reflect the influence of other thinkers and schools, notably Antiochus and Stoicism. Throughout the present paper I presuppose and gladly build on this body of mostly excellent work, even though my emphasis will be somewhat different: apart from paying attention to doctrinal nuances, the following pages explore how Cicero has built thinking with (and against) Forms into the fabric of his arguments, with the aim of illustrating the strategic value that engaging this aspect of Plato’s philosophy (and its reception) had for Cicero’s own politico-philosophical project. This includes particular attention to the seemingly paradoxical fact (frequently overlooked) that Plato’s Forms only register negatively in the dialogues Cicero wrote in the 50s bc (de Oratore, de Re Publica, de Legibus) – dialogues, in other words, that in other respects (such as literary imitation and emulation) belong among his most Platonic – yet appear with considerable prominence in the philosophica he composed in the 40s." (pp. 227-228, a note omitted)
Gill, Christopher. 1988. "Personhood and Personality: The Four-personae Theory in Cicero, de Officiis I." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 6:169–199.

"The theory of the four personae in Book One of Cicero's de Officiis forms part of a larger discussion of what is decorum ('fitting' or 'appropriate') for human beings. (1) This larger discussion is generally taken to be a prime source of Panaetius' ethical theory, in which the notion of decorum (to prepon, in Greek) seems to have held a central place(2)

(...)

However, I believe the theory merits further examination especially for its potential relevance for the study of ancient conceptions of the person.

For this purpose, I think it is useful to draw a general distinction between two types of concern, one centred on 'personhood', and the other on 'personality'. Those who are concerned with 'personhood', as I understand this notion, are interested in persons as a class, and are, especially, concerned to define the nature and boundaries of this class by reference to normative criteria of personhood. Thus, in modem thinking, the conditions of personhood have been stipulated as, for instance, rationality, self-consciousness, and the capacity for assuming legal and moral responsibility for oneself.(6) By a concern with 'personality', I understand an interest in persons as individuals, and, especially, an interest in what makes each individual distinctive and unique. This interest is typically combined with the placing of a high valuation on personal individuality and uniqueness." (pp. 169-170)

(1) See de Officiis (Off) l.93-151 (the decorum theory), including 107-21 (the four-personae theory). All references in this article not otherwise identified are to Off I.

(2) Off. l-II is presented by Cicero as based on Panaetius' peri tou kathekontos: see I.6-10 and Cicéron, Les Devoirs, vol I, ed M. Testard (Paris, 1965), 1-21.
Glucker, John. 1988. "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations." In The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by Dillon, John M. and Long, Anthony Arthur, 34–69. Berkeley: University of California Press.

"When did Cicero change his philosophical affiliations and take up again the case of the Skeptical Acaderny? For a long time I believed that the moment of truth came in July of 51 B.c. when, on his way to his Asian proconsulate, he stayed for a while with Aristus, Antiochus's brother and successor, in Athens and may have become finally disillusioned with the "Old Acaderny" and its doctrines." (p. 50)

(,,,)

"Cicero, then, changed his affiliations twice: once, from a youthful enthusiasm for Philo of Larissa and Academic Skepticism to Antiochus's "Old Academy"-albeit with reservations and with a lingering respect for the Skeptical tradition - and then, some time in 45 B.c., back to the Skepticism of Carneades and Philo. Cicero's own evidence seems so overwhelming that one wonders what it is that made so many scholars ignore it, or feel uncomfortable when faced with it and attempt to find an unsatisfactory solution to an imaginary difficulty." (p. 53)

(...)

"Old age and suffering may have helped Cicero turn back to Academic Skepticism in matters philosophical. He may not have made up his mind to his dying day concerning the sufficiency of virtue to happiness and the importance of external goods. He may have found the various philosophical proofs for the existence of the gods and arguments about their nature inadequate, contradictory, and sufficiently refuted by Cameades. But for the consolations of religion, with its promise of life after death, and for the consolations of old age and friendship, he reserved a corner which was not to be invaded by his skepticism." (p. 69)
———. 1992. "Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations Again." Liverpool Classical Monthly no. 17:134–138.
———. 1995. "Probabile, Veri Simile, and Related Terms." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 115–143. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reprinted in: A. A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 285-306.
———. 1997. "Socrates in the Academic books and othe Ciceronian works." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 58–88. Leiden: Brill.

"Unlike Plato, Socrates founded no school, and everyone familiar with philosophy at the time of Cicero still knew - as we shall soon see - that Plato's dialogues were not the only sources concerned with Socrates. Not even Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues combined: there were other Socratics and Socratic schools, and some of their writings were still available. Not everyone who is a follower, in one sense or another, of Socrates, is necessarily an heir to Plato and can claim possessio of the Academy. Yet disputes about the 'dogmatic' vs. 'sceptical' character of Socrates' philosophy do make their appearances in the Academic books and in some other works of Cicero, and it appears that here, too - with some puzzling exceptions - the two Academic traditions were at loggerheads. These different attitudes to Socrates, and the possible reasons behind them, will constitute the main problem of this article." (p. 60)
Goar, Robert J. 1968. "The Purpose of De Divinatione." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 99:241–248.

"In the second book of De legibus, Cicero manifests a wholly positive attitude toward Roman religion. He affirms every aspect of the state cult, and even defends augury as a true art of divination (2.32-33).

Whatever his motives may be-they will be discussed later - the statement of belief is definitely there, in unmistakable terms. In De divinatione 2, however, Cicero asserts repeatedly that augurium has no more foundation in truth than any other form of divination; that, although it was founded in all sincerity by Romulus, it has been maintained through the centuries solely rei publicae causa. Other forms of divination authorized by the state religion are also exposed as a sham.

What can have occasioned this complete volte-face? ls the work an attack on the state religion also, or merely on divination? What is the purpose of De divinatione? The answers to these questions are to be found by considering the De divinatione as a whole." (p. 241, a note omitted)

(...)

"The workw as never meant by its author to be an attack on the state religion." (p. 248)
———. 1972. Cicero and the State Religion. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

"The purpose of this dissertation is to define Cicero’s attitude toward the Roman state religion. Although this institution plays an important role in his orations and essays, the question of his attitude toward it has not been the subject of an independent enquiry. Much has been written on Cicero’s religious views, but the inevitable tendency is to concentrate on his religious philosophical opinions, as M. van den Bruwaene does in his book La Théologie de Cicéron [Louvain, 1937]. A recent dissertation, The Religious Beliefs of Cicero's Time as Reflected in His Speeches [Bryn Mawr College, 1962] by U.M. Heibges, examines Cicero’s use of religious material in his orations, but, as the title of the work suggests, its basic aim is quite different from that of this investigation.

Before approaching the main problem, it seems well to glance briefly at Roman religion itself. Therefore, Chapter I of this dissertation will consist of a brief survey of the main features of that institution, and will sketch its historical development down to the age of Cicero. The purpose of this review is to attempt to define the nature of Roman religion, its role in Roman society prior to the first century BC, and its status in the Ciceronian era; for all of these were factors that helped to condition Cicero’s attitude toward Roman religion." (Preface, p. 3)
González, Christian Lee. 2014. "'Hateful' and 'Doubtful' Wisdom: Roman Disdain and Appropriation of Greek Philosophy in Cicero's Laelius." New England Classical Journal no. 41:1–21.

Abstract: "In arguing that the writer of the Laelius both appropriates and disdains Greek philosophy, I am advancing a series of observations that will cast light on each other. The first and less problematic one is that Cicero draws heavily from the Greek philosophical tradition whenever he either positively or negatively defines friendship in the text. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, for example, ubiquitously haunt the Latin dialogue. A second one is that the de Amicitia simultaneously and systematically disdains and downplays Greek intellectuals, offering the reader the wisdom of Roman counterparts instead. Such opposite–if not contradictory–tendencies at the heart of one and the same text strongly beg to be explained. I contend that, although dealing with philosophy, the text itself is not philosophical, but mostly rhetorical in both nature and aim. The Laelius is not ultimately concerned with the truth of particular arguments about friendship, but itself as a text and a cultural product aims at becoming an argument in favor of a different (and strictly cultural) ‘truth:’ that the Romans had a philosophical tradition of their own, and a pantheon of wise men to resort to no less than the Greeks. This conviction lies behind the spirit of words such as those with which Cicero invites his contemporaries to snatch glory from an already weary Greece, and bring it back to Rome as cultural spoils."
Görler, Woldemar. 1995. "Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus I.39 and the Continuity of Cicero’s Scepticism." In Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers, edited by Powell, Jonathan G.F., 85–113. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"Until recently it was a near to unanimous assumption that Cicero was an unswerving adherent of the sceptical Academy throughout his life: from his early youth, when he followed Philo's lectures in Rome (88-84 Bc), up to his latest period. This view was questioned now and then, e.g. by Rudolf Hirzel, who argued that Cicero from 79 onwards was not a sceptic but adhered to the dogmatic views of Antiochus of Ascalon.(1) Hirzel's suggestion, however, was partly ignored, partly rejected for more than a century.

A few years ago, John Glucker and Peter Steinmetz,(3) independently of each other, returned to Hirzel's thesis and provided new arguments to establish that Cicero 'changed his affiliations twice: once, from a youthful enthusiasm for Philo of Larissa and Academic Skepticism to Antiochus's "Old Academy"-albeit with reservations ... -and then, some time in 45 B.C., back to the skepticism of Carneades and Philo'.(4) It is the primary purpose of this chapter to prove that such a view is mistaken, and that there is strong evidence for a sceptical attitude in Cicero's writings of the alleged Antiochean period as well. We shall start with one of the trump cards of the conversion theory. The pretended 'harsh criticism' of the sceptical Academy in De Legibus I. 39 will prove to be in close structural analogy to some passages of undeniably sceptical tinge, and it will be argued that Cicero's attempt to 'silence' Academical doubts is not only not an indication of dogmatic leanings, but instead a proof of a sceptical stance. To strengthen this point, some other Ciceronian ways and techniques of expressing sceptical provisos will be discussed. Next, we shall try to give a survey of all direct or indirect indications of Academic scepticism in the three major works of the supposed Antiochean period: De Oratore, De Republica, De Legibus. Finally, some passages will be discussed which were thought by Hirzel, Glucker, and Steinmetz to allude to Cicero's recent conversion in 45 BC. I hope to show that they all admit of a more conventional interpretation." (pp. 85-86, a note omitted)

(1) R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften 3 (Leipzig, 1883), 488 f. n. 1;(...)

(3) J. Glucker, 'Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations', in J. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The Question of "Eclecticism" (Berkeley, Calif., Los Angeles, and London, 1988), 34-69; P. Steinmetz, 'Beobachtungen zu Ciceros philosophischem Standpunkt', in W.W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz (eds.), Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos (Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, 4; New Brunswick and London, 1989), 1-22.

(4) Glucker 53; similarly Steinmetz 13 and 17-18.
———. 1997. "Cicero's Philosophical Stance in the Lucullus." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero' Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 36–57. Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted in: W. Görler, Kleine Schriften zur hellenistisch-römischen Philosophie, edited by Christoph Catrein, Philosophia Antiqua, XCV, Leiden:Brill, 2004, pp. 268-290.

"The above title is ambiguous. In a sense, Cicero's philosophical position in the Lucullus is identical with that reported and defended by 'Cicero', the character in the dialogue: Academic scepticism as taught and practised by Arcesilaus and Carneades. But Cicero is hardly ever just a spokesman for a given doctrine nor is he a simple translator; he takes great pride in 'applying his own iudicium' throughout (Fin. 1.6). So even where, on the whole, he subscribes to the tenets he is reporting, his personal views may differ in emphasis and in details, and we should be able to detect such personal deviations. It is the aim of this paper to point to 'unorthodox' elements and judgments of this kind in the Lucullus and thus to contribute to a clearer idea of what may be called Cicero's personal brand of scepticism. This is not an easy task. Cicero's 'Academic

books' are our principal source of information on Academic scepticism; so every attempt to single out personal comments and 'un-Academic' ingredients risks becoming circular." (p. 36)
———. 2020. "Cicero on artes liberales: merits ans problems." Ciceroniana on line:513–521.

"The well-known Latin formula of artes liberales appears first in Cicero and was coined, in all likelihood, by no other than him(1). It had an extraordinary success with the generations to come. Some random examples may suffice: it was taken up and discussed by Seneca; in later antiquity a canonical list of seven liberal arts was set up: we currently have abundant information about Martianus Capella and his three plus four canon." (p. 513)

(...)

"Back to Cicero. Obviously, a sort of restriction is implied. Cicero’s appeal to acquire and to become familiarized with artes liberales is addressed to “free” persons only: no slaves, of course. The restriction becomes even greater elsewhere. “Free” comes near to the notion of “independent”, financially independent, in other words: not dependent on earning one’s living by one’s own hand, by commercial actions, and the like." (p. 515)

(1) Surprisingly, in Cicero the exact formula appears only twice: inv. 1, 35, quos habuerit artium liberalium magistros; fam. 4, 4, 4, a prima aetate me omnis ars et doctrina liberalis [...] delectavit. But there are numerous variations, synonyms and paraphrases, as will be evident from the pass Gesellschaft, Darmstaages discussed in what follows. For a comprehensive review cf. Christes 1975, [J. Christes, Bildung und Gesellschaft, Darmstadt] 196-201, 235-236 with n. 301; shorter Pöschl 1995 [V. Pöschl, Ciceros Bildungsprogramm, «Rheinische Museum» 136, pp. 193-209.], 201.
Gorman, Robert. 2005. The Socratic Method in the Dialogues of Cicero. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Graver, Margaret. 2014. "Cicero’s Philosophy of Religion." In The History of the Western Philosophy of Religion: Vol. 1: Ancient Philosophy of Religion, edited by Oppy, Graham and Trakakis, Nick N., 119–132. New York: Routledge.

Second edition: first edition Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2009.

"In addition, Cicero works out a strategy for the systematic examination of theological subjects from the standpoint of reason. In his works, especially the later works, he assumes that it is possible to enquire into the foundations of religious belief whether or not one is antecedently committed to the truth of such beliefs. This, of course, is the primary point of difference between the philosophy of religion and religious thought itself: whereas the latter may accept non-rational justifications for belief (revelation, authority, ancestral custom) and has some degree of tolerance for mystery and internal contradiction, philosophical theology admits only properly rational grounds and insists on tight standards of internal consistency and coherence. This basic distinction is already recognized and articulated by Cicero himself, and subsequent versions of it within the Western tradition have been much influenced by his treatises. In his work the emphasis falls not on theological doctrines themselves but on the challenging and testing of religious claims by sceptical argumentation. Only rarely does he admit to inclining toward a positive doctrine, and while he claims to hold some personal religious beliefs, he denies that these are what is at issue in his theological writings. His is a carefully crafted plausibilism, borrowed from Greek philosophers of the last period of the sceptical Academy. He will not present any position as simply true, for all are faced with forcible objections that remain unanswered; nonetheless he holds that a good sceptic will sometimes accept a position as plausible if it is better grounded than any alternative." (pp. 119-20)
———. 2017. "The Dregs of Romulus. Stoic Philosophy in Cicero’s Pro Murena and De Oratore." Ciceroniana on line no. 1:67–95.

"I maintain that neither pro Murena nor de oratore gives evidence of an across-the-board rejection of Stoic ethical thought. Forensic oratory is unilateral by nature: it is expected that the orator will present only one side of the case and will leave any points that might support the opposite conclusion to his opponent. Likewise Antonius’s speech in Book 1 of de oratore is to be understood as one-sided from the start. We are meant to see that Antonius is arguing back and forth in the Academic manner and will eventually reverse his position. What is telling in these attacks is not in what Cicero finds to say against Stoicism, but in what he declines to say. Neither work raises any objection at all to the most fundamental of the Stoic paradoxes: that no form of conduct is good if it is not honorable. That central contention of Stoic ethics is carefully left untouched, and Cicero indeed draws attention to his respectful handling, when he makes Antonius refuse to quarrel about whether oratory or philosophy is «better or truer», and again when he has Crassus remark that he has «no objection at all» to the Stoics(60)."

(60) De orat. 1, 233; 3, 65.
Griffin, Miriam. 1997. "The composition of the Academica: motives and versions." In Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books, edited by Inwood, Brad and Mansfeld, Jaap, 1–35. Leiden: Brill.

"Studying Cicero's Academica even from the historical point of view quickly leads to ἐποχή· The evidence for the various stages of composition and the reasons for them is confusing and conflicting, and Cicero's inconsistencies cast doubt at times on his sincerity.

There are, however, some facts available about the chronological order in which Cicero composed and altered the work and about the reasons he gave, sincerely or insincerely, for these activities.

Although appeal will also be made in what follows to other passages too long or too diffuse to be listed, the texts assembled in Appendix A contain the central facts we possess about the composition, copying and dissemination of the Academica in its various versions and about the titles Cicero intended for the various versions of the work; they also give Cicero's statements of the intended relation of the Academica to his other works of the period, and his account of his reasons for writing the work, in terms of his personal and political life.(1)" (p. 1)

(1) They will be cited with the T number assigned them in Appendix A, [Academica: Chronology of composition and publication] below pp. 28-32.
———. 2012. "The Politics of Virtue: Three Puzzles in Cicero’s De Officiis." In Episteme etc.: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes, edited by Morison, Ben and Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 310–328. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "In this chapter, Cicero’s purpose in writing De Officiis is examined in the light of two puzzling features of the work: the restrictions he places on his subject, given that ‘duties’ are introduced in the broadest terms, and his choice of Panaetius' work as his guiding authority, given that the discussion of a topic of particular interest to Cicero — the apparent conflict between the honourable and the expedient—was missing. The political character of De Officiis is clear, as is its didactic spirit and its concern for the young ambitious to enter public life. In codifying the code of conduct of the Roman governing class, under pressure of fear for the survival of the res publica, Cicero may have thought particularly of the numerous new senators admitted by Caesar and Antony. He might have decided to teach them how to conduct themselves at the top level of Roman society."
Gurd, Sean. 2007. "Cicero and Editorial Revision." no. 26:49–80.

Abstract: "In this essay I discuss Cicero’s practice of submitting his texts to others for comment, arguing that the mutual reading and correction of friends’ works played an important social function. By discussing what would make a text better, Cicero and his collaborators worked to forge and maintain social ties. In addition, I pursue an important corollary: for a text to provoke this activity, it must present itself as unfinished or in progress. Cicero was aware of this corollary, and in the Brutus he used images of textual incompletion to critique Atticist and Caesarian theories of style as solitary, antisocial, and implicitly autocratic. This led him to formulate an important new literary politics, which he put into practice in the years after Pompey’s defeat in the civil war."
Habichr, Christian. 1990. Cicero the Politician. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

"On the political events of Cicero’s time, not much can be said today that is both new and true. Matters are somewhat different for Cicero the politician himself. His image continues to suffer from harsh verdicts, despite the meritorious efforts to do him justice, begun over a century ago with Gaston Boissier’s famous Cicéron et ses amis (Paris 1865, often reprinted). The need persists to strike a balance once again. In my attempt to do this, I do not intend to persuade anyone that Cicero was (or, without Caesar, could have been) a great politician, but simply to show that he was, body and soul, a politician. It hardly needs saying that his performance as such cannot be properly assessed without an appreciation of the conditions under which he and his contemporaries operated.

The narrative combines general background information and specific details. In choosing the material to be presented, I had to be selective, but I tried not to be partisan beyond the unavoidable." (Preface, pp. IX-X)
Hahmann, Andree. 2019. "Cicero Defining the Stoic Science of Divination." Apeiron no. 52:317–337.

Abstract: "This paper is devoted to the Stoic definition of divination as reported by Cicero. It proposes a novel reading that coherently combines the distinct versions offered in De divinatione. Especially important is the proper understanding of the close relationship between providence, fate, and chance. I argue that the Stoic understanding of chance already contains a reference to divine will, which is why the Stoics can equally claim that divination is devoted to chance and providence. This sheds new light both on the Stoic science of divination and the systematic involvement of providence, fate, and divination in Stoic philosophy."
Hall, Jon. 2009. Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Cicero’s correspondence places us at the very heart of political life in Late Republican Rome. Our extant collection includes letters written not just by the orator himself, but also by many of the other leading figures of the period, men such as Caesar and Pompey, Brutus and Cassius, Cato and Mark Antony. These exchanges provide perhaps our most direct insight into the often tense negotiations that shaped events during these turbulent and deadly years. But their importance rests not merely on these compelling details of political history. They are vital social documents, too. These letters show us at first hand how personal relationships were regularly conducted among the Roman elite. They reveal the ways in which these men of phenomenal power, wealth, and ambition tried to negotiate conflict, cultivate alliances, and broker uneasy compromises. In short, they provide a fascinating map of Roman aristocratic manners.

I suggest in this book that these aspects of the correspondence can be profitably analyzed from the perspective of linguistic politeness. The polite phrases and courteous remarks incorporated into these epistolary encounters can tell us a good deal about the values and concerns that underpinned aristocratic interaction." (p. 3)
Hammer, Dean. 2014. Roman Political Thought: From Cicero to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 1: Cicero: To save the res publica, pp. 26-92.

"There are many reasons to begin the study of Roman political thought with Marcus Tullius Cicero ( 106-43 BCE). His work comprises the earliest, most complete set of Roman texts we have. He gives us insight into the increasing exposure of the educated Roman elite to Hellenistic philosophy and rhetoric, a byproduct in many ways of Roman conquest. Cicero reveals, as well, the trajectory of the ambitious politician who must be noticed, forge alliances, and, in the violent final decades of the Republic, most of all survive. And he conveys some of the difficulties of the new man (novus homo) - the politician with no senatorial ancestors - breaking into the Roman elite. Not only was Cicero born an equestrian, lacking the cache and connections of the senatorial order, but also he had no military credentials (except for a brief stint in his youth and during his governorship of Cilicia). As one biographer writes, Cicero "was an intellectual with few important connections and no influential clients at the beginning of his career. It was never his style to further his political goals by spending money: to begin with, he had no large fortune, and he did not plunder provinces as many other senators did - Caesar prominent among them."(3)" (pp. 26-27, two notes omitted)

(3) Habicht Christian. 1990. Cicero the Politician. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 6.
Harries, Gill. 2002. "Cicero and the Defining of the Ius Civile." In Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World: Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin, edited by Clark, Gillian and Rajak, Tessa, 51–68. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter argues that one of the less noticed conflicts of the late Roman Republic centred on who controlled ultimate legal authority, as exercised through its application in the courts. Such a conflict was possible because the written law was under pressure on two fronts. One was the contribution made by philosophical concepts, notably, but not exclusively, that of the (unwritten) ius naturae, based on Stoic ideas, along with new techniques of definition and the systematic arrangement of material that had a wide impact ranging from the structuring of forensic argument to the notional composition of law-codes. The other source of pressure was the exploitation of unwritten law by advocates in the lawcourts. While it is not at all clear how, or if, court judgments actually affected the content of the ius civile, Cicero maintained that iudices could make judgments on points of law, with wider implications."
Harris, Jill. 2013. "The law in Cicero’s writings." In The Cambridge Companion to Cicero, edited by Steel, Catherine, 107–121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Cicero’s analysis of law in the senses of legal right (ius) and positive law (lex) shaped the content of his speeches and was integral to his concept of the Roman citizen community (civitas) and its political expression, the res publica.

(...)

He reflected on law in the context of advocacy, in both theory and practice, exploiting ideas of law appropriate to his arguments in his speeches and instructing others in his theoretical works on how legal arguments should be deployed by the public speaker. His ideas on the philosophy of law were explored both in his writings on rhetoric and philosophy and in his published speeches. While the expression of his thinking was affected by the genres in which he operated, the core content of his thought was consistent. Two legal or quasi-legal concepts in particular were central to his philosophy: natural law as the expression of mankind’s innate attachment to justice, and partnership (societas) as the contractual basis of a citizen community." (p. 107, a note omitted)
Henry, Margaret Y. 1927. "Cicero's Treatment of the Free Will Problem." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 58:32–42.

"It is the belief of the present writer that Cicero in his entire exposition of philosophy maintained one consistent view-point, which may be summarized as follows. Many questions defy logical proof and to many such questions one must say, "I do not know." However, under one condition, we cannot say "I do not know." If the belief under consideration is part of the necessary groundwork for ethics, we have no right to be sceptics. In such cases, we must accept the dogma without proof, that is, we must postulate it. Cicero was proud to be known as a member of the New Academy, and he gloried in the freedom that school accorded its members to accept whatever views attracted them. But he was far from being a thorough-going sceptic.(1) His normal attitude was that of moderate scepticism toward all problems of purely theoretical interest; but he assumed an attitude of vigorous dogmatism in support of any view that lay at the basis, of good conduct, the good life of men, the health of the state. Within the limits of this paper, it is obviously impossible for me to give extended evidence for my belief that this was the philosophical view-point of Cicero.(2) But I hope to show that in De Fato he does take this position, postulating the unprovable doctrine of freedom on the ground of its indispensable value to morals." (pp. 32--3)

(1) De Officiis, iii. 20, et passim.

(2) In my dissertation, The Relation of Dogmatism and Scepticism in the Philosophical Treatises of Cicero (Columbia University, 1925), I have attempted to show by a study of all the dialogues, that Cicero consistently combines scepticism in purely theoretical discussions with certainty on matters that underlie morals.
Horsley, Richard A. 1978. "The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero." Harvard Theological Review no. 71:35–59.

"Philo is the first to use the Greek expression nomos tes phuseos frequently, but the same idea occurs earlier in Cicero. Both Philo and Cicero drew on a Stoic tradition, which was part of a broad movement of social-political philosophy. Antiochus of Ascalon, head of the Academy in the early first century B.C., was the key figure and the thinker upon whom Cicero and, probably, Philo depend. The Christian idea of natural law and the philosophical rationalization of Roman law derive from the transcendent conception of the law of nature."
Huby, Pamela M. 1970. "An Epicurean Argument in Cicero, "De Fato" XVII-40." Phronesis no. 15:83–85.

"The De Fato is an unsatisfactory work, not only because it has come down to us incomplete, but also because Cicero wrote it in a perfunctory way, at a time when he was again thinking of taking an active part in politics after the death of Julius Caesar. It is sometimes possible, however, to see what has gone wrong, and I believe this can be done at XVII-40, and that we have here an argu- ment used by Epicurus." (p. 83)
———. 1988. "Boethius vindicates Cicero as a logician." Liverpool Classical Monthly no. 13:60–61.
———. 1989. "Cicero's Topics and Its Peripatetic Sources." In Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos, edited by Fortenbaugh, William W. and Steinmetz, Peter, 61–76. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

"Eleven years earlier than the Topics, in the year 55, Cicero finished the De oratore, a comprehensive work on rhetoric. In it we find a list of topics (2.163-73) that is identical with that in the Topics, except for some slight variations of terminology and the use of different examples. This list, in fact, occurs in Cicero at least four times, and probably five times: once in the De oratore, three times in the Topics, and once in the Partitiones Oratoriae (7), a work of uncertain date whose authenticity has been questioned, and in which some think the presence of our list is due to later tampering. In the Topics there is an introductory section in which the topics are named in order with some examples (8-24), and then the list is repeated with considerable amplification. Thus in 17 there is a single argument from contraries, with a legal example, but at 47-9 there is a reference to various kinds (genera) of contraries, and the Greek words for negative terms, sterētika (rendered privantia) and apophatika (negantia) are introduced and explained. Finally the list is repeated with just the names of the topics, at 71.

This paper will be concerned mainly with the sources of this list, but it should be mentioned here that the second half of the Topics is concerned with classifying quaestiones and causae, building on the work of the rhetorician Hermagoras of Temnos who wrote in the middle of the second century B.C. In this section the examples are of a much more general and philosophical nature than those for topics, which appear to have been thought out carefully to suit Trebatius. lt is likely that here Cicero is using examples from his Greek sources. " (pp. 62-63, a note omitted)
Hunt, H. A. K. 1954. The Humanism of Cicero. Carlton, N.J., Victoria: Melbourne University Press.

"The purpose of this book is to offer an interpretation of Cicero’s series of main philosophic works from the Academica to the De Officiis. Such a study seems to be needed because no comprehensive survey is readily available. Although there are valuable editions of single works, in each of them the editor has been preoccupied with his task of explaining the argument of the particular work in hand, grappling with textual problems or debating the sources, and has not endeavoured to link the argument with other works. In fact there has been a prejudice against seeking a coherent plan in the series because of a view commonly accepted that Cicero’s purpose was merely to list the doctrines of the various schools on the several topics of philosophy. The result of this view has been that the works have been treated as if they lacked connection and might be read in any order. But by analysis such as is attempted in this book one may detect an orderly sequence in the series and a sustained argument. This does not mean that Cicero planned each step with lucidity and with nice appreciation of its bearing on the argument as a whole, for he admitted digressions and irrelevancies. But the broad development of the argument was coherent. Nor is the credit for this to be given to Cicero, for he was indebted to the Greeks, especially to the school of Antiochus of Ascalon. It was his investigation of Antiochus that suggested the order of topics to be treated and one of the tasks of the present work is to explain the significance in Cicero’s programme of problems raised by his study of Antiochus.

From the general course of the argument it is possible to reconstruct the system which Cicero himself upheld. This is important in the history of philosophy because he now wins the credit not only for those services always ascribed to him as the chief source of information about the Hellenistic schools and the main Roman systematizer of their doctrines, but also for achieving himself a form of humanism unsurpassed in the pagan world for its comprehensiveness and enlightenment and thus establishing a personal position in a branch of philosophy whose importance is increasing in the modern world. (Preface, p. VII)
Hunt, Terence J. 1998. A Textual History of Cicero's Academici Libri. Leiden: Brill.

"The last edition of Cicero's Academicus Primus based on the collation of manuscripts was that of Otto Plasberg; ninety years have now passed since the appearance of his editio maior and doubt has been cast on the quality of Plasberg's work. It has been suggested, for example, that 'one is not certain that Plasberg has said the last word on these matters', (1) and, in a wider context, ill-considered remarks have been made, such as 'all Cicero's philosophical works are preserved in Carolingian manuscripts',(2) which are well wide of the mark.

The purposes of this study are several: firstly, to re-examine the manuscript tradition of the Academicus Primus and to add flesh to the bones which Plasberg exhumed; secondly, to investigate several problems which have surrounded the work, such as the cause and occasion of its fragmentation, and to treat the text of the work as an object of historical research over two millennia.

In undertaking this study I was aware of the risk that I might merely confirm Plasberg's findings; but enough has come out of the study to justify the effort, and a clearer picture has emerged of the fortuna of the work, from Cicero's time down to the present day. In general terms, Plasberg's reputation as a careful scholar is vindicated, so far as he went: if only the detailed workings which lay behind his conclusions had been published, then doubts might never have arisen." Introduction, p. 1)

(1) [C.B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus, The Hague, 1972] 47 n. 17. Earlier, [J.S. Reid, ed. Academica, London, 1885] 46, concluded that 'any future examination of MSS is not likely to contribute much to the study of this portion of the work [i.e. the Academicus Primus]'.

(2) [AE. Douglas, 'Cicero the Philosopher', in T.A Dorey, Cicero, London, 1965, 135-170], 158.
Hunter, Graeme. 1994. "A Ciceronian Critique of Chrysippus." Apeiron.

"Cicero argues in de Fato VI that the Stoic Chrysippus is committed to an incoherent position insofar as he maintains both that divination is possible and that some future singular statements are contingently false. The argument by which the orator attempts to prove this point is, though valid, far from clear,(1) and I shall try to elucidate its logic." (p. 17)

(1) In his critical edition with commentary (Cicéron: Traité du destin Paris: 1950) A. Yon recognizes the obscurity of the argument and offers a paraphrase of it, to which I shall return.
Inwood, Brad. 1990. "Rhetorica Disputatio: The Strategy of De Finibus II." Apeiron no. 23:143–164.

"If Cicero, the avowed Academic who felt free to believe what seemed most probable, not being bound by any school's dogma, was unreasonably hostile to any school of Greek philosophy it was to the Epicureans." (p. 143)

(...)

"Perhaps the best note to dose on is this: Cicero's underlying concerns should be paramount, and when it comes to the Epicurean theory, the real stategy is clearly not the announced purpose of the entire work. For his public, itself raised on rhetoric and not on philosophy, he wished to do two things: to air the basic issues raised by Epicurean hedonism (and this he did, though not dispassionately and judiciously); and to kill its influence at Rome, if he possibly could, by showing that it was not in fact compatible with the traditional Roman attachment to prima facie moral virtue. The brief popularity of the school among traditional Roman aristocrats(31) suggests that the Epicurean claim to reconcile the two was of critical importance; by accepting this claim a Roman could be both an Epicurean and a traditionalist. Cicero's aim here, by attacking this philosophical claim rhetorically, is to make Romans choose between traditional values and Epicurus. If this is his strategy, it provides another reason, beyond mere politeness, for the general attitude to Epicureans which I mentioned at the beginning of my paper. Cicero's tendency is always to allow that as men Epicureans are sound enough, but only because they do not actually live up to their philosophy — a good strategy for encouraging them to choose between their moral values and their devotion to Epicurus, and a strategy which supports the argumentative thrust of de Finibus Ι-II. Whether the apparent rapid decline in the popularity of Epicurean philosophy among aristocrats at Rome has anything to do with Cicero's philosophical works is an interesting question, though one which crosses over from philosophy and rhetoric to social history and so lies beyond the range of both this paper and my own competence." (pp. 163-164)

(31) Such as Thorius and the others mentioned at II 70.
Inwood, Brad, and Mansfeld, Jaap, eds. 1997. Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books. Leiden: Brill.

Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum (Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995).

Contents: Ptrface VII; Introduction IX; M. Griffin: The composition of the Academica: motives and versions 1; W. Görler: Cicero's philosophical stance in the Lucullus 36; J. Glucker: Socrates in the Academic books and other Ciceronian works 58; T. Dorandi: Gli Academica quale fonte per Ia storia dell'Academia 89; K A. Algra: 'Chrysippus, Carneades, Cicero: the ethical divisiones in Cicero's Lucullus 107; J. Barnes: 'Logic in Academica I and the Lucullus 140; R. J. Hankinson: Natural criteria and the transparency of judgement: Antiochus, Philo and Galen on epistemological justification 161; J. Allen: Carneadean argument in Cicero's Academic books 217; G. Striker: Academics fighting Academics 257; M. F. Burnyeat: Antipater and self-refutation: elusive arguments in Cicero's Academica 277; Index nominum et rerum 311; Index locorum potiorum 316-326.
Johanson, Carmen, and Londey, David. 1988. "Cicero on Propositions: Academica II.95." Mnemosyne no. 41:325–342.

"This passage provokes a number of questions about the Latinisation of the Stoic logical term ἀξίωμα, and, in particular, about Cicero's use of effatum as the appropriate Latin term in the Academica, which is both the first of his philosophical works and the only one in which he uses effatum for ἀξίωμα." (p. 325)

(...)

"On our reading of illa definitio, as implying that the definition was pre-Ciceronian, it appears that the definitional strategy it embodies emerged quite early in the history of the Latinisation of ἀξίωμα; and the evidence from Gellius and Apuleius shows that it was a persistent feature of the Latin conceptualisation. This strategy of using being true or false to define the basic propositional concept marks a very important difference between the Roman thinkers about logic and their Greek predecessors, and demonstrates more clearly than anything else that the Latinisation of Greek thought involved rethinking rather than just word-substitution translation. While it is impossible to say exactly what motivated the Roman writers in this departure from the Greeks, it is not implausible to suppose that they saw it as making possible a clear distinction between apophantic and non-apophantic λεκτά i.e., between statemental and nonstatemental utterances. In any case, by taking this path they, like many other logicians in succeeding centuries, avoided difficulties in making that distinction, difficulties which beset not only the early Stoics but also all logicians since them who have eschewed the use of being true or false as a defining characteristic of propositions." (p. 342)
Johnson, William. 2012. "Cicero and Tyrannio. Mens addita videtur meis aedibus (Ad Atticum 4.8.2)." Classical World no. 12:471–477.

Abstract: "Scholar and teacher Tyrannio is known for his management of the Sullan library of Aristotle and for his reorganization of Cicero’s library in Antium. The investigation here examines the parallel between these activities with focus on the curious phrase that Cicero uses to describe Tyrannio’s achievement, mens addita videtur meis aedibus. Conclusions include: mens means to invoke Anaxagorean νοῦς; mens also alludes to the story that Plato used the nickname ὁ Νοῦς (“the Brain”) for Aristotle. This reading illuminates the badinage characteristic of Cicero’s letters to Atticus while also adding to our understanding of Tyrannio’s position within their social circle."
Kaimio, Jorma. 1976. Cicero's Topica: The Preface and Sources. Turun Ylipisto: Instituto Philologiae Classicae Universtatis Turkuensis.
Kapust, Daniel J. , and Remer, Gary, eds. 2021. The Ciceronian Tradition in Political Theory. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Contents: Preface VII; Daniel J. Kapust and Gary Remer: Introduction 3; 1 Brandon Turner: Augustine’s Reception of Cicero 17; 2 Cary J. Nederman: A Medieval Ciceronian: John of Salisbury 35; 3 Gary Remer: More’s Utopia and Its Ciceronian Roots 55; 4 Michelle T. Clarke: Machiavelli: Menace to Societas 86; 5 Eric MacPhail: Montaigne in the Mirror of Cicero 103; 6 Daniel J. Kapust: Thomas Hobbes, Cicero, and the Road not Taken 120; 7 Emily C. Nacol: Locke and Cicero on Property, Labor, and Value 140; 8 Michelle A. Schwarze: Smith and Cicero on Anger, Resentment, and Retributive Justice 160; 9 Daniel I. O’Neill: Burke, Cicero, and the Personalization of Imperial Injustice 178; 10 Dean Hammer: Cicero’s Legacy in Contemporary Political Thought 198; Contributors 225; Index 229-240.
Karamanolis, George. 2020. "The Primacy of Virtue. Versions of an Idea in De finibus V and Tusculunae Disputationes V." In Cicero Ethicus. Die Tusculanae disputationes im Vergleich mit De finibus bonorum et malorum, edited by Müller, Gernot Michael and Müller, Jörn, 149–172. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter.

"My paper consists of two main parts. In the first, I will briefly outline the argumentative structure of De finibus and Cicero’s dialectical discussion of the most important ethical theories of his contemporaries. By doing that, I aim to show that De finibus as a whole makes a coherent and systematic enquiry into the relation between virtue and happiness, reminiscent of the relevant Platonic dialogues (such as the Gorgias or the Euthydemus). The presentation and critical discussion of the Epicurean, Stoic, and the Antiochean/Peripatetic positions is part of that enquiry, which ends without a conclusion on the question of whether virtue alone is sufficient for happiness or not. In the second part of my paper, I will focus specifically on Tusculanae 5, where Cicero, as he himself admits, returns to the question of the sufficiency of virtue that he examined in De finibus, and proceeds to defend the position of the self-sufficiency of virtue, arguing that this was Socrates’ position.

I will try to explain which position Cicero specifically has in mind and why he finds it philosophically preferable to those of the other schools, such as, for instance, that of the Peripatetics and Antiochus." (p. 150)
Kleywegt, A. J. 1973. "Fate, Free Will, and the Text of Cicero." Mnemosyne no. 26:342–349.

"In his excellent edition of Cicero's De Fato (Munich 1963) Karl Bayer qualifies § 44 as "the most difficult passage of the whole work" (p. 161). Many, if not most, readers will agree with this statement, even without fully accepting the solutions proposed by Bayer or one of his predecessors. There has indeed always been considerable uncertainty about the text, and this is reflected in widely divergent opinions on its meaning." (p. 342)

(...)

"Thus we get the concession of Chrysippus : maintaining that fate does play a part when people make decisions, he takes 'fate' as equivalent to 'causality', but not to 'necessity', in this way leaving scope for human freedom of will; on the other hand, his opponents are supposed to be willing to accept the notion of 'fate', provided it means nothing more than 'causality'. This interpretation of both views naturally leads to the conclusion that both sides will come to materially the same result, differing only in the words they choose to express themselves. The last words verbis eos, non re dissidere point back to the first sentence, non re dissidere echoing idem dicant, while verbis dissidere is the exact counterpart of alia oratio, which thus receives additional support. If this reading and this interpretation of the second sentence are accepted, the passage runs smoothly and no longer presents any difficulty." (p. 349)
Kries, Douglas. 2003. "On the Intention of Cicero's De Officis." The Review of Politics no. 65:375–393.

Abstract: "Recent scholarship has yielded a great deal of information on Cicero's De officiis; this essay, however, seeks to move beyond information about the work in favor of an interpretation of Cicero's intention in writing it. To this end, the essay analyzes the genre and intended audience of De officiis, the allegedly Stoic teaching contained in it, and the puzzle presented by its crucial third book. The understanding of Cicero's intention that emerges from these investigations is then briefly compared with Cicero's teaching in De finibus.

The essay ultimately claims that De officiis should be interpreted as advocating a sort of Stoicism for the unphilosophical even while urging the views of the Peripatetics on the more sophisticated."
Krostenko, Brian A. 2000. "Beyond (Dis)belief: Rhetorical Form and Religious Symbol in Cicero's de Divinatione." Transactions of the American Philological Association no. 130:353–391.

"This article, which draws especially upon Linderski (1982) and Schofield, aims to expound an interpretation that joins the idea, developed in more recent work, that the second book is not an unproblematic account of Cicero's own views on divination, to the conviction, commoner to older scholarship, that the contemporary state of the politico-religious system was important to the work's conception. I will suggest that de Divinatione is not quite, or not merely, a discussion of the question of divination, but is an indirect and dialectical attempt to construct a normative definition for religious symbols in Roman culture, among which divinatory practices, in the form of augury and extispicine, were especially prominent. De Divinatione illustrates the inadequacies, for the purposes of Roman social practice, of both the fideistic and the skeptical approach to such symbols; but, having illustrated these inadequacies, the text also points dialectically in the direction of a tertium quid that avoids the pitfalls of both positions." (p. 354)

References

Linderski, J. 1982. "Cicero and Roman Divination." La Parola del Passato 12-38.

Schofield, M. 1986. "Cicero For and Against Divination." The Journal of Roman Studies 76: 47-65.
Lacey, W. K. 1978. Cicero and the End of Roman Republic. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

"Cicero’s biographers must begin with Cicero himself. How much of his testimony they believe, and which parts, will make them produce differing interpretations, but Cicero must himself always be consulted first about what he thought of the situation in the Roman res publica — a term which for convenience (but not for accuracy) is translated ‘Republic’.

Naturally, Cicero was not always right in his diagnosis of what went wrong with the Republic, but we shall not be right either unless we bear several things in mind.

(...)

"An account of some recent books on Cicero and his times is in the bibliography. In this biography I have tried to illustrate Cicero’s importance for the intellectual heritage of Rome as well as his place within the politics and society of his life-time.

Other Romans, maybe, were more -heroic, others reflected more fully the aims and aspirations of Rome’s governing class, but Cicero was, and has always been, the most eloquent spokesman for those who believe that politics is the business of persuasion and the ballot-box, and not of coercion." (pp. V-VI)
Langlands, Rebecca. 2011. "Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero de Officiis." Journal of Roman Studies no. 101:100–122.

Abstract: "When reading exempla and applying them to ethical decisions, Romans had to bear in mind the principle of situational variability: whether an action can be judged to be right depends on the circumstances in which it is performed; what is right for one person in a given situation may not be right for another. This principle and its ramifications are articulated by Valerius Maximus, Facta et Dicta Memorabilia. Comparison with Cicero, de Officiis suggests that situation ethics was a key feature of Roman ethics and that, within this framework, exempla may be understood as moral tools mediating between universal and particular."
———. 2023. "Seeming, Being and Exempla in Cicero’s De officiis 3." In Cicero: De officiis, edited by Brüllmann, Philipp and Müller, Jörn, 179–195. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"A question that runs through De officiis is what to do when (apparent) virtue seems to clash with (apparent) benefit, in a Stoic context that regards nothing as truly beneficial that is not good. This was a topic that Panaetius mentioned but did not in the end discuss, and Cicero takes up the question in De officiis 3.(1) I will argue that right at the heart of this ethical challenge is the issue of “seeming” and its relationship to “being”, closely related to Cicero’s academic scepticism,(2) and that exempla play a central role in negotiating this challenge.

In the second half of book 3 Cicero focuses on the importance of distinguishing between something that seems to be beneficial and something that genuinely is beneficial. De officiis establishes that the wisdom to which the Stoic learner aspires is constituted precisely by the ability to perceive the distinction between real and apparent benefit, as well as the ability to distinguish between good and evil. In book 2 Cicero asserts that wisdom depends on “perceiving what is true and clear in each case” (2.18) and in book 3 the function of practical wisdom (prudentia) is to distinguish between good and evil (3.71).³" (p. 179)

(1) Spelled out at e. g. 3.7.

(2) 2.7–8; see further the contribution to this volume by Georgia Tsouni.

(3) Translations of De officiis are from Griffin and Atkins [On Duties, Cambridge] 1991.
Leeman, Anton Daniel. 1963. Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators Historians and Philosophers. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

Contents: Chapter IV: Cicero and Asianism. Sources of Cicero’s oratorical conceptions—Hortensius—Cicero’s early career (iuvenilis redundantia, Pro Roscio Amerino)—Travel to Greece and Asia Minor—Development after return: In Caecilium, Verrinae, Pro lege Manilia, Pro Rabirio—Summary p. 91;

Chapter V: Cicero’s oratorical theory. Cicero and the De oratore; attitude towards the Greeks; the ‘philosophic’ orator in book I—Book II: inventio, ordo (partes orationis, the principium), memoria—Book Ill: elocutio, virtutes dicendi (Latinitas, explanatio, ornatus); philosophy and rhetoric —Ornatus in general; ornatus ex singulis verbis; the tropes (the metaphor in Aristotle, the Auctor ad Herennium, Quintilian and Cicero), the figures of speech and Cicero’s practice—Rhetoric and oratory p. 112;

Chapter VI: Cicero and the Atticists. Contemporaries and pupils (Crassus; Hirtius, Pansa, Dolabella, Caelius)—-Attitude of the younger generation (Catullus; Calvus, Brutus)—Atticism, polemic against Cicero—Cicero’s answer: the Brutus; the Orator (tripertita varietas of genera dicendi; Varro; compositio, prose rhythm: its nature and use; the period and its subdivisions; the clausula)—Other forms of Atticism; Calidius, Caesar, Sulpicius Rufus; novum genus Thucydidiorum: Pollio, Cimber, Sallust (Epist. ad Caes.)—Cicero versus Atticists and the verdict of Quintilian p. 136;

Chapter VII: Historiography in the late Republic. Cicero’s plans - Cicero’s theories: De legibus (opus oratorium), De oratore, letter to Lucceius—Caesar’s Commentarii—Atticus, Varro, Nepos. Sallust: Thucydideanism, Catonisms, poeticisms, Grecisms; conception of historiography (the prologues)—Asinius Pollio: Atticism, judgment of Cicero—Livy: judgment of Cicero and Sallust; aemulus Herodoti, poeticisms; candor, attitude towards Rome (prologue, Patavinitas)p. 168;

Chapter VIII: Philosophy in the Republic. Honos alit artes (Tusc. Disp. I prol.)—Philosophy introduced: Epicureans, Stoics, Academy and Peripatos; Cicero’s ideals (aemulus Platonis)—Stylistic aspects of philosophical terminology and syntactical expression—Cicero’s philosophica—Brutus—Varro (Saturae Menippeae, Logistorici) p. 198-216.

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